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FOREWORD
New England is the birthplace of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Here 
the Corps’ military mission began at the outbreak of the American Revolu­
tion in 1775. Here, too, civil works projects were among the first to be 
undertaken by Army Engineers when Congress and the President entrusted 
the Corps with its civil mission in 1824. This is the story of the Corps’ serv­
ice and accomplishments in New England from the Battle of Bunker Hill to 
the present. Relating the activities of the Corps to broader regional and na­
tional developments, the book should appeal to a general audience as well as 
to specialists.
I commend Dr. Aubrey Parkman and the many members of the New Eng­
land Division who assisted him for compiling a history in which the division 
can take pride.
JOHN P. CHANDLER 
Colonel, CE 
Division Engineer
PREFACE
The boundaries of the regional divisions and districts of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers coincide generally with watersheds. The New England 
Division includes fifteen river basins and nine coastal areas that lie wholly or 
largely within the six New England states. It covers all of New England except 
western Vermont and small portions of w estern M assachusetts and C onnect­
icut, which lie in drainage basins of the St. Lawrence and Hudson rivers. It 
also em braces small areas of southeastern New York that drain through the 
state of Connecticut, and Fishers Island, New York, located close off the 
Connecticut shore. This is the region, expanded on a few occasions to include 
military work perform ed in Long Island Sound and w estern Vermont, treated in 
this volume. The story of the C orps’ work in New England, however, cannot be 
told as the history of an engineer division. It begins with the birth of the nation, 
and the New England Division was not created until 1942. N or can it be 
recounted as the history of engineer districts. Districts were established in New 
England after the Civil War, but Army Engineers were active in the region long 
before then. And in 1946 New England districts were phased out and their 
functions assum ed by the New England Division. This, then, is a history of 
“ Army Engineers in New England.”
In writing it, my objective has been to relate the work of the Corps in New 
England to larger regional and national events: to tell not only what hap­
pened but why it happened. Therefore I have examined not only the con­
struction of military installations, the improvement of waterways, and the 
assumption of flood control and other more recent civil responsibilities, but 
also the factors that lay behind these undertakings, such as the early shortage of 
civil engineers in America, domestic and international political considerations, 
developments in military and naval weaponry, national economic growth, and 
changing public dem ands relating to the use and management of the nation’s 
water resources. In narrating the early activities of Army Engineers in New 
England considerable emphasis could also be placed on specific individuals 
who supervised the construction of fortifications, carried out canal and railroad 
surveys, and improved river and harbor navigation. They were relatively few 
and the projects of the Corps com paratively limited. Since the Civil War, 
however, the Corps’ work in New England has been directed by more than one 
hundred district engineers and over forty N ortheast, N orth Atlantic, and New 
England division engineers. Corps personnel, mostly civilians, who turned 
concepts into plans and plans into countless projects, have numbered several 
thousand. Only a few are mentioned by name. This is nevertheless the history 
of them all—engineers and adm inistrators, clerks and secretaries, specialists in 
real estate, law, and many other fields of expertise. They all played a part in the 
Corps’ contributions to New England.
XI am deeply indebted to all the present and past members of the New 
England Division who assisted in preparing this history. It would more than 
fill this page merely to list the people who gave generously of their time and 
knowledge in searching out materials scattered through the files of numerous 
offices, provided information from long association with the Corps, and of­
fered helpful suggestions. Special thanks are due to W alter F. M ackie, Chief, 
Public Affairs Office, who provided guidance and help all along the way, to 
Susan Douglas, Public Affairs Specialist, who greatly assisted with typing and in 
securing photographs and other m aterials, and to W alter Avallone, Graphic 
Arts, who skilfully prepared the illustrations. I thank Jesse Remington, Lenore 
Fine, and Albert E. Cowdrey of the Historical Division, Office of the Chief of 
Engineers, for their aid and advice. I also thank Gerald Butler; W ilbarM . Hoxie; 
William Smith, Jr.; the National Archives; the U .S. Army Engineer Museum, 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and the U .S. Military Academy Archives, West Point, 
New York, for permission to use photographs from their collections.
Reading, M assachusetts
Aubrey Parkman
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NARROW REDOUBTS AND GRANITE CASEMATES
Seven days after the first shots of the American Revolution were fired at 
Lexington on April 19, 1775, the Provincial Congress of M assachusetts, 
meeting in the village of W atertown, appointed Colonel Richard Gridley 
“ chief engineer of the forces now raising in this colony, for the defense of 
the rights and liberties of the American continent.” 1 Defiant delegates from 
the M assachusetts towns had taken the first step toward creating what was 
to become the United States Army Corps of Engineers.
A pensioned officer of the British army and one of few Americans with 
military engineering experience, Richard Gridley had learned his skills in 
England’s colonial contests with France. Working in Boston in his early 
years as a surveyor and civil engineer, he became the friend of John Henry 
Bastide, a young British officer who was to become Director of His Majes­
ty’s Engineers and Chief Engineer of Nova Scotia. Bastide was engaged in 
drawing plans for fortifications at Boston, M arblehead, Cape Ann, and 
Casco Bay, and under his tutelage Gridley learned the elements of military 
engineering and gunnery.
Gridley’s first military action came during King George’s War, the Ameri­
can offshoot of the European W ar of Austrian Succession, when in 1745 he 
joined the audacious crow d of New England farm ers, m echanics, and 
fishermen, led by Colonel William Pepperill, who dared to attack the great 
fortress of Louisburg on Cape B reton Island guarding the en trance to 
France’s North American empire. Commissioned a lieutenant colonel and 
captain of the artillery train, and later made the chief bombadier of the 
expedition, he planted around the stronghold’s m am m oth ram parts the 
batteries that compelled its surrender. Some years later G overnor William 
Shirley of M assachusetts, who had dispatched the expedition, commented that 
Gridley, and Bastide who had joined him during the seige, were the only 
engineers at Louisburg of any real service.2
Returning to Boston, Gridley was awarded a captaincy in Governor Shir­
ley’s regiment and ordered to ready defenses against a large French fleet, 
commanded by the Due d ’Anville, sent to burn the upstart M assachusetts 
town and retake Louisburg. Castle William, the island fortress lying in Bos­
ton’s inner harbor, was strengthened, and cannon were planted on other 
islands in the harbor; hulls were sunk in the channel, and a boom was laid 
across it under the guns of the Castle. These preparations, taking several 
months, were never tested. Scourged by pestilence and struck by storm, the 
French armada was scattered off the American coast, with the admiral one 
of the victim s.3
King George’s W ar came to an inconclusive end in 1748. Louisburg, to the 
disgust of New Englanders, was returned to France in an exchange of all 
conquests. With nothing settled, French and British rivalries in America 
continued to simmer until the outbreak of the French and Indian War in 
1754. Returning to active service, Gridley joined another expedition or­
ganized by Governor Shirley, this time up the Kennebec River of Maine to
1
2forestall a French thrust from Quebec along the River Chaudiere. At por­
tages on the Kennebec near present-day Augusta and Winslow, he built Fort 
W estern and Fort Halifax, each a typical frontier defense of pickets enclos­
ing wooden blockhouses and barracks.
Fort Halifax, 1775.
Reprinted from Henry E. Dunnack, Maine Forts (Augusta, Maine, 1924).
The next year, because he “ understood the artillery,” Gridley was com ­
missioned the colonel of a M assachusetts regiment raised to take part in Sir 
William Johnson’s expedition to seize Fort Crown Point, the key French 
citadel on the classic Lake Champlain invasion route linking the French and 
British domains. Part of a larger unsuccessful campaign against Canada, the 
expedition failed to take the French fort. It did succeed, however, in throw­
ing English barriers across the invasion route below it. Johnson built Fort 
William Henry at the foot of Lake George, while Gridley completed and 
took command of Fort Edward, a strong timber and earth structure on the 
Hudson River portage. “ If all the Officers of his Rank in this Army were 
equal to him ,” Johnson wrote of Gridley at this time, “ I should have thought 
myself verry happy in my Station and have flattered myself with Prospects 
equivalent to the hopes and expectations of the G overm ents.” 4
Few things, however, went right for the English in the first years of the 
war; and in 1757 Fort William Henry fell to the army of the Marquis de 
Montcalm, though Fort Edward withstood his assault. Gridley, meantime, 
had formed a train of artillery for an expedition against Louisburg that never 
got beyond Halifax. The next year, following a shake-up of the British high
3command and revision of war strategy by William Pitt, the tide turned. 
Another expedition, this time of British regulars commanded by Generals 
Amherst and Wolfe, set out against Louisburg, and the fortress again fell to 
the English. Gridley again took part in the seige, supervising the expedition’s 
carpenters and army stores. The campaign over, Amherst prevailed upon 
him, on orders from Pitt, to stay with the King’s troops rather than rejoin a 
Massachusetts regiment. Remaining at Louisburg until the next year, he was 
given command of the provincial artillery that sailed with Wolfe against 
Quebec. He took part in W olfe’s daring nighttime scaling of the three- 
hundred-foot rock walls behind the towering fortress-city, and it was his 
corps that dragged up the only two British fieldpieces to reach the Plains of 
Abraham. Loaded with grapeshot, they did deadly work on the troops of 
Montcalm. For his services in the war, England conferred upon Gridley the 
Magdalen Isles in the Gulf of St. Law rence, with an extensive seal and cod 
fishery, and half-pay as a British officer for life. In 1773 the governor of New 
Hampshire granted him three thousand acres of land that now lies in the 
town of Jackson.5
Gridley was a seasoned artilleryman, and since experienced gunners were 
about as scarce as engineers when the Revolution began, the M assachusetts 
Provincial Congress also commissioned him colonel of an artillery regiment 
with the rank of major general. His second-in-command was Lieutenant 
Colonel William Burbeck. In command of Castle William when the fighting 
started, Burbeck had deserted the British army to throw in his lot with his 
countrymen and had been appointed an engineer by the M assachusetts legis­
lature on the same day as Gridley. Among the junior officers of the regiment 
was Burbeck’s son, Lieutenant Henry Burbeck, who tw enty-three years 
later became the Army’s fifth Chief Engineer. The artillery train, however, 
was slow in forming. Cannon were hardly more plentiful than cannoneers, 
and for some time the regiment’s total armament was only a half-dozen small 
iron and two brass fieldpieces.e
Gridley spent most of his time planning field fortifications for the New 
England militiamen who streamed in from the surrounding provinces, trap­
ping the British army in Boston. The British were not strong enough to move 
out and crush the provincials, but their own position could be made virtually 
impregnable by occupying Dorchester and Charlestown peninsulas. Pointing 
like fingers at either side of Boston peninsula, both possessed heights from 
which an enemy could dominate the town and harbor. Learning through 
loose talk in Boston of the British plans to garrison these positions, the M as­
sachusetts Committee of Safety recommended counterm easures, including 
the immediate occupation of Bunker Hill in Charlestown. Accordingly, on 
the evening of June 16, 1775 a detachm ent of about a thousand men, accom ­
panied by Gridley, traversed the narrow isthmus of the peninsula and moved 
up the slopes of Bunker Hill. What followed is clouded by ambiguities in 
contemporary accounts. Apparently Gridley wanted to follow original plans 
and fortify Bunker Hill, which commanded all approaches to the peninsula 
by water or land, but General Israel Putnam, a legendary old warrior from 
Connecticut whose urge to fight was always stronger than his propensity to 
plan, insisted on putting breastw orks on Breed’s Hill, a lower elevation 
nearer and more threatening to Boston. As the field officers argued, the
4cover of darkness slipped by, until finally Gridley rem onstrated that he had 
to work somewhere and wanted a decision. Breed’s Hill was chosen, Gridley 
marked out the lines of a redoubt, and about midnight the digging began.
By eleven o ’clock the next morning earthen ram parts six to seven feet 
high formed a redoubt about 130 feet square. On one side a breastw ork and 
then a reinforced stone and rail fence ran about 300 yards north to the M ys­
tic River. On the other side, toward Charlestown, another fence and the 
houses of the town served as protection. To occupy Breed’s Hill without 
first fortifying Bunker Hill, however, was a blunder. Its wide and gentle 
flanks were difficult to cover, and it could be cut off from the rear. But 
blundering was no American monopoly. The British, covered by guns of 
their ships, could have seized Charlestown N eck and isolated the American 
force. Instead, attacking that afternoon, they assaulted the American posi­
tions frontally. They took the hill on a third charge, when the patriots ran 
out of powder, but at a cost in casualties greater than any other engagement 
of the war. Gridley manned one of the brass fieldpieces of his artillery regi­
ment, and near the close of the battle was struck in the leg by a musket-ball. 
Helped into a sulky to be carried off, he met with some obstruction and had 
ju st gotten out of the carriage when it was riddled by enemy shot and his 
horse was killed.7
Meantime, at Philadelphia, another event of importance to Gridley had 
taken place on June 16. The Second Continental Congress, functioning as an 
American government of sorts, had authorized a “ chief engineer” for the 
“ grand arm y” it had two days before resolved to raise.8 Two and a half 
weeks later, when General Washington took command of the Continental 
Army at Cambridge, his choice was obvious. Gridley was already serving in 
that position by courtesy of the other New England provinces.
Not much bothered by what had been only a flesh wound, Gridley was by 
then back at work on fortifications. Strong redoubts and lines, Washington 
recorded shortly after arriving in Cambridge, formed “ a complete line of 
circumvallation from Charles River to Mystic R iver.” Helping Gridley were 
several younger officers, the most notable of whom was Henry Knox, des­
tined to become the new nation’s first Secretary of War. “ On the Roxbury 
side,” W ashington also recorded, referring to south of the Charles River, 
“ the enemy have dug across the Neck, and let the water through; and our 
people in turn have intrenched across the outer end of the Neck, and are 
strongly fortified there, and on the hill by the m eeting-house.” Here the 
redoubts were the work of Lieutenant Colonel Rufus Putnam , later famous 
in the history of western settlem ent as the leader of the M arietta pioneers. A 
veteran of three campaigns on the Champlain frontier during the French and 
Indian War, Putnam had enlisted at the outbreak of the Revolution in a M as­
sachusetts regiment that took up station at Roxbury. Defensive works were 
needed, and since Gridley was occupied in Cambridge, Putnam was pressed 
into service when acquaintances m entioned that in the late w ar he had 
worked on fortifications under British engineers. N ever having read a word 
on the subject, and claiming no knowledge of laying out works, Putnam 
nevertheless raised defenses at Roxbury, Dorchester, and Brookline as stout 
as those to the north .9
“ The lines of both are im pregnable,” recorded an enthusiastic visitor to
5Colonel Rufus Putnam.
Courtesy of the U. S. Army Engineer Museum, 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
the camps at Roxbury and Cambridge in October, “ with forts (many of 
which are bomb-proof) and redoubts, supposing them to be all in a direction, 
are about twenty miles; the breastworks of a proper height, and in many 
places seventeen feet in thickness; the trenches wide and deep in proportion, 
before which lay forked impediments; and many of the forts, in every re­
spect, are perfectly ready for battle. The whole, in a word, the admiration of 
every spectator; for verily their fortifications appear to be the works of 
seven years instead of about as many m onths.” 10 
Since August, Washington had been edging these fortifications nearer to 
the British in Boston and Charlestown. F irst he placed a redoubt on Plowed 
Hill, a low drumlin within point-blank shot of British-occupied Bunker Hill. 
Next he put a work, laid out by Putnam, on Cobble Hill, an elevation over­
looking the Back Bay separating Cambridge from Boston. Then he located a 
strong redoubt, finished near the end of February, on Lechmere Point, di­
rectly across the Back Bay from the north end of Boston. Now the Com­
mander in Chief was ready for his final move. Powder and shot had been 
gathered in increasing quantities, and fifty-nine large-caliber cannon and 
mortars, captured by Ethan Allen from the British at Fort Ticonderoga and 
hauled across New England on sleds by Henry Knox, were at hand. W ash­
6ington’s plan was to occupy Dorchester Heights, which the British had in­
explicably still failed to garrison, command Boston and the harbor with his 
cannon, and force the British to take action or leave.11
The problem  was how to make a lodgement in the frozen ground. It had 
taken three months to complete the earthworks at Lechm ere Point, yet D or­
chester Heights had to be fortified in a single night, for once the British 
discovered the attem pt they would never allow the works to be finished. 
Inviting Rufus Putnam, who had recently returned from laying out works at 
Newport, Rhode Island, to dine one evening at H eadquarters, Washington 
directed him to turn his mind to the matter. On his way home, Putnam called 
on General William Heath to pay his respects. On H eath’s table he noticed a 
copy of Mullers Field Engineer, and after some difficulty he persuaded the 
general to lend it to him. Thumbing through it—the first engineering manual 
he had ever read—he came upon a description of chandeliers, which inspired 
the plan of fortification he submitted to W ashington and Gridley the next 
day. His schem e was to use chandeliers—heavy pre-assem bled tim ber 
frames—between which could be stuffed bales of hay, bundles of sticks, and 
b a sk e ts  o f  e a rth . R aised  o v e rn ig h t, th ese  p a ra p e ts  co u ld  la te r  be 
strengthened with earth. In front of them  would be a line of felled trees with 
sharpened branches facing the enemy, the equivalent of a modern barbed 
wire entanglement. Stacked outside this barrier would be barrels filled with 
earth. Lending the works an appearance of greater strength, they could be 
rolled down on attackers to break their ranks and hopefully their bones.
On the night of M arch 4, 1776, while the attention of the British was dis­
tracted by cannonading from Cobble Hill, Lechmere Point, and Roxbury, a 
force of two thousand men with 360 oxcarts loaded with entrenching m ate­
rials moved onto D orchester Heights. Their passage was screened from eyes 
in Boston by bundles of hay placed along the north side of Dorchester Neck, 
across which the carts went back and forth until dawn. More than three 
thousand fresh troops were brought up during the night, and by daylight two 
formidable redoubts looked down on the British. “ The rebels have done 
more in one night than my whole army could have done in a m onth,” an 
astonished General Howe is said to have exclaimed. “ It must have been the 
employment of at least twelve thousand m en,” he wrote to Lord Dartmouth, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies. Had Howe tried to take the Heights, 
W ashington was ready with boats and troops to make a general assault on 
Boston. Exposed to the American batteries and not strong enough to force 
the American lines, the British army and fleet departed on M arch 17 for 
Halifax, Nova Scotia.12
The plan for fortifying the Heights was Putnam ’s, but Gridley, as Chief 
Engineer, had directed the work. It was his last exciting achievem ent. 
Sixty-five years made a man old in that day, and Gridley was slowing down. 
The previous Septem ber the congress at Philadelphia had placed him in 
command of Continental artillery, but two months later had felt compelled to 
replace him with Henry Knox. In April, when Washington moved the bulk 
of his army southward in anticipation of a British attack on New York City, 
Gridley stayed behind. He constructed coastal fortifications in and around 
Boston in case the British should return, and he manufactured m ortars and 
howitzers, the first to be cast in this country, at a furnace in Sharon where
7he and a partner had begun smelting iron ore a few years before. He con­
tinued as Engineer General in New England until he retired from service on 
January 1, 1781. Gridley had contributed much to the patriot cause, yet two 
years later he was to suffer a rude blow. When the return of peace was 
celebrated in the Old South Church of Boston, he was not invited to partici­
pate. Inquiring from a friend as to the reason, he received the reluctant reply: 
“ Because, General, you are not considered by those having that m atter in 
charge a Christian.” Gridley had become a U niversalist.13
The military career of William Burbeck also ended on a plaintive note. 
Ordered to New York when W ashington moved his army south, the old sol­
dier refused to go. He was unwilling to leave the service of M assachusetts, 
he explained. It had voted him a salary for life, which at his advanced age he 
did not wish to give up. He asked to be excused from complying with the 
order. When General W ashington apprised Congress of the matter, Burbeck 
was dismissed from Continental service.14
Washington’s choice for chief engineer with his field army at New York 
was Rufus Putnam; and it was this M assachusetts soldier who laid out the 
fortifications around the city in W ashington’s unsuccessful attem pt to hold it 
against British forces returning under General Howe. Putnam, however, had 
never been commissioned an engineer, and he was at this time in line for 
promotion to colonel of a regiment. W ashington, dismayed by the prospect 
of losing his services, appealed to Congress to retain him. “ The Public 
would sustain a capital injury,” the general warned, “ for although he is not a 
man of Scientific Knowledge, he is indefatigable in business and possesses 
more practical knowledge in the Art of engineering than any other we have 
in this Camp or A rm y.” Several weeks later, on August 5, 1776, Congress 
promoted Putnam to full colonel and appointed him Chief Engineer of the 
Continental Army. But Putnam held this office for only a few months. En­
gineers were being commissioned and attached to army units by Congress in 
haphazard fashion whenever men with alleged credentials presented them ­
selves. French adventurers for the most part, few had any real engineering 
ability that Washington could see. Putnam wanted Congress to create a spe­
cially trained engineer corps of officers and men, and when it failed to act on 
a plan he submitted through General W ashington, he resigned in December 
to take command of a regiment of M assachusetts infantry.
Putnam’s engineering talents, however, were to valuable to  be wasted, 
and in March 1778, after campaigning against Burgoyne on the line of the 
Hudson, he was ordered with his regiment to W est Point. While still with 
Washington at New York, he and several other officers had been ordered to 
inspect fortifications being built in the Highlands of the Hudson Valley, and 
his board had recom m ended defenses at West Point. A high wedge of bank 
forcing the river to bend sharply, the point was the key to the command of 
the valley. There redoubts were built by New York forces under the direc­
tion of a Dutch engineer, but the job  was poorly done. In O ctober 1777, 
when General Clinton’s army advanced up the Hudson to join with Bur­
goyne coming down from Canada in a move to isolate New England, the 
British had no difficulty in capturing the fortifications and destroying them in 
two days. Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga a few days later compelled Clin­
ton’s forces to withdraw to New York City. But since the British might push
8up the Hudson again, W ashington ordered the construction of new fortifica­
tions, and a French engineer was sent to direct the work. But Lieutenant 
Colonel de La Radiere’s plans were faulty, and quarrels over them with his 
superiors soon led to his departure. The task was now given to Putnam and 
to Colonel Thaddeus Kosciusko, the skillful Polish engineer with the army of 
General Gates. Together they laid out a stout chain of defenses. One fort, 
built by Putnam ’s regim ent on a high rock commanding the point, was 
named for him. It still stands, now restored at the United States Military 
A cadem y.15
If Congress moved to  create an efficient body of engineers with less haste 
than Putnam  felt was urgent, it nevertheless by several acts lumbered 
piecemeal toward his proposal until finally, in M arch 1779, it authorized a 
separate and distinct “ corps of engineers.”  Commanded by Louis LeBegue 
Du Portail, an officer recruited by the Am erican diplomatic mission in 
France, and largely staffed by other volunteers from the French Royal Corps 
of Engineers, the corps was a vital unit of the Continental Army until it was 
disbanded in N ovem ber 1783 with the coming of peace.16
Engineers in the minuscule army maintained after the Revolution would 
perhaps have been a luxury, but only for the brief span of a decade. War 
broke out again between England and France in 1793, and the situation im­
mediately became ominous as each belligerent tactlessly tried to whip the 
young republic into serving its ends. Fearing that a showdown might come, 
President W ashington urged putting the coast in a condition of defense, and 
in M arch 1794 Congress authorized him to fortify specified ports and harbors 
along the coast. To begin construction of this “ First System ” of fortifica­
tions, W ashington turned tem porarily to the only engineers available— 
French emigres residing in the United States, some of whom had served in 
the Continental Army. The coast was divided into sections, with New Eng­
land assigned to Stephen Rochefontaine. A former captain in the Corps of 
Engineers, Rochefontaine had been brevetted a major by Congress for dis­
tinguished service at the siege of Yorktown. Returning to France at the end 
of the Am erican Revolution, he had escaped back to Am erica upon the 
execution of his king in 1793. Two months after providing for the new fortifi­
cations, Congress authorized a new army unit, the Corps of Artillerists and 
Engineers, to build and man them. Upon organizing the corps in February 
1795, W ashington placed Rochefontaine in command. In this capacity the 
French lieutenant colonel continued to supervise the construction of fortifi­
cations in New England until his retirem ent from the army in 1798.17
Rochefontaine’s authority was narrowly circumscribed. Because appro­
priations were small, he was expected to adhere to estim ates of the War 
Departm ent relating to the cost of each fort and to its weapons and construc­
tion. He was instructed to submit his plans to the state governors and to take 
their orders. And he had limited control of his subordinates. The state gov­
ernors appointed the superintendents in immediate charge of construction, 
and the Treasury Departm ent appointed the agents who supplied materials 
and labor.18
By January 1796 local contractors had nearly finished erecting defenses at 
Portland, Portsm outh, Salem, M arblehead, G loucester, and on either side of 
New London H arbor. Although Rochefontaine occupied good positions,
9mostly sites of earlier works, his forts were more in keeping with the views 
of Congress and the state of the treasury than with his own ideas of proper 
fortifications. Expenditures to date for all forts in New England totaled only 
about $30,000, and for all forts in the country only $132,000. His forts were 
small redoubts of stone and sod, mounting only ten to fourteen guns— 
skimpy armament for a time when cannon were pointed rather than aimed. 
These weapons were cast iron, smoothbore muzzle-loaders, the service guns 
used to the Civil War. They ranged in caliber, which was expressed in terms 
of the weight of the spherical shot they fired, mostly from 6 to 24 pounders, 
though a few were 32 and 42 pounders. Single stone or brick blockhouses, 
sheltering magazines and serving as barracks, covered the landward sides of 
the forts. Most were equipped with reverberatory furnaces for heating red 
hot the iron balls hurled at flammable wooden and canvas ships.
The town of Newport, Rhode Island, commanding the entrance to Nar- 
ragansett Bay, demanded stronger fortifications. The bay—the only one on 
the coast that vessels could enter with a northwest wind—was the best naval 
refuge in the United States, and N ew port’s strategic im portance had been 
demonstrated by its successive occupation during the Revolution by the 
Americans, the English, and the French. An enemy seizing it could menace 
the whole northern region with his ships and troops. On Goat Island, which 
lies in the center of Newport H arbor, Rochefontaine built Fort W olcott, a 
masonry and earth redoubt of cross-moline form accommodating twelve 
guns. To protect the town from assault by land he built a blockhouse on 
nearby Tomony Hill, and to keep open communication with the mainland he 
placed a battery at Howlands F erry .19
These defenses, which were totally inadequate to N ew port’s strategic 
needs, were strengthened between 1798 and 1800 under the spur of an un­
declared two-year naval war with France brought on by French marauding on 
the sea. The engineer in charge was Lieutenant Colonel Louis Tousard. 
Another French veteran of the Continental Army, Tousard had come to 
America early in 1777, serving as an aide to Lafayette. Because of gallantry 
in action the next year on Rhode Island, where he lost an arm, Congress 
brevetted him a lieutenant colonel and awarded him a pension for life. Re­
turning to the military service of France, he was later swept up in its revolu­
tionary turm oil and im prisoned in 1792. A fter several m onths he was 
released through the intercession of the American minister at Paris. Joining 
his family which had fled to the United States, he was commissioned a major 
in the Corps of Artillerists and Engineers when it was organized in 1795.20
On Brenton’s Point, which protects N ewport H arbor on the west and 
commands the main passage into N arragansett Bay, Tousard built Fort 
Adams, a redoubt of irregular star design housing twelve guns. On Eastons 
Point, which lies above the town and was the site of a battery laid out by 
Rufus Putnam during the Revolution, he built Fort Greene, an elliptical 
stone-scarped battery sheltering another twelve guns. He added flank bat­
teries to Fort W olcott, increasing its firepower to thirty guns. He also began 
the construction of an elliptical stone tow er to mount eight heavy guns on 
Dumpling Rocks on Conanicut Island, across the main channel from Fort 
Adams, and a large rectangular fort designed for sixty guns on Rose Island, 
located about a mile to the north. N either was ever finished. During the next
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Fort Adams, Newport, Rhode Island, constructed by Lt. Col. Louis Tousard. 
Reprinted from George W. Cullum, Historical Sketch o f  the Fortification Defenses 
o f  Narragansett Bay (Washington, 1884).
century the Dumpling tower crumbled into a picturesque ruin, at one time 
serving as an artillery target for a flamboyant com m ander of Fort Adams, 
one Captain John Magruder. The fort on Rose Island was for a spell the 
quarantine station for the Port of Newport. New construction in New Eng­
land during the naval war was restricted to N ew port. At o ther harbors 
Tousard repaired a number of forts which, though built only a few years 
before, had been left ungarrisoned and neglected.21
Boston, a bustling commercial community exceeded in size in the United 
States only by New York and Philadelphia, had since the inauguration of the 
First System relied for protection solely on Castle William. The M assachu­
setts legislature, which at first refused to cooperate at all with the War De­
partm ent, would in any case have nothing to do with fortifications except on 
Castle Island, where defensive works of some kind had existed since 1634. 
M assachusetts finally ceded the island to the United States in October 1798, 
and Castle William, renamed Fort Independence upon a visit by President 
Adams the next year, was repaired by Tousard. But nothing more was done 
to bolster Boston’s defenses until the quasi war with France was over. The 
first stone of a new Fort Independence was laid in May 1801; and in January 
1803 a pentagonal, bastioned, fifty-gun brick and stone structure, not m ate­
rially different in its dimensions from the fort that still stands on Castle Is­
land, was com pleted. Its principal designer was Jean Foncin, a French 
eng ineer who sh o rtly  befo re  had been  invo lved  in the  p lanning and 
construction of Fort M cHenry at Baltim ore.22
On March 16, 1802, in anticipation of the signing of a treaty of peace by 
the European belligerents at Amiens, France, Congress cut back and re­
organized the army. Of otherwise no perm anent significance, the act created a 
separate Corps of Engineers, limited in size to sixteen officers. It provided
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Plan of Fort Independence, Boston Harbor, by Jean Foncin. 
The National Archives.
further that the Corps was to constitute the personnel of a military academy 
at West Point. In so doing the act recognized the almost complete absence of 
trained military and civil engineers in the United States. In effect it estab­
lished a national college of engineering. Beginning with only four officers 
and three cadets, the new academy for some years did little more than hob­
ble along with few instructors, few cadets, and few standards of qualifica­
tion. Colonel Jonathan Williams, who commanded the Corps and the school, 
complained in 1808 that “ the military academy, as it now stands, is like a 
foundling, barely existing among the mountains, and nutured at a distance 
out of sight, and almost unknown to its legitimate paren ts.” 23 A decade 
later, however, the Academy was thoroughly reorganized, and thereafter grew 
in prestige and influence. Until 1835 it was the only school in the country to 
graduate engineers, and until nearly 1850 it remained almost the sole source 
of academically trained members of the profession. It continued under the 
supervision of the Corps of Engineers until 1866, when it was placed directly 
under the War Department.
Although headquartered at West Point until 1808, the Corps’ first few of-
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fleers were soon away much of the time inspecting coastal fortifications, a 
duty that began in April 1803 when the Secretary of W ar dispatched four 
officers to the maritime frontier. Major Decius W adsworth went to New 
London and Newport, while Lieutenant A lexander Macomb checked over 
the fort at Portsmouth, New H am pshire.24 While such tours appear to have 
been frequent, they were usually of short duration. Appropriations for the 
armed services in these years of “ Jeffersonian econom y” were meager, and 
there was little new fortification construction. In New England there was 
none at all.
This complacence, born of an untroubled foreign scene, lasted for only a 
brief time. The Peace of Amiens proved to be tenuous and short, and in 1803 
France and England again went to war. Gradually the old troubles and wor­
ries of the 1790s reappeared as the impressment of seamen from American 
ships and the abuse of American shipping, especially by England, kindled 
resentments. A crisis came in June 1807, when the British frigate Leopard, 
seeking British deserters, fired on the American frigate Chesapeake off the
Brig. Gen. Joseph Gardner Swift.
Courtesy of the U.S. Army Engineer Museum, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
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Virginia capes. Twenty-one seamen were killed or wounded, and four of the 
Chesapeake’s crew were impressed. America vibrated with exasperation and 
anger, and had it not been for the restraining hand of President Jefferson the 
outraged nation would probably have flung itself into war five years earlier 
than it did. By the time Congress convened in December the excitement was 
dying down, but the event nevertheless jarred the legislators into voting over 
$1 million for fortifying Atlantic harbors.
The Corps o f Engineers was filled to  its com plem ent of sixteen offi­
cers, the Atlantic coast was divided into administrative sections, and the 
“ Second System ” of fortifications was begun. New England, which com­
prised the “ Eastern D epartm ent,”  was assigned to Major Joseph Gardner 
Swift. The son of a physician from Nantucket, M assachusetts, Swift had 
been appointed a cadet of the Corps of Artillerists and Engineers in 1800 by 
President Adams. Assigned for a time to the fortifications at N ewport under 
the command of Lieutenant Colonel Tousard, he was sent in October 1801 to 
a languishing military school at W est Point organized by that corps earlier in 
the year. He was one of the three original cadets of the new academy opened 
by the newly formed Corps of Engineers in July 1802 and, at the age of 
eighteen, became its first graduate in October. Before taking charge in New 
England he had acquired several years of practical experience supervising 
the construction of Fort Johnston on Cape Fear, N orth Carolina, and for the 
past year had been in command at W est Point.
Swift discovered that the “ narrow redoubts”  built by Rochefontaine, now 
badly damaged by the depredations of time, had never adequately protected 
New England’s harbors. He also found that the W ar Departm ent preferred 
the counsel of ancient worthies in Washington to the advice of its own young 
engineers. Advising that new works on Dumpling Rocks and at Coasters 
Harbor would be better expenditures for the defense of Newport than repair­
ing Forts W olcott and Adams, he was told that repairs on the old works 
must first be finished. He advised that any defensive system for Boston 
should include works on Georges and Long islands, commanding the main 
channels into the outer harbor, but the War Departm ent chose to fortify 
Governors Island, located across from Castle Island in the inner harbor. 
Swift also thought that new fortifications should be designed on the spot 
where they were required, but he records that he received from the War 
Department “ several plans of a species of Star Fort, contrived at Washing­
ton, too small for any flank defense and too complicated for a mere battery, 
unsuited to the positions for which they were devised.” The only resort left 
to him “ was to turn these plans on their centre until they might suit the sites 
as best they might, in Boston, Portland, and other harbors.” 25
Work was quickly carried out under the direction o f locally appointed 
agents, and by O ctober 1809 Swift could report th a t his engineering 
functions in the Eastern Departm ent were ended. Because of the clamor of 
local apprehensions, many places were fortified, but the modest share of 
funds allotted to New England meant that the small works o f Rochefontaine 
were repaired rather than replaced, and that most of the new works were not 
any larger. Connecticut’s defenses were readied by the reparation of Fort 
Trumbull, Rochefontaine’s work on the west side of New London Harbor, 
and by the construction of a small battery at New Haven and a brick gun
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house at Stonington. In N arragansett Bay, Fort Adams and Fort W olcott 
were repaired, a small battery was placed south of Newport, and guns were 
mounted at Bristol, halfway up the bay. In M assachusetts, Rochefontaine’s 
works at Salem, M arblehead, and Gloucester were repaired; an earthen bat­
tery was erected on Plum Island at the mouth of the M errimack River; and 
small masonry “ Washington S tars,”  mounting only five or six guns, were 
built at Plymouth and New Bedford. Boston acquired a larger star fort, sup­
ported at the urging of Swift by two outlying batteries, on Governors Island, 
and a sod battery and a brick gun house near the Charlestown Navy Yard. 
At Portsmouth, Fort Constitution, Rochefontaine’s work on the New Hamp­
shire shore of the harbor, was repaired; a masonry and earth battery, Fort 
McClary, was built in K ittery on the Maine shore; and a brick gun house 
was erected in town. At Portland, Fort Preble, another “ W ashington S ta r,” 
was placed on Spring Point on one side of the main channel into the harbor, 
and Fort Scammell, a semi-circular brick battery with a wooden blockhouse, 
was put on House Island on the other side; a detached battery of Rochefon­
taine’s old fort at the north end of town was repaired, and another of the 
ubiquitous brick gun houses was constructed.28
Responsibility for fortifications east of Portland, Swift learned after arriv­
ing in New England, had been assigned by the W ar Departm ent to Colonel 
Moses Porter, a veteran artillery officer whose service in the Army extended 
from the Revolution to his death in 1822. P o rter’s w orks, strung along 
Maine’s serrated coast at Georgetown, Edgecomb, Boothbay, St. George, 
Castine, M achias, and Eastport, were all small batteries of sod or stone. 
Several were covered by wooden blockhouses and furnished with barracks, 
but none mounted more than six guns.27
Because of the abundance and importance of its harbors, New England 
was fortified at twenty localities. Only fourteen additional harbors were for­
tified on the rest of the Atlantic coast.
Matching in 1809 its appropriations of the year before for coastal fortifica­
tions, Congress then drastically cut further spending on them. And domi­
nated by anti-navy Jeffersonian Democrats, it trimmed back from already 
low levels its expenditures on the Navy. When war finally came in 1812 the 
United States, despite anticipating it for years, was as wretchedly prepared 
to constrain the power of the British fleet as it was to carry out its long- 
touted strategy of striking at England by seizing Canada. Bungling and inep­
titude characterized much of the conduct of the war on land, while at sea 
British ships operating out of Halifax and Bermuda seized eastern Maine, 
plundered the coast almost at will, and blockaded every im portant Atlantic 
harbor and bay.
Reaping more humiliations than victories, the nation discovered that righ­
teousness and rhetoric were poor substitutes for military preparations. And 
it took to heart, if only for a brief time, a few of the lessons the war had 
taught. On the assumption that England might have to be fought again at 
some future date, Congress in 1816 voted $838,000 to initiate a program of 
coastal fortification construction. It also authorized the President to employ 
a “ skillful assistant” to aid the Corps of Engineers, an appointm ent that was 
given to General Simon Bernard, a military engineer who had served with 
Napoleon. To select sites and design works for a new defense system, the
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War Departm ent created a Board of Engineers for Fortifications, initially 
consisting of General Bernard, Colonel William M cRee, and Major Joseph 
G. Totten of the Corps of Engineers, and a captain of the Navy. For a few 
years, however, things were stormy within the W ar Departm ent. Bernard 
was given so much authority and deference by the departm ent that Joseph 
Swift, who since 1812 had been Chief Engineer, protested. That plans al­
ready drawn up by the Corps and approved by the Secretary of War had to 
await the arrival of Bernard before being put into execution was in his view 
disgracefully humiliating to the Corps. He and other officers believed that 
the earlier imported engineers had been mostly bunglers, and that it was 
impolitic in any case to entrust defenses to any foreigner, whose first inter­
ests would likely be those of his own country. After two years of frustration, 
Swift felt compelled to resign. McRee did the same. Totten stayed in the 
Corps, but he believed that Bernard’s appointment had been a mistake. Ber­
nard remained in the service of the United States until 1831, when he re­
turned to France to become the aide-de-camp of King Louis Philippe and, 
five years later, his minister of w ar.28
By 1821 the Board of Engineers had elaborated a com prehensive “ Third 
System ” of defense. Integrating naval and m ilitary planning, it recom ­
mended Charlestown, M assachusetts, and B urnell's  Bay, Virginia, as sites 
for great naval arsenals; it designated Boston Roads and Hampton Roads as 
main harbors of rendezvous, with Narragansett Bay classed as an indispen­
sable a c ce sso ry  to  B o sto n  R oads; and it fixed  upon N ew  L o n d o n , 
M arblehead, P ortsm outh , Portland, the estuaries of the K ennebec and 
Penobscot rivers, and Mount Desert Bay for the New England links of a 
coast-long chain of naval stations and ports of refuge. This naval design was 
complemented with projections for fortifications to guard the more important 
naval stations and anchorages, to protect principal cities and the mouths of 
navigable rivers, and to hold strong positions that an enemy might seize for 
his own use. Each proposed fortification was classed in a schedule of con­
struction according to its relative importance. Those in the First Class were 
to be started as soon as possible; those in the Second Class at a later period; 
and those in the Third Class at a still more remote time. Although in the 
course of continued planning priorities were changed and the number of 
works proposed was greatly increased—in 1825 twenty works were listed for 
New England; in 1851 the number, including old works to be repaired and 
new works to be constructed only in the event of impending war, exceeded 
sixty-five—the essential features of this system of defense remained un­
changed for the next half century .29
The construction of fortifications began in a clim ate of reinvigorated 
nationalism. Wartime divisions quickly gave way to unexampled national 
unity born of a sense of common participation in a great cause; and the 
sentiment prevailed that true independence having been preserved, it must 
not again be imperiled. But as the War of 1812 receded in time, revived 
sectional antagonisms eroded national enthusiasm; military, naval, and civil­
ian officials assailed perm anent fortifications as unnecessary; Congress 
grew neglectful; and tariff and other policies ate away treasury surpluses. 
A ppropriations for fortifications becam e more or less perfunctory , and 
sometimes were not voted at all. Although construction costs increased
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greatly over the decades with a general rise in prices, the average annual 
appropriation to the outbreak of the Civil W ar was considerably less than the 
initial one of 1816. Many forts urged by the W ar Departm ent were never 
begun, and those that were rose with agonizing slowness. The slow pace of 
construction forced by limited funds was made even more halting by the 
frequent failure of Congress to vote appropriations early in the year, which 
often caused the loss of half the working season and created difficulties in 
arranging contracts, through which practically all work was done, and in 
securing artisans, m echanics, and laborers when they were needed. A nother 
curb on construction was that the Corps of Engineers was too small for the 
burden of work assigned to it. Congress had increased the size of the Corps 
in 1812 to twenty-two officers, but it was not until 1838 that it authorized 
another increase, permitting a maximum of forty-three officers. Even when 
forts were readied, because appropriations for ordnance lagged behind those 
for the forts them selves, completed placem ents often stood empty of guns.30
The Third System of fortifications was no doubt overly ambitious, and 
many works were never really needed. Certainly some forts were unneces­
sarily elaborate, the threat of an enemy was seldom clear, and the forts 
never faced a hostile foreign force. A congressional policy of constant evalu­
ation of the recom m endations of the W ar Departm ent was required. A policy 
of drift was followed.
Nevertheless, a num ber of fortresses were built on American coasts under 
the Third System. And again New England received the heaviest concentra­
tion of defenses, with eight localities fortified out of a total of nineteen on 
the Atlantic coast. Mostly enclosed works, the forts were massive structures 
of stone or brick depending upon materials available. In New England they 
were made of granite. Because m asonry walls were vulnerable to concen­
trated cannon fire, the exterior walls, or scarps, on the landward sides of the 
forts were shielded by structures that had been employed on land fortifica­
tions since the invention of gunpowder. The essential com ponents were a 
ditch in front of the scarp wall, a counterscarp wall on the o ther side of 
about the same height, and a glacis, or earthen slope, descending away from 
the top of the counterscarp. Protecting scarp walls from direct fire, they still 
preserved traditional impediments to storming assaults. On sea fronts these 
structures were usually omitted, permitting the installation behind the ex­
posed scarps of one or two tiers of guns in casem ates, or bombproof-roofed 
chambers. With their rows of casem ated guns, and with guns mounted close 
together behind earthen parapets on the tops of the walls—that is, mounted 
en barbette—the forts could bring a trem endous volume of fire on any ship 
coming within range. Built as close to the shore as possible to make the 
fullest use of comparatively short-range guns, the forts were preferably lo­
cated where the conditions of navigable channels made it necessary for pass­
ing vessels to come in fairly close. Since sailing ships could not lay down 
breaching fire without anchoring, and their wooden hulls were no m atch for 
walls of stone or brick, the American pre-Civil W ar forts were extremely 
effective installations.31
Construction in New England began in 1824 when plans were completed 
for a new Fort Adams at Newport. Of massive proportions and spreading
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over twenty acres, the fort was to be an irregular pentagon, prominently 
bastioned on its sea fronts and casem ated on all sides for gun-rooms and 
quarters. With two tiers of casem ate guns on its main sea front, one tier on 
each of its other two sea fronts, and upper batteries en barbette all around, it 
would mount nearly five hundred pieces of ordnance.32
Supervision of its construction was given to its designer on the Board of 
Engineers, Major Joseph G. Totten. A native of New Haven, Totten had
Maj. Gen. Joseph Gilbert Totten. 
Courtesy of the U.S. Army Engineer Museum, 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
been graduated from W est Point in 1805 at the age of sixteen. In 1808-09 he 
had assisted M ajor Swift on harbor defenses in New England and directed 
the construction of forts at New York City. During the war with England he 
was chief engineer for the Armies of N iagara and Champlain. Appointed a 
member of the Board of Engineers in 1816 and serving on it for more than 
two decades, he developed principles of coast defense construction that 
were followed for a century. Of special note were his experiments with 
casem ate em brasures. Employing new designs, he reduced their openings to 
less than a quarter of that on many European forts and still provided scope 
for guns to swing laterally through sixty degrees as com pared to the forty 
degrees that was standard abroad. He introduced on the world scene the use 
of arm or plate in seacoast fortifications when he designed iron throats for 
em brasures and two-inch-thick iron shutters that were opened when a gun
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was fired and then automatically slammed shut.33 Appointed Chief Engineer 
in 1838, Totten commanded the Corps until 1864, a length of time never 
close to being equalled.
If Totten had few peers among nineteenth century engineers, he could not 
speed the construction of Fort Adams beyond limits set by small and irregu­
lar appropriations. The fortress rose inchmeal. It was not ready to receive 
any ordnance until 1841, and it was not until 1858 that all its batteries were 
completed and its quarters equipped to receive a full garrison. Some meas­
ure of benefit, however, did result from this long period of construction. 
Little was known in the United States about building such great defense 
structures, and various principles and details of the art of fortification were 
used at F ort Adams in new com binations, com pelling T otten  to make 
numerous experiments to test materials and ideas. He made the first experi­
ments on the expansion and contraction of building stone by natural changes 
in tem perature and on the relative stiffness and strength of certain kinds of 
timber. He experimented with the composition of m ortars, the thickness of 
sustaining walls, and the thrust of arches. In this work he was assisted over 
the years by a large proportion of the young officers of the Corps sent to 
serve apprenticeships with him. Fort Adams thus became for the Corps a 
kind of graduate school of applied science.34
Fort Adams, Newport, Rhode Island, c.1930. The outer defenses employed on the 
landward side of Third System forts appear at the right.
Boston Harbor was of key importance in the new defense system, but for 
more than a decade other demands on the Corps of Engineers were too 
numerous and pressing for it to do more than build a seawall on Georges 
Island, on the harbor’s outer rim, to protect it from erosion and preserve it
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as a site for fortifications. This project, carried out betw een 1825 and 1829, 
was also directed by Totten. The construction of a fort on Georges Island 
was begun in 1833. A sprawling, bastioned pentagonal of Quincy granite, 
with a single tier of casem ates all around. Fort W arren was designed to take 
three hundred guns. Major Sylvanus Thayer was placed in charge.35
Major Sylvanus Thayer.
Courtesy of the U.S. Army Engineer Museum, 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
Born in Braintree, M assachusetts, Thayer had attended Dartmouth Col­
lege, had transferred to West Point in 1807, and a year later had joined the 
Corps of Engineers. Like Totten, he had assisted Major Swift in constructing 
batteries in New England and during the War of 1812 had served on the 
Canadian frontier. In 1815 he and Colonel William McRee were sent abroad 
to study fortifications, army workshops, and military schools in France. Re­
turning in 1817, he was appointed superintendent of the Military Academy. 
Taking over a chaotic institution without entrance qualifications, definite 
course of study, or set period of residence, he transform ed it within a few 
years into an American version of the famous Ecole Polytechnique at Paris, 
making a West Point education stand for a solid program of study and high 
standards of efficiency and honor. His fame as “ Father of the Military 
Academy,” however, has eclipsed his later, lengthier service in New Eng­
land. From 1833, when, tired of having his authority undermined by Presi­
dent Jackson, he was relieved of command of the Academy at his own re­
quest, until 1857, when he took leave of absence because of broken health, 
he was in charge of most of the work of the Corps of Engineers from Boston 
northward. During this period he was also on the Board of Engineers for 
Fortifications, serving after 1838 as its president.36
Taking up residence in Boston, Thayer directed work on Fort W arren for
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the next twenty-four years, experiencing the same difficulties and delays as 
did Totten at Fort Adams. Nine years passed before the fort’s exterior walls 
were finished and provisions could be made for the tem porary mounting of a 
few guns in a crisis. Fifteen more years went by before it was fully ready for 
its armam ent bearing on the main channel and partially ready for guns on its 
other fronts. When the Civil W ar broke out, three more years later, Fort 
W arren was ready for its casemate guns and about three-quarters of its bar­
bette armam ent, but was still not finished.37
Fort Warren, Boston Harbor. View of Fort Independence, Boston Harbor.
A year before Thayer came to Boston, Congress had voted a small sum for 
repairs on Fort Independence. Because no engineer was available, however, 
nothing was immediately done. Taking up the project in 1833, Thayer found 
that the funds could be stretched only to building a protective seawall and 
repairing the island’s wharf. The appropriation had been based on 1831 
prices, and construction costs in the area had meantime risen twenty-five 
percent. Partial repairs of Fort Independence would in any event have been 
a waste. According to the Board of Engineers, which at this time consisted 
solely of Totten and Thayer, the outmoded and dilapidated fort needed to be 
wholly rebuilt to provide a secondary line of defense to Fort W arren and 
other projected works in the outer harbor. Thoroughly redesigning it to 
guard the inner harbor with seventy-nine guns and to house stores, recruits, 
and hospitals in time of war, the two engineers planned to replace its decay­
ing brick scarps with walls of granite more than double in height, replace its 
tumbling-down quarters, magazines, and storerooms with bom bproof case­
m ates, and replace or reshape most of its accessory structures. With an 
optimism as to congressional largess difficult to com prehend, the House 
Committee on Military Affairs approved their plan on the ground that since 
F o rt W arren  w ould  no t be fin ish ed  fo r five o r six m ore y e a rs , a 
reconstructed Fort Independence would take less time. The reconstruction 
of Fort Independence, however, consumed more than a dozen years. Begun 
in 1836, the fort was ready to receive some armam ent in 1845, and by the 
end of 1848 was nearing completion. Then a want of funds and the presence 
of a garrison brought work practically to a standstill.38
In 1838 Congress voted $25,000 for fortifications at New London Harbor, 
where Rochefontaine had built two small redoubts, Fort Trumbull and Fort
the parade. 
Courtesy of Gerald Butler.
Rebuilt by Colonel Thayer as a case- 
mated work. Courtesy of Gerald Butler.
37
Seawall and jetty under construction at Fayerweather Island, Black Rock Harbor, 
Connecticut, 1914. A seawall was first constructed here in 1836-37 under the supervi­
sion of Col. Totten.
Breakwaters at Rockport Harbor, Massachusetts. The long breakwater on the left 
was originally constructed under the supervision of Col. Thayer in 1836-38. It was 
rebuilt and the short breakwater on the right was constructed in 1902-5.
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The inner breakwater at Stonington, Connecticut, 1914. This work was originally 
constructed under the supervision of Col. Totten in 1828-31.
and straightening the channel had been very great, and although it was im­
possible to state what their ultimate effect would be on the entrance bar, it 
was satisfactory to know that vessels drawing seventeen feet could now pass 
over it without difficulty. Reports on work at the harbor later in the century 
indicate that he must have m eant at high water.
Piers were built for the same purpose in several other New England rivers. 
A pair of protective piers at the mouth of the Kennebunk River in Maine, 
constructed  earlier by the T reasury  D epartm ent and soon w recked by 
storm s, were rebuilt and extended considerably so as to confine the channel 
more narrowly and obtain more w ater over the bar. In the Saco River of 
Maine ten tim ber and stone fender piers were built to prevent vessels from 
being swept on ledges and two piers were constructed at the river’s entrance 
to create a channel through the bar, where the depth was only two feet at 
mean low water. A much larger project was initiated in the Thames River of 
Connecticut, which for a distance of three miles below the city of Norwich 
was obstructed by a num ber of shoals. The project, begun in 1835 with plans 
prepared by topographical engineer Hartman Bache, consisted of the con­
struction of fourteen piers, or wing-dams, jutting out from the shores of the 
river, the scouring effect of which would be supplem ented by dredging. 
When work on the project was closed down four years later by the cutoff of 
funds, seven wing-dams were nearly completed and two dredging machines 
were at work on the bars.
Dredging operations were also employed at several other places in New 
England. The first dredging machine used by the Corps in the region was on 
an experimental project at N antucket Harbor. Here Lieutenant Jonathan 
Prescott, an artillery officer on engineering duty, undertook in 1829 to im-
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Jetties at the mouth of the Kennebunk River, Maine. The original jetties, constructed 
by the Treasury Department in 1820-21, were timber cribs filled with stone. They 
were soon destroyed by storms and worms. Between 1829 and 1838 new stone and 
granite jetties were constructed by the Corps of Engineers to confine the river chan­
nel and obtain more water over the bar.
prove the entrance channel. N arrow , tortuous, and only six feet deep at 
mean low water, the channel wound through a bar a mile and a quarter wide. 
Encountering no difficulties for several work seasons, Prescott reported in 
1831 that prospects for the perm anent improvement of the channel continued 
to be promising. But shortly thereafter his work of three years was obliter­
ated by a single storm, and the project was abandoned. More successful 
dredging projects were carried out at Southport and Bridgeport harbors in 
Connecticut, where channels through the bars were considerably deepened. 
At Saybrook H arbor, where the Connecticut River flows into Long Island 
Sound, two dredging machines, one driven by horsepow er and a new model 
driven by steam, were cutting through the entrance bar when river and har­
bor work was brought practically to a standstill after 1838 by the stoppage of 
appropriations.
Most New England waterways were strewn not only with shoals but with 
ledges and boulders that had to be blasted or raised. Thus improvements by 
rock removal as well as the excavation of shoals were made on the Berwick, 
Saco, and K ennebec rivers in Maine, the Cocheco River in New Hampshire, 
and the Saugatuck River in Connecticut. New England’s Army Engineers 
also on several occasions arranged by contract for the removal from harbors 
of wrecked ships that were hazardous to navigation.
For most of the projects carried out in New England, topographical en­
gineers John Anderson, John Abert, H artm an Bache, and William Swift 
made the surveys and drew up the plans and estim ates, while Joseph Totten 
and Sylvanus Thayer superintended operations. This was in accordance with 
the division of responsibility for river and harbor im provem ent between the 
Topographical Bureau and the Corps of Engineers that had been established 
at the outset of this work by the Army. N either corps, however, was happy
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with this system. Colonel Abert argued that the corps that designed im­
provements was best qualified to carry them out; while Totten and other 
officers of the Corps of Engineers felt hardpressed to fulfill their military 
duties. In 1836 the Secretary of W ar transferred a num ber of works in the 
interior to the Topographical Bureau; and two years later, upon the organi­
zation of the Topographical Corps, the W ar D epartm ent assigned to it all 
civil work not connected with fortifications.
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Letter from Col. Alexander Macomb, Chief Engineer, to Lt. Col. Joseph Totten, in 
charge of all Corps projects in New England, June 1, 1827. The letter refers to sur­
veys for civil works at Hyannis Harbor, Massachusetts, Saugatuck River and Har­
bor, Connecticut, and Kennebec River, Maine, made by Topographical Engineers Lt. 
Col. John Anderson and Lt. Col. John Abert.
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Captain William H. Swift was now placed in charge of civil works in New 
England. But his active superintendency was brief. The depression opening 
in 1837, presidential opposition to federal improvements of a local nature, 
and unabated state and sectional rivalries combined to spell an end to the 
annual river and harbor acts of the past dozen years.13 Except for a limited 
measure in 1844 providing for works in the interior, there was not another 
general river and harbor act until 1852. A few appropriations continued to be 
made by special acts, but those for New England were solely for seawalls in 
Boston Harbor, work that related to fortifications and therefore remained 
with the Corps of Engineers. Topographical Engineers were still assigned 
duties in New England, but of different kind. They continued to make occa­
sional harbor surveys related to  the planning of fortifications. A surveying 
party staked out and mapped the nation’s northeast boundary. And Captain 
Swift assisted the United States Coast Survey and constructed towers for 
the lighthouse service.
The W ebster-Ashburton Treaty of August 1842 awarded the United States 
some 7,000 of the 12,000 square miles on its northeast frontier that had been 
in dispute with Great Britain. The treaty described the boundary agreed 
upon in term s of rivers, highlands, and lines between them. To locate and 
map the line, a brigade of Topographical Engineers, covering the ground in 
conjunction with a party of British engineers, spent several seasons pinpoint­
ing by astronom ical determ inations the exact geographical positions of the 
reference points named in the treaty. The American party  was led by Major 
James D. Graham, another veteran of Long’s w estern explorations and later 
of canal and military surveys in New England. Stationed in Washington 
when not in the field, Graham and his assistants prepared a set of boundary
Major James D. Graham.
U.S. Signal Corps Photo (Brady Collection) 
in the National Archives.
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maps of meticulous detail. They had scarcely com pleted them  when they 
were ordered to join the armies of Taylor and Kearny in the w ar that had 
opened with Mexico. The maps were left in an office of the Topographical 
Bureau, and there they were completely destroyed in a fire. The loss was 
serious, but fortunately under a rule of the bureau the field books had been 
placed in a different repository. Graham, upon returning to W ashington in 
1848, was therefore able to start work on a new set of maps. Merely to replot 
the boundary would have been no great task, but the original maps had de­
picted the topography on either side of the line, exhibiting features valuable 
from a military point of view, and it was desirable that the new maps should 
do the same. Consequently Graham and several assistants spent three more 
years on the job , finally turning out a new portfolio of forty-five large and 
precise m aps.14
The United States Coast Survey was first established in 1816 with the 
appointment within the Treasury Departm ent of surveyor Ferdinand R. Hass- 
ler, a Swiss engineer who had once taught m athem atics at W est Point and 
had introduced in this country the subject of analytical trigonom etry. In 1818 
Congress transferred the responsibility of charting the coast to the Army and 
Navy but neither service initiated systematic surveys. In 1831 Colonel Abert 
reported that, because of their small number, Topographical Engineers had 
done nothing under the law of 1818 except surveys relating to military de­
fense. Two years later the Coast Survey was reestablished in the Treasury 
Department, again under Hassler. At H assler’s request Captain Swift was 
assigned to assist him, a job  Swift filled on a part-time basis for the next 
decade, making surveys in Fishers Island and Long Island sounds. In 1840 
Swift went to Europe for about a year to procure instrum ents for the Coast 
Survey. While there he took the opportunity to examine hydraulic works in 
Holland and inspect lighthouse structures of a new design in Great Britain. 
The latter investigations were to lead to Swift’s most interesting assign­
ments, and to his greatest engineering failure.15
The administration of lighthouses in the United States was also under the 
Treasury Departm ent. Usually contracting for the construction of towers it­
self, the Treasury had, however, in 1831 and in 1834 called upon the Army to 
construct several lights, including one on Goat Island in N ewport Harbor, 
built by Lieutenant Cullum. In 1843 it called upon the Army again. Between 
1829 and 1842 it had three times had a stone beacon built by contract at 
Black Rock Harbor, near Bridgeport, Connecticut. Each tow er had been 
destroyed by storm within a year. When Congress in 1843 appropriated 
another $10,000 for a beacon, the Secretary of the Treasury was John C. 
Spencer, who form erly had been S ecretary  o f W ar. While in the W ar 
D epartm ent, Spencer had discussed with Colonel A bert the lighthouses 
inspected by Swift on the coasts of England and Ireland, where British 
engineers, using newly invented mooring-screws for forcing iron piles into 
m uddy or sandy  shoals , had e rec ted  sk e le to n  to w ers  o f sim ple and 
inexpensive design that offered almost no resistance to waves. Discussing 
the subject w ith A bert again, and asking the co lonel’s opinion o f the 
practicability of erecting a pile structure at Black Rock H arbor, Spencer was 
assu red  th a t w hile ledge footing a t the h arb o r p rev en ted  the use of 
mooring-screws, a pile tow er could still be designed. Spencer asked Abert to
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accept the project, which Abert assigned to Swift, who was now serving as 
his principal assistant in Washington. Designing a structure consisting of six 
iron piles wedged into holes bored in a heavy granite platform laid on the 
ledge, with the piles tied together by wrought iron bars and topped by a cage 
that was visible from a great distance, Swift in three months constructed a 
beacon thirty-six feet high that cost less than half the sum allotted by 
Congress. Three days after it was finished the beacon was hit by a storm as 
severe as those that had wrecked the earlier stone towers. A number of 
steamboats in the sound were disabled and a lightship was driven from its 
moorings, but the beacon stood the test without injury.16
Could pile structures be used successfully on American coasts for the 
larger towers of lighthouses? A few years later Swift made the first attem pt 
by an American engineer to find out. In 1847 Congress for the firt time as­
signed the construction of several lights directly to the Army, in this case to 
the Topographical Engineers. All the towers were to be built at difficult and 
hazardous places, but the w orst was O uter Minots Ledge off the southern 
chop of M assachusetts Bay. Part of a reef that had caused more wrecks than 
any other on the coast, the ledge was exposed to the full brunt of the Atlan­
tic wave. Rarely, even at low w ater and in calm weather, was an area more 
than twenty-five feet in diam eter left bare by the sea—never was it more 
than thirty feet—and never was any part of the rock more than three feet 
above water. Working with less than $40,000, Swift designed a tow er of nine 
piles sunk five feet into the ledge and rising sixty feet high. Bedded on a 
twenty-five-foot diam eter and closing to fourteen feet, the piles supported a 
combination lamp and keeper’s house ten feet high. To bore the nine pile 
holes took most of two whole working seasons. During the first year men 
could get on the rock only twenty-five days; and twice a specially designed 
drilling machine, pintled and chained to the rock, was swept away. Men 
were frequently washed from the rock, but no lives were lost. Once the 
drilling was com pleted, work progressed more rapidly, and by the autum n of 
1849 the tow er was finished and turned over to the Treasury Department.
Swift was sure that all doubts about the practicability and m odest cost of 
using pile lights on this side of the Atlantic had been removed. Critics of the 
tower were not lacking, but he rejected their dire predictions of its destruc­
tion. But the technique of building skeleton iron lighthouses was still in its 
infancy, and Swift’s structure could not stand the strains to which it was 
exposed. On April 16, 1851 it was carried away by a gale of hurricane force 
lasting for several days. Apparently waves reaching m ountainous heights 
struck against the keeper’s house, which became a fatal point of resistance 
at the end of a sixty-foot lever. The ten-inch piles of the tower were bent and 
snapped off a few feet above the surface of the ro ck .17
Another lighthouse was to be built on Minots Ledge, but before this was 
done Army Engineers in New England were again assigned, for a short time 
at least, projects of river and harbor improvement. In the election campaign 
of 1852 the Whig and Free Soil parties, both more attuned to the interests of 
eastern businessm en and w estern farm ers than the Southern-controlled 
Democratic party, proclaimed them selves in favor of internal improvements. 
Swaying with the political winds, Congress in August passed a bill for more 
than a hundred river and harbor works, fifteen of which were in New Eng­
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land. With the Whig Millard Fillmore in the White House, the bill was en­
sured against a presidential veto. Because the Topographical Bureau already 
had numerous duties, while the fortification work of the Corps of Engineers 
had been practically suspended for the past two years for want of funds, the 
War Department assigned the public works on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts 
to the Corps of Engineers.18
The New England projects were carried out by Colonel Sylvanus Thayer, 
Captains William D. F raser and George Dutton, and L ieutenants John New­
ton, Zealous B. Tower, and Charles E. Blunt. These officers built new 
breakwaters at Owls Head H arbor and Richmond Island H arbor in Maine; 
repaired the old breakw aters at Portland and Hyannis and the piers at the 
mouth of the Kennebunk River; and patched up seawalls at M arblehead and 
a dike at Woods Hole, built years before by other agencies. At Plymouth 
Beach they closed several large breaches, opened by the storm that brought 
down Minots Light, by the old method of giving nature a hand with brush 
fences; they strung a tim ber bulkhead along a beach at Provincetown and 
planted more beach grass; they dredged again at Bridgeport H arbor until 
funds ran out; and they blasted out rock obstructions in New H aven H arbor 
and in Cobscook Bay, Maine. They also made five river and harbor surveys 
called for by the act of 1852.
Another project, seemingly a simple one, was the im provem ent of the 
Kennebec River for a few miles below Augusta. When L ieutenant John 
Newton finished his reconnaisance and set about to arrange contracts, how­
ev e r, he d isco v ered  th a t the  sudden  dem and  fo r d redging  m achines 
everywhere in the country resulting from the act of 1852 had skyrocketed 
bids for work in his area beyond all reason. For nearly two years the project 
was stalled. In 1854 N ewton was succeeded by Captain William Fraser. Giv­
ing up attem pts to arrange for dredging by contract, F raser devised a raking 
apparatus suspended between two scows towed by a steam er and began the 
job  with workers on day wages. His machine scraped away sand and gravel 
from the river bars with great success, but Fraser soon had another problem. 
He uncovered dozens of large boulders, some weighing up to seventy tons. 
Drilling holes in them, into which he drove iron rods to serve as hafts, he 
raised and floated them  away with flat-bottomed boats when the tide rose. 
Ingenious though his methods were, F raser was able to clear only a short 
stretch of the river with the $6,000 at his disposal.19
The River and Harbor Act of 1852 also provided for the preservation of 
Great Brewster Island, lying on the outer fringe of Boston Harbor. In 1840 
Colonel Thayer had made a detailed report on the islands of the harbor, 
recommending repairs on some of the seawalls already built and the con­
struction of walls on other islands. In the next three years Congress voted 
appropriations for the repairs and for the construction of a seawall on 
Lovells Island, to which Thayer had given first priority. But three later ap­
propriations for seawalls on Great Brew ster Island, included in broader river 
and harbor bills, were killed by presidential vetoes. In 1848 an appropriation 
for Great Brewster was finally approved, and the construction of seawalls on 
two heads of the island began. Apparently because Thayer was burdened 
with other duties, Captain Henry W. Benham was placed in charge. Spend­
ing most of his subsequent career in the Corps at Boston directing the con-
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Colonel Henry W. Benham.
U .S. Signal Corps Photo (Brady Collection) 
in the National Archives.
struction of seawalls and fortifications, Benham shares honors only with 
Thayer for length of service in New England. The funds voted in 1848 for the 
seawalls on Great Brewster ran out in 1850. When the new appropriation 
was made in 1852, Thayer took over the project, carrying it on until late 
1854, when it was again suspended for want of m oney.20
The product of election-year pressures, the River and H arbor Act of 1852 
failed to restore an ongoing program of civil public works. The Democrats 
won the election; and with preponderant influence in government for the rest 
of the decade resting in the party that from 1840 to 1860 consistently de­
clared against internal im provem ents, Congress did not pass another general 
river and harbor bill until after the Civil War. Occasionally it voted funds for 
a project or two, but none of these was in New England. When the 1852 
appropriations ran out, river and harbor work in the area by the federal 
government again came to a halt.
Two more construction projects of different kind, however, were carried 
out in the decade of the 1850s. One was the Marine Hospital at Chelsea, 
M assachusetts, built between 1855 and 1859. The supervising engineer was 
Captain Barton S. Alexander, transferred from Washington where he had 
been directing work on public buildings. The hospital, however, was not 
Alexander’s principal assignment. He had been sent to New England to di­
rect the construction of a new lighthouse on Minots Ledge.
In August 1852 Congress created a Lighthouse Board, composed of army 
engineers, naval officers, and civilians, that was to have entire charge, under 
the Secretary of the Treasury, of the construction, m aintenance, superinten­
dence, and operation of lighthouses. One of the board’s first decisions was
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Bvt. Brig. Gen. Barton S. Alexander. 
Courtesy of the U.S. Army Engineer 
Museum, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
to build a stone tow er on Minots Ledge. Chief Engineer Totten, who was a 
member of the board, designed the structure. It was a masonry shaft, purely 
conical in shape because of its limited base, 112 feet high. Solid, except for a 
small central well, for half its height, it had a cylindrical hollow space above, 
divided into several stories by iron floors. Using the holes for the piles of the 
form er skeleton light, Totten pinned the tow er to the rock with gun-metal 
dowels rising to the twelfth course of masonry. Each course of masonry 
throughout the tower was also doweled to the one above and the one below. 
Personally selecting Alexander to construct the work, Totten assigned him 
to the duty in April 1855.
Minots Ledge had to be cut across its whole surface to receive the founda­
tion stones of the tower, and cut to the extent that the stones were all bed­
ded below low water. Because part of the ledge was at all times under 
water, and the rest was bare for only an hour or two at low spring tides when 
the sea was dead calm, there were weeks together when workmen could not 
land on the rock. To have men ready to work on the ledge whenever it was 
possible—men disciplined and physically qualified for the hard labor and 
exposure—Alexander employed the same working party ashore to cut and 
dress the stones for the tower, thereby giving them constant work and full 
wages.
The first blow on the ledge was struck on July 1, 1855, and the first stone 
was laid on July 9, 1857. In 1855 only 130 hours could be spent on the rock. 
In 1856 men were on it for 157 hours, and in 1857 for 130 hours. During the 
second season’s work Alexander erected an iron scaffold to make the cutting 
operations safer, using the holes of the form er skeleton lighthouse. The fol­
lowing January a gale threw  the bark N ew  Em pire, loaded with cotton,
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against the scaffold, breaking off the iron posts and shattering the rock in 
places, making it necessary to do some of the work of the preceding year 
over again. Once the foundation was in place, more time could be spent on 
the rock, and the stones of the tower, all previously fitted together on shore, 
went up with less trouble. In 1858, 208 hours were put in on the rock; in 
1859, 377 hours; and finally on June 29, 1860 the last stone was laid.
Minots Ledge Light.
Photo by Kevin Cole. Courtesy of the Boston H erald American.
“ The lighthouse on M inot’s ledge is the most im portant engineering work 
that belongs to our lighthouse system ;”  said Colonel J. G. Barnard, reput­
edly one of the best civil and military engineers of his day, speaking nearly 
two decades later on the subject of lighthouse engineering. “ Indeed,”  he 
added, “ it ranks by the engineering difficulties surmounted in its erection, 
and by the skill and science shown in the details of its construction, among 
the chief of the great sea-rock lighthouses of the w orld.” 21 Still standing and 
in service, Minots Light was the last civil work in New England by the 
Corps of Engineers before the war broke out between the states.
THE DISTRICTS AND THE DIVISION
The Civil W ar settled the long-debated issue of river and harbor improve­
ment. It opened a period of trem endous growth in transportation, trade, in­
dustry, and agriculture. Old political patterns dissolved before new dynamic 
forces, and new ruling groups emerged anxious to provide expanding eco­
nomic enterprise with a federal helping hand. And this assistance included 
the development of the nation’s navigable waterways. The Republican party 
had begun its national career with a declaration in its platform of 1856 that 
appropriations by Congress for the improvement of rivers and harbors were 
constitutional and justified by the obligation of the government to protect the 
lives and property of its citizens. The postw ar Democratic party, forsaking 
its earlier opposition to internal improvements, was no less eager to give 
river and harbor im provem ent steady and generous su p p o rt.1 The civil 
works function of the Corps of Engineers, sporadic and uncertain since its 
inception in 1824, began to burgeon.
Even before the war ended, river and harbor work was resumed in a small 
way. In June 1864 Congress authorized the Secretary of W ar to expend 
$350,000 to repair harbors on the seaboard and the Great Lakes. Two of the 
five projects opened on the Atlantic coast were in New England, where 
Army Engineers again took up the work of preserving the delicate beaches 
that formed the harbors of Plymouth and Provincetown. In July 1864 Con­
gress reopened projects in Boston H arbor with appropriations for continuing 
the seawalls on Great B rew ster Island and repairing those on Deer and 
Lovells islands. Colonel James D. Graham, the cartographer of the nation’s 
northeastern boundary twenty years before, was placed in charge of these 
works and of all harbors on the Atlantic coast. Graham had drawn up plans 
and got construction under way when, late in D ecem ber 1865, he died at 
Boston. Lieutenant Colonel Henry Benham, recently assigned to fortifica­
tion work in Boston Harbor, took over the seawalls and the Provincetown 
beaches, while Major George H. Mendell took charge at Plym outh.2
River and harbor improvement began on a broad scale in June 1866 with a 
congressional appropriation of nearly $3.7 million for over fifty works and 
nearly forty examinations and surveys throughout the country. Thereafter 
river and harbor appropriations, voted annually with but few exceptions, 
grew by large amounts. For the decade of the 1870s they totaled nearly $54 
million; for the decade ending in 1972 they came to $5,757 million, exclusive 
of large sums provided for m aintenance.3
A project began with a directive in a river and harbor act, usually inserted 
at the representation of local interests, for the preliminary examination and 
survey of a waterway to determine if it were worthy of improvement. The 
engineer making the investigation would inspect the waterway, hold public 
hearings to learn the views of local citizens, and establish w hatever liaison 
might be necessary with other governmental agencies. If the examination 
report, after being reviewed by a division engineer, a Board of Engineers for 
Rivers and H arbors, and the Chief of Engineers, recommended the proposed
48
49
improvement, the Secretary of War was authorized to order a detailed sur­
vey so that plans and estim ates might be submitted to Congress. The survey 
report would go through the same gantlet of review, and additional public 
hearings and consultations with other governmental agencies might be held.4 
Reports had to include information relating to the commercial im portance of 
the waterway. After 1909 they had to include any obtainable data relating to 
terminal and transfer facilities, to the developm ent of waterpower, and to 
any other subject that might properly be connected with the project. After 
1920 they had to include recommendations as to what local cooperation 
should be required if the improvement would bring special benefits to the 
localities involved.
M any reports  w ere un favorab le . But navigational dem ands upon a 
waterway sometimes changed, local interests were often persistent, and 
congressmen were almost always anxious to have as much federal money as 
possible spent in their districts. Therefore Congress, in 1913, legislated that 
requests for reviews of reports, to  determine if any modifications should be 
made, might be submitted to the Chief of Engineers merely by resolutions of 
appropriate committees. These “ review report’’ requests became so com ­
mon that more investigations were ordered by them  than by regular legisla­
tion. A nother significant m odification of the report procedure was the 
abandonment by law, in 1958, of preliminary examination reports. Originally 
designed to avoid the expense of surveys and plans for waterways manifestly 
not w orth im proving, the tw o-stage rep o rt p rocess had becom e both 
inefficient and uneconomical as the C orps’ water resources responsibilities 
broadened and investigation and planning grew more complex. W henever 
preliminary studies indicated the desirability of further investigation, the 
Corps could now proceed directly with more detailed surveys.5
In reporting a waterway worthy of improvement, Army Engineers meant 
only that the project was feasible and that the resulting increase in com­
merce would warrant the expense. As the Chief of Engineers stated in his 
annual report of 1884, they were not recommending the execution of the 
work. He noted that of the 147 localities enum erated in the River and H ar­
bor Act of 1882 for examination and survey, 76 were reported as not worthy. 
The act of 1890 provided for 203 examinations and surveys, more than half 
of which resulted in unfavorable reports. “ The chief of engineers is required 
by law to make the estim ates,”  wrote an investigator of the 1890s, “ but 
were he to name the works that Congress ought to undertake, he would 
recommend far fewer than Congress now authorizes.” Between 1902 and 
1940 the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors reported on approxi­
mately 4,800 investigations, including 400 for flood control. The recom ­
mendations were unfavorable to 60 percent of the navigation improvements 
and to 85 percent of those for flood control.8 Engineers in New England, 
required at one time or another to examine almost every waterway that 
could float a boat, contributed proportionately to these unfavorable reports; 
the records of some waterways, in fact, reveal a series of unfavorable re­
ports. Occasionally Congress would appropriate funds for works prior to 
investigations, and sometimes it would vote appropriations despite unfavor­
able reports, but usually the procedure described for instituting projects was 
followed. Although the nineteenth century river and harbor pork barrel won
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considerable notoriety, the Corps succeeded at least in keeping a lid on it.
Until 1920 river and harbor acts specified the am ount appropriated for 
each project, usually a sum sufficient for only one or two working seasons. 
This “ driblet system of appropriations,” as a report of the House Committee 
on Rivers and Harbors in 1892 styled it, not only encouraged Congress to 
initiate more works than it might otherwise have done but made projects 
more costly by precluding large and continuing contracts. The problem  had 
been only slightly alleviated by the practice beginning in 1890 of occasionally 
permitting long-term contracts on some projects, to be paid for as appro­
priations were from time to time provided. After 1920 Congress voted lump 
sums each year to be apportioned to projects by the Chief of Engineers. 
Work could now be prosecuted more efficiently since rapidly moving proj­
ects were less subject to interruption and funds were not tied up on inactive 
projects pending the fulfillment of requirem ents of local cooperation. Con­
gressional control, however, was not relinquished. Congress continued to 
specify where examinations and surveys were to be made and to authorize 
new works; and in appearances before the Bureau of the Budget and before 
appropriation committees, the Chief of Engineers had to justify the portions 
of the Budget Bureau’s recommended appropriation that were to be allotted 
to various projects during the fiscal year under consideration.7
With works and surveys rapidly multiplying after 1866, local river and 
harbor engineer offices were established to plan and carry them out. And by 
practice, rather than by specific directive, an administrative system of dis­
trict engineers in charge of all projects within certain geographical areas 
came into being. The informal development of the district unit is indicated 
by a letter from the Chief of Engineers to the Secretary of W ar, dated May 
20, 1884, which speaks of “ districts, as that term is now understood.” 8 Al­
though the first district engineers sometimes supervised fortification work, 
most military construction in the immediate postw ar years was directed by 
other officers. In New England, district engineers were not given jurisdiction 
over fortifications everywhere in the region until 1883, and since defense 
construction had by then come to a standstill, the added responsibilities 
were for some time more nominal than real.
New England’s first river and harbor office was established at Portland, 
Maine, in the autumn of 1866. The River and H arbor Act of the previous 
June had provided for a half-dozen works and surveys in the state, which 
were initially assigned to Major Barton S. Alexander, then reconstructing 
fortifications at Portland. By a series of directives from the Engineer De­
partment in October and Novem ber, however, these civil works were turned 
over to Lieutenant Colonel George Thom, a form er Topographical Engineer 
who was also working on Maine fortifications, as his primary responsibility.9 
In charge of the Portland Engineer Office for over sixteen years, Thom 
supervised a district that eventually embraced all of Maine and New Ham p­
shire. From 1871 to 1883 it also included eastern M assachusetts south to 
Provincetown.
A second district office was operating at Newport, Rhode Island, by the 
next year. The River and H arbor Act of 1866 had provided for only one 
work and one survey on New England’s south coast, both in Connecticut, 
which were assigned to Major David C. H ouston, in charge of defense work
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at Fort Adams. The next year seven more works and surveys on waterways 
in Connecticut and Rhode Island were also entrusted to H ouston. Although 
Houston remained in charge of modifying batteries at Fort Adams, his chief 
responsibility was now river and harbor im provem ent, and an engineer dis­
trict covering the two states had been created .10 In May 1870 Houston was 
succeeded by Major G ouvem eur K. W arren, who remained in charge of the 
Newport D istrict until his death twelve years later.
In M assachusetts river and harbor work was for several years under vari­
ous officers. Colonel Graham and then Colonel Benham and Major Mendell 
were in charge of the first few works. Several new projects were then as­
signed to Lieutenant Colonel John C. Foster and Captain Jared Smith. By 
1869, however, m ost work in M assachusetts had either been directly as­
signed or transferred to Foster, and a district had thus come into being. 
Apparently because work on the seawalls of Great Brew ster, Lovells, and 
Deer islands had initially been authorized by a fortification act, they re­
mained under Benham; but Foster had charge of new seawalls begun in Bos­
ton H arbor on Long and Gallops islands and on Point Allerton, the harbor’s 
southern chop. Two other works in M assachusetts, the beach at Plymouth 
and newly authorized repairs on the breakw ater at Hyannis, were assigned 
in 1869 to the N ewport District.
Because the Corps had few officers and many duties, and since the vol­
ume of work in sections of New England changed from time to time, so did 
the size and num ber of New England engineer districts. On May 25, 1871 the 
Boston Office was closed, Foster went to W ashington to be Assistant Chief 
of Engineers, and all river and harbor projects in M assachusetts south to 
Provincetown, except Benham ’s seawalls, were transferred to Colonel Thom 
at the Portland Office. On April 1, 1873 the seawalls were also transferred. 
On June 11, 1874 the projects in M assachusetts were returned to Foster at 
Boston, and the district was reestablished. But two months later, on August 
24, Foster died. Colonel Thom was again instructed to take over, and works 
in M assachusetts thereafter remained under the Portland Office until January 
18, 1883. On that date the Boston District Office was reopened under Major 
Charles W. Raymond.
In southern New England districts were reorganized a half-dozen times in 
less than thirty years. In 1870 the N ewport Office relinquished the works at 
Plymouth and Hyannis to the Boston Office and acquired jurisdiction over 
all projects on the south, or New York, shore of Long Island Sound. Two 
years later, in July 1872, it was given charge of the southern coast of M assa­
chusetts and the islands of N antucket and M artha’s Vineyard. By July 1874, 
however, its work load had apparently become unwieldy, for a new engineer 
office, under M ajor John W. Barlow, was opened at New London with juris­
diction over all harbor work on both shores of Long Island Sound. Although 
the new district included the entire Connecticut coastline, projects on the 
Connecticut River remained under the Newport Office. This arrangement 
lasted until May 1883, when the New London Office was closed and all 
works on Long Island Sound and on the Connecticut River were transferred 
to an engineer office at New York City. Thirteen years later, on August 5, 
1896, in a reorganization that was to last for still a longer time, the engineer 
office at New London was reopened, with M ajor Smith S. Leach in charge.
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The New London District took over all works on the Connecticut shore and 
the Connecticut River, while projects on the south shore of Long Island 
Sound remained under the New York Office.
A series of jurisdictional changes now took place in northern New Eng­
land. On September 30, 1899 an engineer office, headed by Major W alter L. 
Fisk, was opened at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, which was assigned all 
projects between Portland, M aine, and Lynn, M assachusetts. On April 30, 
1901, its jurisdiction was extended to works in Vermont and New York on 
Lake Champlain, which previously had been under the F irst New York, 
New York, District. But the Portsm outh District had a short life, for on 
August 31, 1903 the office was closed and its works were transferred to the 
engineer office at Boston. A year and a half later, on M arch 31, 1905, all
projects in Maine and New Hampshire were again put under the Portland 
Office. The works on Lake Champlain continued to be supervised by the 
Boston District until 1911, when they were returned to the office at New 
York City.
Until 1920 New England continued to be divided into four districts. River 
and harbor projects in the area, however, had by then greatly fallen off, and 
another reorganization was in order. On January 1 the Newport and New 
London districts were combined into a single district with its office at Pro­
vidence, Rhode Island. Initially including the states of Rhode Island and 
C onnecticut, the southern coast of M assachusetts, and the C onnecticut 
River valley in M assachusetts, the Providence District later assum ed ju ris­
diction, when flood control work began in the 1930s, over the entire drainage 
basin of the Connecticut R iver in M assachusetts, New H am pshire, and 
Vermont. On June 9, 1920 the Boston and Portland districts were merged, 
with the office at Portland becoming a suboffice of the Boston District. Ex­
tending from Eastport, on the eastern tip of Maine, to Chatham, on the 
elbow of Cape Cod, the Boston District em braced most of eastern New 
England.
New England was to have still another district, but it was one of ephem ­
eral life and microscopic size. On May 17, 1935 an engineer office was 
opened at Eastport, Maine, for the prosecution of the Passam aquoddy Tidal 
Pow er P ro jec t, L ieu ten an t C olonel Philip  B. F lem ing in charge. On 
N ovem ber 1, 1936 the office was closed and its activities were turned over to 
the Boston District. Sharing between them the C orps’ work in New England, 
the Boston and Providence districts remained in existence until O ctober 1, 
1946. On that date they were discontinued and their functions were absorbed 
into the office of the New England Division.
Engineer divisions had existed since Decem ber 3, 1888. With river and 
harbor work growing enormously, direct supervision of all districts from 
W ashington had becom e difficult. Chief of Engineers Brigadier General 
Thomas L. Casey therefore divided the country into five administrative di­
visions, assigning to each division engineer supervisory responsibilities over 
all districts within his division whose engineers were below the grade of 
lieutenant colonel.11 The N ortheast Division, whose office at New York City 
was opened by Colonel Henry L. Abbot, included six districts with territory 
stretching from the Atlantic coast to Michigan. The Newport District came 
under its jurisdiction, but the Boston and Portland districts, whose engineers 
were lieutenant colonels, continued to report directly to Washington. The 
Portland District was not absorbed into the division until April 1897, when 
Major Richard L. Hoxie became the district engineer. The incorporation of 
the Boston District occurred in two stages. Military construction came under 
divisional jurisdiction in June 1901, when District Engineer Lieutenant Colo­
nel William S. Stanton transferred fortification work in the district to Cap­
tain Harry Taylor, then engineer of the Portsm outh District. Two years later, 
following the fusion of the Boston and Portsmouth districts, civil work was 
also placed under divisional control, even though Stanton, a lieutenant colo­
nel, was still the district engineer.
Like the engineer districts, the engineer divisions were frequently re­
organized. In 1901 the N ortheast Division was redefined to include only the
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New England districts. The division engineer was usually also engineer of 
the First New York, New York, District, but the district itself did not be­
come part of the division until 1909. Over the next two decades there were 
several shifts in and out of the division by first three and then two New 
York, New York, districts, and the division was expanded to include the 
Philadelphia, Wilmington (Delaware), Baltimore, and W ashington districts. 
In 1929 the N ortheast Division was superseded by a less extensive N orth 
Atlantic Division consisting of the Boston, Providence, First and Second 
New York, Philadelphia, and Wilmington districts. Within a dozen years, 
however, through the addition of the Baltimore and W ashington districts, the 
N orth Atlantic Division had grown to the size of its p redecessor.12 Finally, 
on May 1, 1942, because of increased military construction on the eastern 
seaboard, the New England Division was carved out of the N orth Atlantic 
Division. Its office at Boston was opened by Colonel Leonard B. Gallagher. 
Four years later, when the Boston and Providence district offices were 
closed, the New England Division became an operating division with both 
district and division functions, the only such administrative unit within the 
continental United States.
Although planning and supervising large volumes of work, the New Eng­
land district offices until the mid-1930s were surprisingly small establish­
ments, employing only three or four army and civilian engineers. District 
engineers were for some time assisted by a junior officer or two assigned to 
gain practical experience, but the perennial shortage of engineer officers 
forced the curtailment of this practice in 1908. Assistant Engineer Lieutenant 
Ulysses S. Grant, III, remained with the Boston Office until July 1909, but 
thereafter the districts had no Corps officer assistants for many years. A 
handful of civilian assistant engineers and other technical people, and a few 
clerks, made up the perm anent personnel of an engineer office. In 1908 the 
Newport D istrict em ployed an assistan t engineer, a ju n io r engineer, a 
draftsman, and three clerks in the office, and three inspectors, a foreman, a 
master and steam engineer of the district’s launch, a diver, and a clerk in the 
field—a total of fourteen people. In 1918 the district’s personnel numbered 
twenty-six, with more than half engaged in coastal defense construction .13 
Districts sometimes expanded their staffs, as when extensive surveys were 
being made on the Connecticut River in 1872-73 and ten assistant engineers 
were on the payroll of the N ewport Office, but usually a district did not 
employ more than two or three civilian engineers. In addition to perm anent 
personnel, who were under Civil Service examinations and regulations, the 
districts hired artisans and laborers on a daily or monthly basis as they were 
needed.
District engineers inevitably had to be acquainted with alm ost every detail 
of the projects and problem s of their lightly-staffed offices. Until about 1912 
some district engineers were inspectors of lighthouse districts and in this 
capacity were responsible for the maintenance and construction of lights 
under the Lighthouse Service. District engineers were also officers of the 
United States Army and as such were subject to the same rules and regu­
lations as all o ther officers. Occasionally this could lead to inconveniences, 
as Major G. W. Pillsbury, engineer of the New London District, discovered 
in November 1912 when the Commanding General of the D epartm ent of the
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East ordered him to take a test ride in the vicinity of New London and 
arrange with the commanding officer of Fort Wright for a physical examina­
tion before and after the ride. Since no mounts were available at Fort 
Wright, which was a seacoast battery on nearby Fishers Island, Pillsbury 
had to use his private mount. “ As I have anticipated that this animal would 
not be used for military purposes, it has not been foraged at government 
expense and has not been kept in condition,” Pillsbury explained to the 
Commanding General. “ I am now taking steps to have her placed in condi­
tion for the ride .” The required army test, it appeared, would probably be 
less one of army officer than of non-army horse. But arrangem ents were still 
not settled, for the test ride required that one night be spent under canvas. 
“ On account of the lack of transportation,”  Pillsbury informed the Com­
manding General, “ I know of no way in which this can be done unless a tent 
is pitched in the yard of my house. Information is requested as to whether 
such a course is desired, particularly in view of the fact that it might be 
considered undignified in a civilian com m unity.” 14 Records do not reveal 
whether the major was forced to shock the citizens of New London with the 
odd ways of the Army.
Flood-control work in the 1930s and military construction in the 1940s 
enlarged the New England engineer offices beyond recognition. The pres­
sure of World W ar II, especially, swelled their personnel. Competing during 
the war with the military services and private industry in a tight labor m ar­
ket, the districts sent out recruiting team s to scour key New England cities 
for the engineers, technicians, clerks, and other people they needed. By the 
end of the war the Boston District employed about 170 engineers among a 
total personnel numbering about 565, not counting ungraded employees. The 
Providence District was about the same size, and the New England Division 
Office had a staff of 21 military personnel and 205 civilians. Simple office
Members of the Structural Section of the Design Branch, Engineering Division, of 
the Providence District, 1939. Left to right: (seated) John Pack; William Smith, Jr.; 
section chief John Dingwall; Roy Martin; Eugene Vaughn; Eli Viner; (standing) Scott 
Baird; Robert McAleer; Robert McCormack. Courtesy of William Smith Jr.
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structure, where organizational problems had not extended beyond the best 
location of the desks, had necessarily given way to bureaucratic arrange­
ments. Organization position charts of the Boston District Office for 1946 
carried more than ninety neatly connected blocks representing the offices, 
suboffices, divisions, branches, sections, subsections, and other units into 
which its personnel was divided, sorted, and arranged.
With a return to normal peacetime work the personnel of the New Eng­
land Division, which in October 1946 absorbed employees from the discon­
tinued districts, rapidly shrank. By January i947 only 614 people from the 
large wartime organization remained. In June 1950, when hostilities broke 
out in Korea, the employment figure was 556. The communist attack gal­
vanized Congress into providing for a defense posture the National Security 
Council had recommended, a huge new military construction program was 
authorized for New England, and to carry it out the division hurriedly 
searched for qualified people. Recruiting teams were again sent out, news­
paper publicity was employed, and spot announcem ents on the need for en­
gineers, inspectors, and other employees were made over radio stations. 
One Boston station donated to the Corps a five-minute broadcast five days a 
week for ten weeks in place of a paid commercial. By Septem ber 1951 the 
personnel of the division had been increased to a force of 1,065. The division
Some senior members of the New England Division enjoying an outing at Hingham, 
Massachusetts, 1958. Left to right: (front) Joseph Keefe, Finance and Accounting 
Branch; William Schmidt, Construction Division; George Smith, Finance and Ac­
counting Branch; Dominic D’Agostino, Finance and Accounting Branch; William 
Steinmetz, Comptroller; John Ferullo, Finance and Accounting Branch; William 
Conners, Chief, Budget Branch; (standing) William Smith Jr., Construction Division; 
George Messier, Budget Branch; Robert Taylor, Chief, Management Branch; Thomas 
Moran, Budget Branch; John Murphy, Procurement Branch; Henry Pickersgill, Con­
struction Division; Harold Gamble, Engineer in Charge, Cape Cod Canal; John Ek- 
lund, Chief, Construction Division; Robert Lafrenz, Executive Assistant; John 
Dooley, Finance Officer; John Wm. Leslie, Chief, Engineering Division; Thomas 
Kehoe, Budget Branch; Francis Czernicki, Chief, Finance and Accounting Branch; 
Charles Sieman, Audit Branch; John Gale, Chief, Audit Branch. Courtesy of William 
Smith, Jr.
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remained at about this strength until 1955, when the resumption of civil work 
on a large scale again pressed up the employment figure until by 1958 it 
reached a peak of 1,750. Then as both military and civil projects in New 
England tapered off, the personnel of the division dwindled almost every 
year until by May 1975 it numbered 659.15
In the days of few personnel and simple organization, the quarters of the 
New England engineer offices had consisted of only a few rented rooms in 
the business sections of their cities. Scattered and incomplete records reveal 
a number of changes in location. The Boston District Office appears to be 
typical. In 1869 it was housed in Boston City Hall. Three years later it was at 
No. 2 Bulfinch Street. In 1895 rooms were maintained in the W inthrop Build­
ing at 7 W ater Street. Upon incorporating the Portsm outh District in 1903, 
the Boston District took larger quarters in Rooms 1015-17, Barristers Hall, at 
25 Pemberton Square. There it stayed until D ecem ber 1919, when it moved 
to the thirteenth floor of the Boston Customs House. These accommodations 
sufficed until 1936, when the start of flood control work made more office 
space necessary. Additional rooms were rented at 148 State Street until Sep­
tember 1937, when the whole office was moved to the Park Square Building 
at 31 St. James Avenue.
Headquarters of the New England Division since 1958. The former Murphy Army 
Hospital, Waltham, Massachusetts.
When the New England Division was established its office was in the Sec­
ond National Bank Building at 75 Federal Street. Upon absorbing the Boston 
District in 1946 it took over the district’s quarters in the Park Square Build­
ing. The next year it moved to Building 21 of the Boston Naval Annex in 
South Boston. Following the outbreak of the Korean War, arrangements 
were made through the recently established General Services Administration 
for still larger accom m odations, and on May 21, 1951, the office was re­
located at 857 Commonwealth Avenue. In the fall of 1955 the division moved 
again, this time to the North Station Office Building at 150 Causeway Street. 
Finally, in October 1958, the division settled down at the former Murphy 
Army Hospital in the rolling environs of Waltham, about ten miles west of 
Boston. A sprawling maze of small brick buildings linked by corridors, the 
cantonment-type hospital had been built by the Boston District during World 
War II for the care of soldiers stationed around G reater B oston.16
NAVIGABLE RIVERS AND SAFE HARBORS
The coasts of New England are stabbed with several large and many small 
waterways. Between 1864 and 1975 the Army Engineers improved 172 of 
them .1 Naturally shallow and cluttered with shoals, ledges, and boulders, all 
but a dozen rivers and harbors required dredging or rock removal for the 
construction of channels, anchorages, and turning basins. At about seventy 
localities im provem ents included the building of breakw aters, je tties, or 
other structures. Projects ranged from building sand-catchers at W estport 
Harbor for $1,000 to developing Boston H arbor at a cost of over $25 million.
During the nineteenth century small rivers and harbors absorbed much of 
the attention of the New England districts. Some of these minor waterways 
served small commercial ports where coastal sailers brought in coal, grains, 
and other bulky goods and carried away lumber, quarry stone, ice, seafood, 
and local manufactures. Others sheltered fishing and lobstering fleets, and 
still others were mainly collecting points for their catches. Projects at New 
England’s larger harbors, though fewer, were generally more ambitious and 
prolonged. Often work seemed to be in a race with increasing commerce and 
bigger ships. Providence River, for example, which stretches eight miles 
from the city of Providence to N arragansett Bay, was initially obstructed by 
several shoals, and at one point the low-water depth of the channel was only 
four and a half feet. Continuing work first begun in 1852, Newport District 
engineers deepened the channel first to nine feet at mean low water, then to 
twelve, then to fourteen, and then again to twenty-three feet. In 1882 they 
begun cutting a twenty-five-foot-deep, 300-foot-wide channel and a capa­
cious anchorage basin , a pro ject tha t w ould perm it the largest ocean 
steam ers then plying the seas to reach the city.
At the turn of the tw entieth century, when there were five New England 
d is tr ic ts , im provem ents w ere co n cu rren tly  underw ay  at no less than  
sixty-six localities, excluding those on Lake Champlain, which lie outside 
the present limits of the New England Division. River and harbor projects 
then tapered off in number. Almost every waterway considered worthy of 
improvement by current standards had been or was being improved. By 
1917, the year the United States entered World War I and retired officers 
and civilians tem porarily took charge of the New England districts, projects 
had been completed on ninety-five rivers and harbors. On sixty-eight of 
th ese  w a te rw ay s , no fu r th e r  im p ro v em en ts  have  b een  m ade; on 
tw e n ty -se v en , no th in g  m ore w as done un til a f te r  W orld  W ar II. 
Im provem en ts on th irty -e ig h t w aterw ays w ere con tinued  o r renew ed 
between the wars, but projects were begun at only seven new localities.
As projects became fewer in the twentieth century, they generally became 
larger and more restricted to localities of major commercial importance. 
Shipping at small ports declined as trains and trucks took over the business 
of the coastal sailers. The scene of greatest river and harbor activity shifted 
southward to the more heavily industrial states, and projects in Maine, 
whose sawtoothed coastline had earlier seen the largest num ber of works,
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D redges a t work in N ew  E ngland w a terw ays
Dipper dredge Governor Herrick , 1914. Clamshell dredge Sta te o f  M aryland, 1947.
Hydraulic dredge General, 1947. Sea-going hopper dredge Comber, 1956.
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dwindled to a handful. Although some small waterways used primarily by 
fishing fleets were improved, most work centered on harbors im portant 
mainly for their commercial traffic.
World War II, swamping the Boston and Providence districts with military 
construction, restricted river and harbor work to a trickle. The war over, 
congressional authorization between 1945 and 1950 of forty-seven new proj­
ects promised a strong revival of navigation work. Operations had begun at 
only a dozen places, however, when hostilities erupted in Korea. Military 
construction again took priority, and river and harbor work, except for 
maintenance, diminished to two dredging projects. In 1955 work was re­
sumed on a broad scale, and by 1975 im provem ents had been made at 
thirty-two new and fifty old localities. Some sixteen additional projects were 
authorized but remained inactive pending compliance with requirem ents of 
local cooperation. Projects actively underway in any one year ranged from 
twenty-one in 1957 to three in 1972.
The resurgence of navigation work after the Korean W ar meant a prepon­
derance again of projects on small harbors, with Maine again becoming the 
scene of more works than any other state. The new burst of activity also 
evidenced a new public demand upon the civil function of the Corps of 
Engineers—the developm ent of recreational facilities. While some of the 
small projects were at minor commercial ports and fishing and seafood pro­
cessing centers, more were at harbors used as much or more by recreational 
fleets, and some were at localities used almost exclusively by recreational 
craft. Work on nineteen of these small harbors was carried out under Section 
107 of the River and Harbor Act of 1960, which permits the Corps, without 
specific congressional authorization, to accomplish certain small projects 
with general funds appropriated annually.
At major harbors, channels, anchorages, and turning basins continued to 
be developed to allow deep-draft oil tankers and other large vessels to come 
in at any tide stage. The main channels of Boston and Providence harbors 
were deepened to forty feet at mean low water, and a forty-foot channel was 
authorized for Fall River, the second largest port in M assachusetts. At Port­
land Harbor, where about 75 percent of the tonnage is crude oil brought in 
large tankers and transshipped by pipelines to refineries in Canada, the en­
trance channel was cut to forty-five feet. Thirty-five foot channels were con­
structed at B ridgeport, New H aven, Portsm outh , and W eym outh Fore 
River, the last being the location of one of the largest shipbuilding plants on 
the Atlantic coast. Channels thirty to thirty-three feet deep were dredged at 
New Bedford, Salem, and New London.
Boston Harbor, the largest and busiest in New England, was the object of 
the most extensive planning and development. Before the Civil War the 
great need of the harbor had not been improvement for navigation, but pres­
ervation. About forty-seven square miles in extent, sufficiently deep for ves­
sels of the time, and fronting directly on the Atlantic yet protected by a 
screen of islands and headlands, the harbor was generously endowed by na­
ture. It was nevertheless a fragile harbor. Tides and storms were rapidly 
wearing away its natural breakwaters, not only to the detrim ent of these 
covers themselves and of channels being filled with debris, but also to that of 
navigation in the loss of guide marks for sailing directions. Consequently,
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the years between 1825 and 1854 saw Colonels Totten, Thayer, and Benham 
building the huge granite seawalls protecting the bluffs of Georges, Deer, 
Rainsford, Castle, Lovells, and Great Brewster islands.
The politics of sectionalism and the coming of the w ar between the states 
interrupted this work, leaving the comprehensive recommendations made by 
Colonel Thayer in 1840 for protecting the Port of Boston only partially car­
ried out. Therefore for a decade after the war, the building of more seawalls 
was a principal item in broader plans for improving the harbor. In 1864 Colo­
nel Graham resumed work on the walls of Great Brewster Island and began 
repairing those on Deer and Lovells islands. By the early 1870s Colonel Ben­
ham had com pleted this work and built a new wall on Lovells Island. 
Meantime Colonels Foster and Thom had constructed walls on Long and 
Gallops islands and on Point Allerton. The walls, which rose to fourteen feet 
or more above mean high water, were most vulnerable at their foundations, 
and to protect them the engineers designed stone aprons and numerous pro­
jecting jetties for the faces and angles most exposed to storms and currents. 
Subsequent Boston District engineers extended some of the walls until they 
reached a total length of about three and three-quarter miles.
By the 1850s the art of shipbuilding was making giant technological leaps, 
and soon Boston H arbor no longer satisfied all standards of a safe and 
adequate port. For a few years there was a frenetic construction of clipper 
ships, a daring new type of vessel characterized by long, sharp lines, clouds 
of canvas, and deep draft. No sailing vessel ever approached the clippers in 
power, majesty, or speed. But winds had to be favorable, and even before
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Seawall on Gallops Island, Boston Harbor.
Photograph by 101st Photo Sect., 26th Div. Aviation, Mass. N.G.
the “ clipper fever”  began it was evident that iron steamships would soon 
replace wooden sailing vessels in the carrying of ocean freight. After the 
British-built Great Western crossed the Atlantic in fourteen and a half days 
in 1838, a number of steamship companies were organized in the United 
States and abroad. The British companies, especially, rapidly improved the 
design and construction of their steam ers, and by 1860 they were driving the 
clippers from the seas. Becoming bigger and deeper than men had once 
thought ships could be, the iron steam er was soon necessitating the deepen­
ing of Boston and other hitherto satisfactory harbors.
The first project for channel improvement in Boston H arbor was drawn up 
by Colonel Foster and adopted by Congress in 1867. It provided for a main 
ship channel 23 feet deep and 600 feet wide at mean low water. The chief 
obstacle to the entrance of large vessels into the inner harbor was the “ U p­
per Middle B ar,” a 2,200-foot-wide formation of hardpan that restricted the 
channel to 18 feet deep and 100 feet wide. Before tackling this compacted 
barrier the contractor had a powerful new dredging machine built expressly 
for the purpose, but still found the work immensely slow and difficult. 
Further slowdowns were occasioned by the discovery of a number of huge 
sunken ledges that had to be chipped away by drilling and blasting. But 
finally in 1879 the project was completed. As shipping increased and vessels 
became larger, other projects followed. By 1966, when the last project was 
completed, the main ship channel had been deepened to 40 feet and widened 
to a maximum of 1,100 feet; two more entrance channels, 30 and 35 feet 
deep, had been cut to the sea; an anchorage 40 feet deep, 2,700 feet wide, 
and 6,000 feet long had been constructed; and over a dozen tributary chan­
nels in the harbor and its arms had been dredged and blasted to depths of 
from 12 to 40 feet.
Boston H arbor was well provided with good natural covers, but not all
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New England harbors were so favored. Breakwaters, which Corps engineers 
designed and built at about two dozen localities, were necessary for their 
improvement. Varying in cross section and design according to particular 
requirements, the breakwaters range in length from a few hundred feet at 
tiny harbors like that at Criehaven, Maine, to more than two and a third 
miles, the aggregate length of three structures forming a wholly artificial 
harbor nearly a mile square at Point Judith, Rhode Island. A primary pur­
pose of many of the earlier breakw ater projects was to provide harbors of 
refuge for the sailing vessels that continued to dominate the coastal trade 
until after the turn of the century.
Breakwaters for constructing a wholly man-made harbor were first em­
ployed at Block Island, twelve miles off the Rhode Island coast. The island 
had no natural harbors, no ships could find anchor in a storm, and no decked 
vessels were owned there. The open boats of the island’s inhabitants were 
hauled upon a beach by oxen. In 1867 Congress ordered an examination and 
survey at the island for creating a harbor of refuge. Newport District En­
gineer Major H ouston made the survey, and in 1870 his successor, Major 
Warren, began the construction of an anchorage on the east side of the is­
land. By 1873 W arren had built a tem porary harbor about 300 feet square, 
dredged to 7 feet at mean low water. A nother enclosure about 800 feet 
square was then constructed outside this small basin; and a third, still larger, 
sheltered anchorage was formed by extending the main breakw ater beyond 
the enclosed areas to a distance of 1,950 feet from shore. Although work on 
retaining walls, a je tty , dredging, and portions of the breakwaters continued
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The long breakwaters at the Point Judith Harbor of Refuge.
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until 1916, the original project was essentially completed in 1879. Two years 
later Lieutenant Colonel W arren reported that the harbor was crowded to 
capacity in active seasons and that local business had so increased that a 
new dredging project was underway to accom m odate a small steam er now 
belonging to the island. Ultimately the harbor was dredged to 15 feet at mean 
low water.
Block Island Harbor of Refuge.
The breakw aters at Block Island cost about $825,000 to construct. Those 
at Point Judith, built between 1890 and 1916, the longest in New England 
and until the inflationary 1970s the most expensive, cost nearly $2.5 million. 
Almost as expensive as the Point Judith complex was a breakw ater at Sandy 
Bay, M assachusetts, that the Corps was never anxious to  build and was 
finally left only about one-quarter completed. A large bight on the northeast­
ern shore of Cape Ann, Sandy Bay lies almost exactly halfway between Bos­
ton and Portland, and apparently for this reason Congress in 1882 ordered a 
survey for the construction of a harbor of refuge. Submitting a report in 
1883, Boston District Engineer Major Charles Raymond presented a plan for 
a breakwater 9,000 feet long, estim ated to cost $4 million. He made no rec­
ommendation, however, as to the worthiness of the project. “ The proposed 
harbor will have great accessibility in the daytime in weather when the adja­
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cent coast can be seen ,” Raymond said. “ In the night and in thick weather, 
when the lights are obscured, it is a serious question whether an attem pt to 
enter it could be made with safety.” Explaining that a slight error at the 
northern entrance would bring a ship upon a rocky shore and that the east­
ern entrance was always dangerous because of outlying reefs and ledges, he 
left it to qualified mariners to answer whether it would be safer to try to 
enter the harbor in a storm or stay outside.
Evidently not finding this conclusive enough, Congress in 1884 appro­
priated $100,000 for the construction of “ a national harbor of refuge of the 
first class,” provided that a board of engineers decided that Sandy Bay was 
the best location between Boston and Portland. The special board that was 
convened  d isp layed  no g re a te r  en th u siasm  fo r the p ro jec t th an  had 
Raymond. It reported that it did not consider the construction of the harbor 
necessary or expedient at that time, but should Congress decide otherwise, 
both the location and Raym ond’s plans were the best that could be adopted. 
It increased the estim ated cost to $5 million and figured that another $2.5 
million would be necessary for lighthouses, buoys, and defense.
The m atter would probably have ended there had not “ interested parties” 
approached Secretary of W ar William C. Endicott in April 1885. Arguing 
that the expenditure of the $100,000 available would be to the substantial 
benefit of commerce by clearly marking a ledge from which the breakw ater 
was to be extended, they asked him to direct that operations be commenced.
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Long Beach, it is exposed to storms from north through east. The break­
water completed by the New England Division in 1971, which runs easterly and 
then southeasterly out from shore for about 3,500 feet, creates a protected 
anchorage sixty acres in extent. Provincetown H arbor, lying within a sandy 
hook on the tip of Cape Cod, was splendidly protected by nature from Atlan­
tic storms from the east, north, and w est, but was exposed to bad weather 
sweeping up from the south across Cape Cod Bay. The new Provincetown 
breakwater, a 2,500-foot-long offshore barrier completed in 1972, now pro­
vides a safe anchorage for Provincetown’s fishing fleet and the large number 
of transient vessels that put into the harbor.4
Plymouth Harbor Breakwater.
Several breakwaters built in New England by the Corps were designed, 
not to shelter anchorages, but to arrest dangerous tidal cross currents or to 
protect river or harbor entrances. The largest breakw ater of the latter type 
was built at the mouth of the Saco River in Maine. Navigable for about six 
miles to the cities of Saco and Biddeford, the Saco wound over numerous 
ledges and shoals before discharging into the sea through a wide sandy beach 
where the depth over the bar was only two feet at mean low water. In 1866 
Congress authorized the repair of the piers built inside and at the mouth of 
the river thirty years before. But since the piers at the entrance had failed to 
deepen the water over the bar, M ajor Alexander, during his brief supervision 
of projects in Maine, recommended replacing them with a long breakwater 
extending from the north side of the river’s mouth, which would better hold 
the channel out into the sea. Lieutenant Colonel Thom began the project the 
next year. Reporting in 1869 that 2,550 feet of the breakw ater had been com ­
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pleted, Thom claimed with too much optimism that it had already accom ­
plished everything expected of it: it had closed the old circuitous channel 
and formed a deeper, more uniform, and more direct one. U nder succeeding 
projects to 1938, the breakw ater was raised, strengthened, and extended 
6,600 feet into the sea; a jetty  was built out 4,800 feet from the south side of 
the river’s mouth to contract the channel and obtain more w ater over the 
bar; small fender jetties within the ri ver were repaired and two jetties were 
built to serve as contraction works; and dredging and ledge excavation was 
carried out to a depth of eight feet at mean low water. Although the works at 
the mouth of the river did not achieve the perm anent seven-foot depth that 
had originally been expected, they did succeed in creating a straighter and 
deeper channel. While the depth over the bar varies from time to time, five 
feet at mean low w ater is generally available by action of the river’s current. 
A project depth of eight feet to the head of navigation, adopted in 1925, is 
maintained by periodic dredging.
Saco River Breakwater and Jetty.
Je tties  w ere built by N ew  E ng land 's  Engineers at m ore than  th irty  
localities. Some were intended as fender piers, others were built to control 
river or tidal currents or to protect shores from erosion, and still others were 
designed as contraction works. One of the largest je tty  projects was at N an­
tucket H arbor, where Lieutenant P rescott’s pioneer efforts at dredging in 
New England earlier in the century had been erased by a single storm. Ex­
cept for the small harbor of Hyannis on the north side of N antucket Sound, 
N antucket H arbor offered the only shelter between the harbors of M artha’s 
Vineyard, thirty-two miles to the west, and Provincetown, eighty miles to 
the north, for vessels navigating the dangerous waters of the sound. Pur­
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suant to a congressional directive in 1879, Lieutenant Colonel W arren pre­
pared plans that he believed would increase the mean-low-water depth over 
the harbor’s wide bar from six to twelve or fourteen feet. He proposed the 
construction of a je tty , or if necessary, two jetties, across the bar so as to 
arrest the motion of littoral sand and concentrate tidal currents in the chan­
nel. Unlike other places were contraction works had been built, Nantucket 
H arbor had no river currents to assist outgoing tides, but it had been ob­
served that outgoing tides had a greater scouring effect by them selves than 
incoming ones, and thus more material would be carried out of the channel 
than carried in. If the project were successful, the harbor would be available 
as a harbor of refuge. And any increase in channel depth, W arren figured, 
would aid communications with the island, which was already becoming an 
important summer resort. Begun in 1880, the project dragged on for nearly 
sixty years, appropriations for it averaging only about $8,000 annually. One 
benefit of this long period of construction was that it provided time to exper­
iment and observe results. Before two converging jetties were finally com ­
pleted in 1937 to lengths of 6,987 and 5,000 feet, they had been built to 
varying heights and cross sections to find the best proportions for controlling 
the scour. Dredging, provided for by a modification of the project in 1886 if 
scouring did not result in the expected channel depth, was begun in 1905 and 
completed in 1930. Since then the controlling depth has never been less than 
twelve feet, and dredging has been necessary only a few times to maintain a 
depth of fifteen feet. More than doubling the depth of a form er shallow and 
tortuous channel by natural scour, the N antucket project is an outstanding 
example of the successful application of contraction works.
Jetties built at the mouth of the Connecticut River at Saybrook and at
Contraction-works jetties at Nantucket Harbor.
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several other places were also successful in deepening w ater over the bars. 
The most troublesome jetty  project was at New buryport H arbor. By the 
close of the Civil W ar the long-neglected jetties designed by Major Totten in 
the Corps’ first tidew ater experim ent with contraction works had been de­
stroyed, and the channel over the bar was only from five to seven feet deep. 
Unlike the bars at most river entrances, the bar at the mouth of the Mer­
rimack was not formed by the dropping of debris as the river’s current 
slowed down upon entering the sea, but by the rolling in of sand by ocean 
waves. The river struggled to keep its entrance open at even a shallow 
depth, and the channel and the sandy points on either side of the entrance 
were constantly shifting their positions. The plan of improvement for the 
harbor, drawn up by Lieutenant Colonel Thom and modified by the Board of 
Engineers in 1880, aimed at securing a depth of seventeen feet across the bar 
by the construction of converging rubblestone jetties extending from Salis­
bury and Plum Island points. An actual depth of seventeen feet, it was as­
sumed, would guarantee, even during storms, a navigable depth of thirteen 
and a half feet.
By 1885 the north je tty  had been pushed out from its anchoring point 
about 2,000 feet, and the south jetty  about 1,000 feet. Major Raymond, who 
had taken over the project two years before on the reestablishm ent of the 
Boston District, reported that the depth over the bar had increased three feet 
since the beginning of the project, and that half the gain had been made in 
the past year. “ These works, being an attem pt to improve the mouth of a 
river on a sandy coast, are of great scientific in terest,” he commented. 
“ Such attem pts have generally proved failures, but in this case there is rea­
son to expect success.” 5 But the constant action of storms driving in sand 
was to limit the success of the project severely. Construction on the jetties 
continued until they were completed in 1914. The south jetty  measures 2,415 
feet in length, and the north je tty , 4,118 feet. They converge until 1,000 feet 
apart and then extend seaward parallel to the axis of the channel for 1,000 
feet. During the period of construction the channel changed in depth from 
year to year, measuring anyw here from eight to thirteen feet; and the com­
pletion of the jetties had little effect on this constant variation. The jetties 
provided somewhat more w ater over the bar—the usual minimum depth was 
nine feet—but shifting sands continued to change conditions rapidly and 
frequently.6
Damage to the Newburyport jetties by storms necessitated m ajor rehabili­
tation of them in 1936 and again in 1970; and betw een 1937 and 1942 gov­
ernment dredges twice deepened the channel to fifteen feet. In 1945 a project 
was adopted, subject to local cooperation, providing for a channel fifteen 
feet deep through the bar and twelve feet deep to the city’s wharves. Pend­
ing compliance with the requirem ents of local cooperation, the channel 
would be improved to depths of twelve and nine feet. Nothing more was 
done at the harbor, however, until 1958, when the channel was dredged to 
the lesser depths of the project, the plans for the greater depths having 
realistically been relegated to the inactive category. Since then maintenance 
dredging to maintain twelve feet of w ater over the bar has been carried out 
every few years.
Jetties, or wing-dams, as well as training walls and dikes, were also con-
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The jetties at Newburyport Harbor, March 1969.
structed upstream  in several New England rivers, including the Kennebec, 
Thames, and Housatonic. Most of these projects were small works built in 
the nineteenth century, and by deepening w ater somewhat over shoals they 
were of benefit to the shallow-draft commercial river vessels of that time.
The most extensive efforts to improve river navigation were naturally 
made on the Connecticut River, New England’s longest navigable waterway. 
In the early developm ent of central New England, freight had been moved 
on the river in small boats of light draft to points more than two hundred 
miles above its mouth. Rapids at several places had been surmounted by 
dams and navigation canals constructed by private enterprise. By the post- 
Civil W ar era, however, all that remained of these works was the W indsor 
Locks Canal, and a rock-filled, timber-crib dam to divert w ater into the 
canal, at Enfield Rapids, about sixty-three miles from the river’s mouth. 
Since the canal, built by the Connecticut River Company in the early 1830s, 
could not accommodate vessels drawing more than three feet of water, navi­
gation for all practical purposes ended at H artford, fifty-two miles up the 
river from the sea. T hirty-four miles above H artford , a pow er dam at 
Holyoke, M assachusetts, completely interrupted navigation.
Below Enfield Rapids the m ajor obstructions to navigation were river bars 
scattered for about ten miles on either side of Hartford. The Connecticut at 
this point flows through an alluvial region. Its banks are easily eroded, caus­
ing constant changes of its bed and the formation of shoals at every flood 
stage. Major H ouston, who made the first postw ar survey of the river in 
1867, observed that piers for confining the channel built some years before 
by private agencies were now either dangerous obstructions or covered by 
deposits. He therefore advised against the construction of perm anent works 
in the area. The channel could be kept open, he believed, only by annual 
dredging.
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One of the three small navigation locks at the downstream end of the Windsor Locks 
Canal, 1940.
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G ouvem eur W arren, coming to the Newport District in 1870, thought dif­
ferently. Between Hartford and Enfield Rapids, a distance of about eleven 
miles, shoaling sometimes left depths of only eighteen inches at low water, 
and Warren hoped to secure a perm anent depth of three to four feet by the 
use of wing-dams. Since the W indsor Locks Canal could not pass vessels of 
more than three-foot draft, no greater depth in the river was necessary for 
the time being. During the next decade W arren constructed jetties at five 
bars. He never regarded them as more than tem porary improvements of lim­
ited capacity, however, and by the time he had finished the last of them, he 
obviously thought they did not have even that value. In his annual report of 
1881 he noted that while at locations where work had been done the results 
were still satisfactory, changes that had taken place elsewhere in the river 
had left it at extreme low water in about its original unnavigable condition.
Below Hartford the river was kept open after 1870 to steam ers running 
between Hartford and New York City by annual dredging to a depth of nine 
feet. Hoping for more perm anent improvement of the channel, W arren in 
1880 began the construction of training walls and jetties at six of the worst 
bars. In 1887, however, when works had been com pleted at two places and 
the bars still had to be dredged every year about as much as before, the 
project was abandoned. Perm anent works in the river were not tried again 
until 1911, when a project was adopted to provide a twelve-foot channel to 
Hartford by dredging and by the construction, for sixteen miles below the 
city, of spur dikes, training walls, and revetm ents. U nder this project some 
construction was carried out every year, largely by hired labor, until 1929. 
Training walls and spur dikes of tim ber and stone, and revetm ents of riprap 
and brush, were built along the river at more than a dozen places bearing 
intriguing names such as Cys Hollow, Press Barn Reach, and Pistol Point 
Bar. In 1935 a new project provided for a fifteen-foot channel to Hartford 
and for additional dikes, training walls, and revetm ents. The channel was 
dredged to project depth by 1937, but only a few of the regulatory structures 
were completed. The channel to Hartford was kept open by maintenance 
dredging, and new work on the Connecticut focused on improvements at 
recreational boating centers near the river’s mouth.
While navigation .was being improved on the Connecticut River below 
Hartford, projects fo r im provem ent betw een H artford  and H olyoke re­
mained on the drawing board, the victims of complexities that often exist in 
the planning of public works.
In 1878 G ouvem eur W arren submitted plans for opening this upper stretch 
of the river to larger vessels by the construction of a seventeen-mile-long 
canal from below H artford to the head of Enfield Rapids. The canal, and 
dredging above it, would provide an eight-foot channel to Holyoke. Justify­
ing the proposal, W arren observed that it would reduce transportation costs 
of bulky articles into a large manufacturing region reached only by railroads. 
Although river and harbor im provem ent received much of its support in this 
period of largely unregulated private enterprise precisely because it offered a 
competitive means of reducing railroad rates, W arren’s scheme was shelved. 
He estim ated that the im provem ent would cost about $3 million, a figure that 
seemed to outweigh expected benefits of the plan.
N o further studies were made until 1896, when Congress ordered a new
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Construction of a training wall at Clay Banks, Connecticut River, 1914.
Construction of brush and riprap revetments at Cys Hollow, Connecticut River, 1915
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survey. The next year M ajor Smith S. L each , in charge of the newly 
reopened New London Office, submitted a favorable report, estimating that 
the cost of im provem ent, including locks and dams for surm ounting the 
rapids, would be about $2 million. The river towns of southern M assachu­
setts, suddenly seeing themselves again the thriving ports they had been a 
century before, energetically backed the proposal, and the M assachusetts 
legislature sent lobbyists to Washington. Hartford interests, on the other 
hand, were not at all eager to see commerce bypassing their city. For the 
next dozen years a controversy raged over the desirability of the improve­
ment, and Congress ordered several more surveys and reviews of reports. 
Each time, however, the Corps submitted an unfavorable recommendation. 
The cost of surmounting the rapids would be at least $3 million, the En­
gineers reported , and unless w aterpow er could be developed by private 
interests in connection with the project, the cost to the United States would 
be out of proportion with expected benefits to navigation and com m erce.7 
Development of pow er by the federal government itself was a recom m enda­
tion the Corps had no authority to advance; it was outside the thinking of 
most people of the time, and beyond the reach of political possibilities.
In 1909 the Connecticut River Company, which was already using the 
canal at Enfield for small power plants and had not previously been disposed 
to enlarge its facilities, and a newly organized corporation, the Northern 
Connecticut Power Company, both petitioned Congress for the privilege of 
developing w aterpow er at Enfield Rapids; and in this context Congress or­
dered another examination and survey. The Board of Engineers, in keeping 
with policy set by President Theodore Roosevelt that the government be 
com pensated for waterpower rights, recommended that private interests as­
sume responsibility for all damage claims and for constructing a lock and 
dam at Enfield Rapids, which would become the property of the United 
States.
In 1913 this scheme for making the navigation project justifiable was 
modified when a bill authorizing the Connecticut River Company to con­
struct a pow er dam was referred by the Senate to Secretary of W ar Henry L. 
Stimson for comment. On the advice of the Chief of Engineers, Stimson 
recommended that the company be required to pay a reasonable annual re­
turn to the federal government for the power rights, this com pensation to be 
applied to the improvement of navigation. The United States would pay for 
construction work on the dam that was exclusively in the interests of naviga­
tion and would have title and control of such property. In this revised form 
the bill passed the Senate but was killed in the House by congressmen who 
claimed that federal legislation respecting waterpow er on the Connecticut 
River violated states’ rights. Meanwhile Congress had ordered still another 
examination and survey. Reporting in 1915, New London District Engineer 
G. P. Pillsbury came to the same conclusions as had the Board of Engineers 
earlier. He deemed the improvement of the river advisable, provided that 
waterpower or other interests assum ed all responsibility for damage claims 
and constructed a suitable lock and dam at Enfield, to  be deeded to the 
United S tates.8
There the m atter rested until 1928, when the Northern Connecticut Power 
Company, which had meantime acquired the w ater rights at Enfield Rapids
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from the Connecticut River Company, was granted a license by the Federal 
Power Commission (established in 1920) to construct a lock and dam. This 
revived interest in the navigation question, and the House Committee on 
Rivers and Harbors requested the Board of Engineers to review the C orps’ 
last report on the improvement of the river. Submitting its findings in April 
1930, the board noted that ten highway and railroad bridges lay between 
Hartford and Holyoke, all of which would have to be provided with draw or 
lift spans to allow passage of the type of freight steam ers now plying the 
lower river. Since local interests were opposed to modifying the bridges, the 
board recom m ended that no im provem ent be made. The M assachusetts 
towns thereupon immediately about-faced and agreed to modify the bridges, 
and a week later the board issued a second report favoring improvement. 
The project it recommended provided for the extension of the twelve-foot 
channel from H artford  to H olyoke by dredging and suitable regulatory 
works; for the construction by private interests of a lock and dam at Enfield 
Rapids; and for the lengthening by the federal government of the lock at 
Enfield and the construction of a low dam and lock near Hartford, which 
would create a pool covering the shallow stretch of the river to Enfield. 
Terms of local cooperation included the modification of the bridges and the 
provision of satisfactory terminal facilities by the upriver cities.9
Despite strong opposition from Connecticut forces, Congress included the 
project in the River and Harbor Act of 1930, and at last it appeared that a 
channel would be cleared from Holyoke to the sea. Then suddenly the power 
company decided not to build the dam; and in Septem ber 1931 the Federal 
Power Commission was forced to revoke its license. Why the company 
made this decision remains a subject of conjecture, but most likely it was 
simply that the economic collapse of 1929 made the pow er enterprise less 
attractive than it had seemed the year before.10
The M assachusetts towns now clamored for the federal government to 
construct the entire works, including the pow er dam at Enfield; and again 
the Corps of Engineers was ordered by the House Committee on Rivers and 
Harbors to review the project. Providence District Engineer Major Charles 
J. Taylor, reporting early in 1933, recommended the construction of a lock 
and dam so designed that the work could later be modified for the develop­
ment of power. He was overruled, how ever, by all his superiors, who 
thought the costs involved too great and the public benefits too limited. The 
Chief of Engineers therefore recommended no alteration of the authorized 
project except a change of wording to permit the construction of the lock 
and dam at Enfield by any state, municipal, or private interest under license 
by the Federal Power Commission, a modification that was included in the 
River and Harbor Act of 1935.11
This was hardly the action the upriver towns wanted, and even before the 
final passage of the act of 1935 the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors 
had again requested the Board of Engineers to review the Corps’ last re­
ports. New studies, changing circum stances, and a somewhat altered ap­
proach to the problem resulted in a reversal of the Corps’ previous findings. 
The new proposal, drawn up by Providence District Engineer Lieutenant 
Colonel John S. Bragdon, was sent to Congress in January 1939. Bragdon 
recommended that the authorized plan of improvement be modified to pro­
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vide fo r the  c o n s tru c tio n  and  im m ed ia te  o p e ra tio n  o f a co m b in ed  
navigation-power developm ent at Enfield Rapids, the combined benefits of 
which would, in view of prospective river traffic and present pow er values, 
be in excess o f co sts . B ragdon also  p ro p o sed , as an o th er n ecessary  
modification to make the project economically feasible, that the term s of 
local cooperation regarding bridge draws or lifts be changed to require 
vertical bridge clearances of twenty feet. The principal transportation line 
operating barges on the river promised to provide vessels to handle the 
twenty-foot clearances, which meant that only four bridges would have to be 
raised and one draw span installed. Bragdon estimated the cost of the project 
to the government at about $12 million.12
At hearings conducted by the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors 
Bragdon’s proposal was supported by the M assachusetts river cities and a 
nu m b er o f in d u s tr ie s  and was o p p o sed  by the  e n tire  C o n n ec ticu t 
congressional delegation  and by pow er, ra ilroad , ra ilroad  labor, coal 
(because considerable petroleum would be transported), and other interests. 
The committee, after first rejecting the project by a close vote, ultimately 
approved it. But the full House, which in 1939 had few supporters of public 
power schemes, decisively defeated the proposal. Attem pts by proponents 
of the Enfield project to secure its adoption by Congress in 1941 and again in 
1943 also failed to secure favorable action.13
Yet the Enfield power and navigation project was still not dead. In 1946 
Congress called for another examination and survey of the Connecticut 
River, and the next year the House Committee on Rivers and H arbors re­
quested a review of the 1939 report on the river between Hartford and 
Holyoke. Under these authorizations the New England Division conducted 
more studies, on which it reported in June 1949. The division recommended 
providing a sixteen-foot channel to Hartford and a twelve-foot channel from 
Hartford to Holyoke. Rather than building a low dam at Hartford to back 
water to Enfield, as previously contem plated, it proposed dredging a naviga­
tion channel. At Enfield it proposed to construct a somewhat higher dam, 
with considerably greater generating capacity, than had been envisioned 
under the previous plan. The cost to the government of the project would be 
close to $32 million.14
At public hearings on the project, old alignments rather startlingly went 
somewhat topsy-turvy. The power company that now controlled the w ater 
rights at Enfield no longer opposed the project, but applied to the Federal 
Power Commission for permission to construct the powerhouse and install 
the generating equipment. Connecticut state authorities followed in train and 
abandoned official opposition to the proposal. A num ber of M assachusetts 
interests, on the other hand, no longer favored it, claiming that the higher 
dam by backing water upstream  would in one way or another cause them 
financial injury. But in general most M assachusetts spokesmen still tended 
to favor the project, and had it been considered by Congress it apparently 
would have received greater local support than in the past. The project, 
however, was not approved by the Board of Engineers, which felt that its 
navigation benefits had not been clearly established.15
The enthusiasm of upriver interests for improving the stream for commer­
cial navigation, however mixed it may have been in 1949, was in later years
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to wane. When the House Committee on Public Works, in June 1964, issued 
another request for the Corps to review its reports of 1939, its concern was 
not cargo carriers but a new and expanding business—recreational boating.
Various state and local officials, as well as private interests of the com ­
munities betw een Hartford and Holyoke, wanted a navigable channel be­
tween the two cities that would permit small craft to run the whole river 
from Long Island Sound to Holyoke. Division engineers, looking for the best 
means of providing safe and dependable passage for recreational craft, at 
first considered the construction of a low-elevation dam at Hartford that 
would form a navigable pool extending upstream  to W indsor Locks. Federal, 
state, and local fish and wildlife agencies, however, said that the plan would 
result in the loss of 60 percent of a shad spawning area. When the engineers 
considered placing the dam several miles up the river beyond a tributary 
stream, the fish and wildlife agencies protested that it would still flood 45 
percent of the shad spawning area. The engineers then decided upon a 
dredged channel six feet deep to W indsor Locks, where a small navigation 
lock would lift boats thirty-three feet into the W indsor Lock Canal, whose 
channel would also be deepened to six feet. The plan further required the 
construction of a small dam in the canal downstream from the lock to main­
tain adequate pool elevation and the replacem ent of the existing lock at the 
head of the canal with a flood-control gate. The cost of the improvement was 
estimated at $9 million, to which local interests would be required to con­
tribute half. They would also be responsible for operating and maintaining 
the project, acquiring Enfield dam and the upper four miles of the canal from 
their owner, and various lesser obligations. These requirem ents were more 
than local interests cared to meet. Although expressing interest in the plan, 
they claimed that they could not participate in it financially. Thereupon Di­
vision Engineer Colonel John H. Mason, winding up the m atter in 1973, 
recommended that no improvement be made for the p resen t.16
For over one hundred years Army Engineers thus devoted an enormous 
amount of time and expertise to studies and plans for improving a thirty- 
four-mile stretch of the Connecticut River. Technically, improvement was 
always feasible, but technical feasibility was only one of many considera­
tions that had to be taken into account. Costs in relation to benefits, conflict­
ing economic interests, reversals of attitudes, changing navigational needs, 
problems relating to non-federal contributions, and recently em phasized 
considerations of ecological impact all helped to shape the history of this 
proposed navigation improvement.
Dredging waterways and building breakw aters and jetties were the major 
river and harbor activities of Army Engineers in New England, but by no 
means the only ones. At Plymouth and Provincetown they continued the 
work of preserving the harbor-protecting beaches by the construction of bulk­
heads, jetties, dikes, and catch-sand fences; and at several other harbors 
they carried out smaller but similar projects. At Woods Hole, M assachu­
setts, they constructed an anchorage basin for the use of the United States 
Fish Commission and other governmental agencies. They constructed dikes 
for a variety of purposes, erected spindles and beacons to mark rocks in 
channels, and at a num ber of places removed wrecks and old bridges that 
were hazards to navigation.
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Plan of pier to form an anchorage basin at Woods Hole, 1883.
Like most river and harbor work of the Corps until fairly recent years, 
these projects were directed wholly to the improvement of navigation. That 
was what public and congressional interest dictated. But at least one small 
project was of a different kind. At Newport, Rhode Island, a causeway be­
tween Coaster H arbor Island and Rhode Island closed off a small cove, 
water could not flow freely through the causeway’s one small opening, and 
deposits built up, creating noxious odors. In 1891-92 the N ewport District 
dredged the cove and pierced the causeway with several bridge trusses. An 
insignificant project, and perhaps from the viewpoint of a later generation 
one that only perm itted sewage to flow out to sea, it nevertheless appears to 
have been the first in New England directed tow ard environm ental im­
provement, which currently absorbs much of the C orps’ attention.
The causeway to Coaster H arbor Island did not impede navigation, but
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New England district engineers encountered the problem  of man-made 
obstructions in other waterways. “ Throughout the country ,” writes the his­
torian of the Refuse Act of 1899, “ industries were building wharves and 
piers, municipalities were filling in open water, sawmills and factories were 
dumping refuse, and cities were disposing of rubbish, dredged spoil and 
sewage without regard to the effects on navigable streams. Bridge building 
had become a splendid art carried on in a legal wilderness of special laws by 
Congress and the sta tes.” 17 All these activities encroached upon constitu­
tional powers over navigable waterways claimed by the federal government 
since the time of John Marshall. Before the Civil W ar there had been little 
need to exercise this authority. The aggravation of abuses and the growing 
federal investment in waterways after the war, however, made its invocation 
more compelling.
Portland District Engineer George Thom called attention to the obstruc­
tion of streams in Maine as early as 1867. Directed to improve the St. Croix 
River, which m arks the lower portion of the boundary between Maine and 
New Brunswick, Thom reported that the river was choked with slabs, edg­
ings, and sawdust, which had been accumulating for more than thirty years 
from sawmills near Calais. If the river were cleaned out, he cautioned, it 
would soon be closed again unless this dumping of waste was stopped. The 
next year Thom made a survey of the Penobscot River below Bangor and 
reported even worse obstructions. Sawmill waste thrown into the stream  for 
more than fifty years had accumulated to an average depth of ten feet, and in 
places to more than eighteen feet. To restore the channel to its original con­
dition for a three-and-a-half mile stretch below the city would require the 
excavation of more than five million cubic yards of material. Thom, there­
fore, recommended for the present merely the cutting of a passable channel. 
And again he advised that perm anent improvement was impossible unless 
the mills were prevented from throwing in waste. He added, however, that 
recent state laws had in great measure accomplished this prohibition.
The Maine laws proved to be wholly ineffective. Beginning work on the 
Penobscot in 1871, Thom was soon complaining that millwaste continued to 
be thrown into the stream. Finding the same situation on several other rivers 
in his district for which appropriations had been made, he repeatedly rec­
ommended that Congress withhold funds for their improvement until this 
obstruction of navigable rivers was prevented by federal legislation. But 
Congress continued to vote appropriations, and Thom was obliged to carry 
out the work. In each case it was not long before the river was again impass­
able or more work was necessary to keep it open.
Only on the St. Croix was work postponed, and this was because of its 
international nature. The appropriation of 1867 had been made with the pro­
viso that New Brunswick contribute a like amount. Between 1873 and 1909 
Congress three more times voted funds for the river and five times ordered 
new surveys. But the government of Canada steadfastly refused to cooperate 
in the project until satisfactory assurances were made that the dumping of 
waste would be permanently stopped.18 Portland District engineers invar­
iably agreed with this position and favored improvement of the river only if 
the practice were brought to an end. “ To remove the refuse of the mills from 
the river without taking any measures to prevent the necessity for repeating
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the expense at some future day ,” said Jared Smith politely in 1886, ‘‘is a 
proposition which cannot be com m ended.” 19 It was not until 1911 that suffi­
cient assurances against dumping were obtained and an agreem ent with 
Canada was made. On the basis of the commercial benefit of the improve­
ment to each side, Canada agreed to bear ten percent of the cost. Dredging 
of a twelve-foot channel began in 1912 and was completed in 1916. By this 
time, however, the project was of little value. During most of the fifty years 
of delay Calais had been a busy port. Even though vessels in the lumber 
trade had had to drop down river nearly four miles after being partially 
loaded and it had been necessary to  lighter a large part of the freight of all 
kinds to deep water, the annual value of waterborne commerce had often 
been several million dollars. In 1920 it was less than $350,000. The river is 
now used chiefly by a small fishing fleet.
Colonel Thom ’s suggestions for legislation prohibiting the obstruction of 
waterways were the first voiced by the Corps of Engineers. They were soon 
being echoed by other army engineers and other interests. At the instigation 
of the New York City Cham ber of Commerce, Representative Abram S. 
Hewitt introduced a bill in Congress in 1876 to prohibit the dumping of waste 
materials in navigable waters. It died in committee. The next year the Chief 
of Engineers, Andrew A. Hum phreys, sent to Congress the draft of a new 
bill that covered not only dumping but also the obstruction of waterways by 
bridges or any other construction.20 The broader nature of H um phreys’s bill 
owed something to New England district engineers. Thom had added the 
building of bridge piers and draws to his complaints coming down from Port­
land, and Major W arren at Newport was complaining about present and pro­
spective bridge obstructions in the Pawtucket River of Rhode Island and 
w anting  to  know  if th e re  w ere  any  legal m eans to  co n tro l b ridge 
c o n s tru c tio n .21
Hum phreys’s bill, like H ew itt’s, was set aside in the House of Representa­
tives, as were several later bills. Despite increasing federal appropriations 
for w aterways, the obstruction of them  did not arouse much interest in 
Congress. It was easy to view most obstructions as petty and local, and 
opposition to corrective action from railroads, bridge companies, and other 
interests was strong.22
But the problem of obstructions was of growing concern to the Corps, and 
at the urgings of the W ar Departm ent some progress was made, usually by 
attaching proposals to river and harbor bills, which few congressmen cared 
to endanger or delay. Minor gains were made between 1880 and 1890 by 
giving the Secretary of W ar greater authority to clear wrecks from navigable 
waters. Under this authority the New England districts by 1917 had arranged 
for the removal of 315 wrecks, over half of them in the vicinity of Cape Cod 
and Nantucket Sound. More im portant was the authority given to  the Secre­
tary of War in August 1888 to order the alteration of bridges that obstructed 
navigation. The act was hardly printed before the Boston and N ewport dis­
tricts recommended the alteration of nine bridges across the Charles River 
and one spanning the Taunton River. When the Old Colony Railroad Com­
pany refused to alter the Taunton River bridge, the Secretary filed a com­
plaint with the Justice Departm ent as provided in the law. During the next
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three decades the New England districts required the owners of forty-six 
bridges to meet specifications they made for changes.23
The act of 1888 also em powered the Secretary of W ar to establish harbor 
lines beyond which no piers or wharves could be extended or deposits made 
except under regulations that might later be prescribed by law. Two days 
after the law was passed the Chief of Engineers appointed a board of en­
gineers, which included the Boston District engineer, to  determ ine harbor 
lines at Boston. The next three New England localities at which harbor lines 
were established were the unlikely small ports of Stamford, Connecticut, 
and Lubec and Bath, Maine. The appointment of a board of engineers to 
draw lines at Stamford resulted from a petition to their senator from citizens 
of the town objecting to a pier that was about to be built into a channel the 
Engineers had ju st dredged. At Lubec and Bath, narrow channels and rapid 
tidal currents prom pted District Engineer Jared Smith to nip quickly propos­
als for the extensions of wharves that were arousing protests. Two decades 
after the passage of the act of 1888, lines had been established at thirty-five 
New England harbors either by district engineers or special boards of en­
gineers. In each case consideration was given to all interests involved. The 
district engineer or board was required to make a full report to the Engineer 
Department as to the necessity of the action, to hold a public hearing, and to 
consult with municipal authorities.24
Complete success in the protection of waterways appeared to be won with 
the River and Harbor Act of Septem ber 1890. A bloated piece of legislation 
making appropriations for 413 projects and 203 examinations and surveys, 
the bill was amended by senators in conference committee to include all the 
regulatory provisions for which the Chief of Engineers and other advocates 
of protective legislation had long been asking. Upon being sent back to the 
House, the revised bill was accepted without debate by members anxious to 
vote for the great pork-barrel measure and get home for the N ovem ber elec­
tions. The act made it unlawful to dump into waterways waste of any kind 
that obstructed navigation; to build any structure that might impair naviga­
tion or to change the course or condition of a navigable channel without 
permission of the Secretary of War; or to construct any bridge over a navig­
able waterway until the location and plan had been approved by the Secre­
tary of W ar.25
The provision relating to the construction of bridges worked well. Its first 
application in New England was to a bridge connecting Little Island with the 
mainland at Osterville on Cape Cod, plans for which were recommended for 
the Secretary’s approval by the Newport District engineer in May 1891. 
Plans for 130 other new or reconstructed bridges were investigated and rec­
ommended by the New England districts during the first two decades after 
the passage of the ac t.26
Other sections of the act soon proved to be less effective. An unfortunate 
phrase in the prohibition against dumping obliged the government to show 
that each act of dumping had individually obstructed a waterway—a crip­
pling requirement since obstructions generally resulted from an accumulation 
of deposits. With respect to structures that impaired navigation, a resound­
ing declaration prohibiting “ the creation of any obstruction . . .  to the navig­
84
able capacity of any w aters” was followed in the next sentence by the 
exemption of “ structures erected for business purposes” —an exception that 
practically vitiated the prohibition. No provisions were made for gathering 
evidence against violators, nor was authority given to appropriate govern­
ment officers to make arrests.
Wanting new legislation, the Corps got its first real opportunity in 1896 
when the House Committee on Rivers and H arbors asked for its assistance 
in drafting that year’s omnibus bill. An astute attorney was sent to the Hill, 
who inserted a provision in the bill directing the Secretary of W ar to compile 
all existing laws relating to the protection and preservation of waterways and 
suggest necessary revisions. The Corps now had the chance to draft a bill 
containing the reforms it desired. Three years later Senator William P. Frye 
of Maine inserted the proposals in the river and harbor bill of 1899 and 
adroitly maneuvered them through Congress with bland assertions that the 
am endm ents prepared by the Chief of Engineers involved no real changes 
but only codification of existing law s.27
The changes were actually of enormous significance. Section 10 of the act 
of 1899 forbade any obstruction to navigation not “ affirmatively authorized” 
by Congress and made it unlawful to build any structures or make any exca­
vations or alterations in navigable waters except by plans recommended by 
the Chief of Engineers and approved by the Secretary of War. Section 
13—the Refuse Act of 1899— was equally com prehensive because of its 
simplicity. It uncomplicatedly prohibited the discharge or deposit of “ any 
refuse m atter of any kind or description” —except municipal sewage—in 
navigable waters of the United States and their tributaries. Since the phrase, 
“ which shall tend to impede or obstruct navigation,” of the act of 1890 was 
discarded, it was no longer necessary to show that any particular act of 
dumping obstructed navigation. Customs officials and Corps personnel were 
empowered to arrest violators. As in the earlier act, the Corps was au­
thorized to issue permits prescribing conditions under which deposits of ma­
terial not obstructing navigation might be m ade.28
The sweeping assertions of federal authority over waterways contained in 
Sections 10 and 13 provided the legal bases for a program of permits set up by 
the Corps to protect navigation. The adm inistration of the program, at first 
rather improvisional, was gradually developed and improved until by 1917 
detailed  regulations defining perm it p rocedures had been w orked out. 
Printed regulations explained the law and provided form letters and speci­
men drawings to assist applicants. Such instructions have been periodically 
reissued, and investigations have been carried out, permits granted, and 
abuses checked by small staffs in the engineer offices, all as a routine, not 
very visible, but im portant part of the C orps’ daily activities.29 From the 
beginning of the program through 1946, the Boston District and its earlier 
components issued about 5,000 permits for dredging, filling, or construction 
of some kind, while the Providence District and its predecessors issued some
6,000 permits. Between 1947 and 1973 the New England Division issued 
8,085 permits, the num ber in any one year ranging from 234 in 1948 to 363 in 
1968. Alleged violations of the law were routinely checked. Between 1966 
and 1974 the Permits Branch of the division carried out 248 such investiga­
tions. When necessary, reports were sent to the Division Counsel with rec­
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ommendations for litigation. Of nineteen investigations made in 1974 by the 
month of September, for example, reports on six were subm itted to the Divi­
sion Counsel with recom m endations for legal action, and reports on two 
were sent to the Office of the Chief of Engineers for administrative action. 
One p erm it w as issu ed  and the  re s t o f th e  ca se s  w ere  still u n d er 
consideration.30
By the Department of Transportation Act of O ctober 15, 1966, the super­
visory functions of the Secretary of W ar over bridges and causeways were 
transferred to the Secretary of Transportation. The adm inistration of permits 
relating to them thus passed from the Corps of Engineers to the Coast 
Guard, which the act separated from the Treasury D epartm ent and placed 
under the new secretaryship.31 Four years later it appeared, a t least for a 
brief time, that this loss of authority would be more than com pensated for by 
the extension of the C orps’ permits responsibilities in another area.
Section 13 of the act of 1899—the Refuse Act— was shaped by ideas and 
interests prevailing in 1899, and was intended solely for the protection of 
navigation. The possibility that it might be used to protect public health, and 
thus encroach upon the police powers of the states, was in fact closed off by 
the exemption of municipal sewage from its broad definition of refuse. The 
function of the Corps under the act was to protect the navigability of United 
States waters, not their quality. Yet navigation ends sometimes faded into 
environmental ones, as when, upon the passage of a law in 1924 forbidding 
oil discharges in tidal waters, the Corps began to apply the Refuse Act to 
spills on inland streams as well.
During the 1960s the federal courts, reversing seven decades of legal in­
terpretations, began construing the Refuse Act as covering the discharge of 
pollutants; but definite authority to extend the Refuse Act to environmental 
purposes was not granted the Corps until 1970. The mercury scare of that 
year revealed the inadequacy of existing laws against w ater pollution, and 
several congressional leaders urged that a permits program already being 
planned by the Corps be set up to control the discharge of pollutants at their 
source. On December 23, 1970 President N ixon directed the Corps to do so 
under Section 13 of the act of 1899. Under the resulting program, the regu­
lations for which were published in the Federal Register on April 7, 1971, 
permits were required for all discharges into navigable w aters and their 
tributaries, and applicants had to specify in detail the nature and quantity of 
the discharge or deposit. Decisions whether to issue permits, made in co­
ordination with the regional offices of the Environm ental Protection Agency 
and other appropriate federal and state offices, were to be based on an 
evaluation of the impact of the discharges or deposits on anchorage and 
navigation, water quality standards, and fish and wildlife resources.32
The Corps’ administration of the program was short-lived. On Decem ber 
22, 1971, the Corps was enjoined by a federal judge in the District of Colum­
bia from issuing Refuse Act permits under the Corps’ regulations. The court 
held that the regulations were invalid because they authorized permits for 
discharges into non-navigable waters, which were not em braced by the Ref­
use Act, and because they were inconsistent with the National Environm en­
tal Policy Act of 1969. An appeal was filed with the Justice Departm ent, but 
before the courts acted Congress cut through the legal difficulties. By the
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Federal W ater Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, enacted on Oc­
tober 18, 1972, the pollutant permit program was transferred to the En­
vironmental Protection Agency.33
During the brief few months the program was under the jurisdiction of the 
Corps, the Permits Branch of the New England Division was an exception­
ally busy place. Its small personnel, which early in 1971 numbered only eleven 
people from chief to clerks, was expanded until a staff o f sixteen was 
employed on the discharge program alone. Launching a trem endous public­
ity program through the newspapers, television, radio, and notices sent to 
known or probable dischargers, the branch sent application forms and in­
formation about the program to approximately 3300 prospective applicants, 
most of whom responded cooperatively. About 1000 applications were de­
termined not to be pertinent. E ither the applicant did not have a discharge 
that came under the program, had ceased to discharge, was interested in the 
program but not discharging, or was discharging outside the area of the divi­
sion and was referred to the New York District. A nother 1652 applications 
were in the process of review, of which about 80 had reached the stage of 
public notices being issued, before the program was transferred to EPA. An 
enforcement and follow-up program was in progress in 648 more cases relat­
ing to refusals to file applications or furnish additional information, about 10 
of which had already been recom m ended for possible legal action. When the 
program was transferred to EPA, 426 applications from dischargers located 
on navigable waterways were screened for possible applicability under Sec­
tion 10 of the act of 1899, and permits under this authority were issued in 35 
cases.34
The Corps continues to issue permits relating to dredging, filling, and con­
struction, but decisions are made on a broader basis than envisaged or au­
thorized when the permits program began. No longer is the protection of 
navigation the sole criterion. The National Environm ental Policy Act and 
several subsequent environmental acts require the Corps to consider all fac­
tors affecting the public interest. And in the milestone test case of Zabel v. 
Tabb, 1970, in which the Office of the Chief of Engineers instructed the 
Justice Departm ent to cite the injury to wildlife but not the obstruction to 
navigation that would result from a land developer’s scheme, the Fifth Cir­
cuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of a district court that a permit 
could be denied only to protect navigation. “ Every Federal agency,” said 
the court, “ shall consider ecological factors when dealing with activities 
which may have an impact on m an’s environm ent.” 35
other” —and suggested widths of 300 feet at the high-water line and 198 feet 
at the bottom. The depth should be twenty-three feet, the same as the main 
ship channel of Boston Harbor. This would allow the heaviest vessels of the 
Navy to pass through at half tide. Significantly, Foster was the first engineer 
to discard the idea of locks, which he felt would only increase costs and 
contribute to shipping delays and accidents. He calculated that in a canal of 
the dimensions he proposed the swiftest current for mean tides would be 3.8 
miles per hour, and for maximum tides, 4 miles per hour. This velocity— 
which would only last for a few minutes anyway—was no greater, he pointed 
out, than that of currents in some other navigable waterways. For the pro­
tection of the eastern  entrance of the canal, Foster proposed a granite 
breakwater 4,000 feet long running nearly parallel to the shore, estim ated to 
cost nearly $2 million. The total cost of the canal, including the breakwater, 
he figured at about $9.7 million.3
F oster’s report established the concept of an open canal, but had no 
further effect, for the Ship Canal Company never started construction. In 
1880 the M assachusetts legislature granted a charter to a new Cape Cod 
Canal Company. Again government aid was sought, and the River and H ar­
bor Act of 1881 called for an examination and survey of Buzzards and 
Barnstable bays at the entrances of the proposed canal. The assignment this 
time went to Newport District Engineer Gouverneur W arren. Reporting the 
next year, W arren recommended the dredging of a 500-foot-wide, 21-foot- 
deep approach channel in Buzzards Bay, costing about $350,000, and the 
construction in Barnstable Bay of two jetties extending from the shore, 
rather than an offshore breakwater, which, with a small am ount of dredging, 
would cost only about $918,000.4
A bill for granting this aid began its way through Congress, but was ulti­
mately discarded, for the new company also failed to begin construction. 
And for the next twenty-five years the prospects for a canal remained uncer­
tain. Petitioners scrambled for charters, several were granted, considerable 
land was acquired, and small starts were made at digging, but never was 
more than a pittance of capital raised or more than a few shovelfuls of earth 
turned. Almost everyone saw rosy possibilities in a canal, but practically no 
one was willing to risk his own money.
In 1907 August Belmont, a New York investm ent banker and builder of 
the city’s first subway, agreed to buy the rights and property of the Boston, 
Cape Cod and New Y ork Canal Com pany, chartered in 1899. Belmont 
formed a syndicate to underwrite the building of the canal, organized a sub­
sidiary construction company, and retained William Barclay Parsons, a noted 
railroad engineer, as chief engineer. On June 22, 1909, Belmont, removing a 
shovelful of earth with a small silver spade from Tiffany’s, proclaimed the 
start of the Cape Cod Canal.5
Five years later, on July 29, 1914, the canal was opened with great fanfare, 
the presence of num erous distinguished guests, and a grand procession 
through it of the palatial yachts of the New York Yacht Club on its annual 
summer cruise.6 It was a much smaller waterway than Colonel Foster had 
proposed. Although its charter depth was 25 feet, its minimum bottom  width 
was only 100 feet and its surface width 200 feet, which precluded two-way 
traffic. The land cut of the canal was 7.68 miles long, the dredged approach
00
Coast from Fishers Island to Cape Cod, showing the approximate location of 1203 wrecks. Sixty of the wrecks 
indicated occurred prior to 1880, 1016 between 1880 and 1903, and 127 between 1903 and 1920.
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in Buzzards Bay about five miles, and the approach in Barnstable Bay about 
one-half mile, making the total length of the passage about thirteen miles. A
3,000 foot breakw ater extended into Barnstable Bay from the north side of 
the canal’s eastern entrance, and a stone sand-catch je tty  600 feet long 
reached out from the opposite side. Crossing the canal were two highway 
bridges and one railroad bridge, each with an opening under its draw span 
about 140 feet wide.
After more than two hundred years of discussion and planning, the canal 
was a reality. Investigations, traffic analyses, and common sense had all 
pronounced that it would save lives, ships, and cargoes, shorten distances to 
southern ports, lessen freight costs, and reduce insurance rates. Yet the 
canal was neither a financial success nor a transportation triumph. Miscalcu­
lations had added greatly  to  construc tion  time and costs . D ifficulties 
presented by boulders scattered through the sands of the cape had been 
underestim ated, too much digging had been done with dredges and too little 
by m ore efficient s team -shovel operation  in the d ry , and excavation  
equipment had been too antiquated and too small for the job. When finished, 
the canal failed to attract the traffic expected for it. The current was a major 
deterrent. Underpowered vessels had to await slack w ater or a favoring tide. 
Tugs towing barges could not proceed against the current, and on going with 
it had to take them  through one at a time. And accidents occurred, giving the 
canal a bad reputation. M ariners complained of delays in transit through the 
single-track route, of the narrowness of the channel and of shoals caused by 
erosion of the canal’s banks, of the hazards of passing through three 
drawbridges, and of the prevalence of ground fog. There were also skippers 
who avoided the canal simply because they preferred sailing wide-wayed 
routes they knew to trying a narrow one they not know .7
As early as 1915, Belmont, who formerly had been indifferent to govern­
ment aid or purchase, thought that the national government “ ought to really 
acquire the canal.” The first actual step in this direction was taken in May 
1917, five weeks after the United States declared w ar on Germany, when 
Senator John W. W eeks of M assachusetts introduced a bill for the purchase 
of the canal. Slightly amended, the bill became part of the River and H arbor 
Act of August 1917. The Secretaries of War, Navy, and Commerce were 
authorized to examine and appraise the value of the works and franchises of 
the canal. If all favored acquisition, the Secretary of W ar was to negotiate 
for its purchase or, if that failing, institute condemnation proceedings. The 
actual investigation, the act stipulated, was to “ be conducted under the di­
rection of the Secretary of W ar and the supervision of the Chief of Engineers 
in the usual m anner provided by law for making preliminary examinations 
and surveys.” 8
The bulk of the investigative work was carried out under the direction of 
the engineer of the N ortheast Division, Brigadier General William T. Ros- 
sell, retired, a form er Chief of Engineers. Rossell hired the public accounting 
firm of Price, W aterhouse and Company of New York to examine the books 
of the canal and construction companies to determine the actual cost of the 
canal. T he ac co u n tan ts  rep o rted  th a t cash  co n s tru c tio n  c o s ts  w ere 
$8,265,743.04, and if various intangible items, such as paym ents in stocks 
and bonds for rights, prom otion, and services, discounts on securities, and
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Old type dipper dredge chewing out the channel for the Cape Cod Canal during its 
construction, 1909-14.
Section of the original cut of the Cape Cod Canal showing the railroad tracks over 
which material excavated in the dry was carried away.
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Colonel Barclay Parsons, right, congratulates August Belmont in April 1914 when the 
final construction gate of the Cape Cod Canal was removed, permitting the waters of 
the east and west excavations to meet.
The Nantasket Beach paddle-wheel steamer Rose Standish  leads the fleet that cele­
brated the opening of the Cape Cod Canal on July 29, 1914.
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View of the Sagamore Highway Bridge shortly after the canal was opened. The nar­
row passage between the abutments of the bridges crossing the canal was one reason 
many mariners preferred the outside route around the cape despite the dangers.
The Eastern Steamship Belfast rammed into Sagamore Bridge on April 16, 1919.
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losses in operation, were added at their stated value, the total cost of the 
canal was $12,956,718.31. Rossell also requested Boston District Engineer 
Colonel Francis R. Shunk to investigate the value of the canal from the point 
of view of its use. Shunk submitted a lengthy report on the amounts and 
character of shipping that went around the cape or through the canal, on 
various aspects of the canal’s operation and commercial benefit, and on why 
it did not carry more traffic. “ On the whole I do not think that the canal can 
be considered a success,”  Shunk concluded, “ nor do I believe that with its 
present dimensions it will be of great benefit to com m erce.” After consider­
ing all the data, Rossell reported that from military and commercial points of 
view the canal was worth to the United States its actual cash cost of con­
struction, or $8,265,743.04.
The Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors held public hearings and 
secured additional information relating to the canal, and, shaving down the 
intangibles in the Price, W aterhouse audit, reached an appraisal of $10 mil­
lion for the cost of constructing the passage. It did not believe, however, 
that the United States should pay that amount. Since the canal diverted only 
about one-fifth of the tonnage carried past the cape from outside routes, the 
savings effected to the public by making it a free waterway would not w ar­
rant an expenditure equal to the cost of construction. If commercial uses 
alone were considered, the board held, $2.5 million was the upper limit of 
any justifiable expenditure by the government. As to the military value of 
the canal, the board cited a memorandum from the General Board of the 
Navy that concluded the military advantages of the w aterw ay were not 
worth the costs of enlarging and defending it. The board, therefore, simply 
capitalized the savings on tolls by government vessels that would use the 
canal, which it figured would hardly exceed $1 million. The total value of 
public ownership, it concluded, was thus not more than $3.5 million.
Chief of Engineers Major General William M urray Black, while recogniz­
ing the limitations on the worth of the canal, nevertheless felt that it did have 
com m ercial value and  reco m m en d ed  its  p u rc h ase . “ In  th e  ex isting  
em ergency,”  he explained further, “ war risks make continued use of the 
canal necessary and its im provem ent desirable.”  The channel was dete­
riorating, and the canal company was unable to maintain its project dimen­
sions. Taking a different approach from either the division engineer or the 
Board of Engineers in determining what price should be paid, Black said it 
should be as nearly as practicable what it would have cost the United States 
to have done the work. Submitting a report to the Secretary of W ar in July 
1918, he said that this would probably be $10 million, the amount named by 
the Board of Engineers as the construction costs of the canal company. In 
December 1918, however, Black submitted a second report containing more 
precise estimates that he had meantime obtained. One estim ate, made by 
Newport District Engineer Colonel J. H. Willard, retired, set the hypotheti­
cal cost to the United States at $8 million, while another estim ate made by 
an assistant engineer in the Office of the Chief of Engineers, M. W. Lewis, 
set the figure at $8,110,000.
The Cabinet secretaries subscribed to General Black’s government-cost 
approach and offered the canal company $8,250,000 for its rights and proper­
ties. The company’s response was to claim that the government could not
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have built the canal for that am ount and to make a counterproposal of $13 
million.9
Meantime the issue of price had become further complicated by govern­
ment operation of the canal. On the morning of July 21, 1918, the German 
submarine U-156 had surfaced three miles off the elbow of Cape Cod and 
shelled the Lehigh Valley tug Perth Am boy  and her string of four barges 
until the barges sank and the tug was set afire. The next day President 
Wilson announced that the canal would be temporarily taken over by the 
government and run by the Railroad Administration, an agency set up the 
previous December to avert chaos in the nation’s transportation system. To 
handle the increased traffic driven to protected waters by the submarine 
menace, the Railroad Administration dredged the canal, which had suffered 
badly from lack of routine maintenance, and made other repairs. Disputes 
now arose over compensation due to the government for its expenditures 
and com pensation due the canal company for the governm ent’s use of the 
passage.
Since no agreement was being reached on the price of the canal, Secretary 
of War Newton D. Baker instituted condemnation proceedings in April 1919. 
The government contended that a fair price was something under $8 million; 
the canal company wanted $25 million. The jury , arriving at a verdict in less 
than a day despite extremely lengthy and complicated testim ony, apparently 
split the difference and said that the canal was worth $16,801,201.11.10 This 
award was made in N ovem ber 1919. In February 1921, however, it was set 
aside on writ of error by the Circuit Court of Appeals, which remanded the 
case back to the District Court for a new trial.
Another com plication from the governm ent takeover of the canal had 
meanwhile arisen. When the Railroad Administration returned the country’s 
railroads to private control on M arch 1, 1920, the canal was included in the 
transfer. But claiming that the condem nation proceedings had ended its 
rights and titles in the canal, the company would not accept it. Since nobody 
would mind the store, the canal closed down—just as a severe snowstorm 
paralyzed land transportation and worsened already short fuel supplies in the 
Boston area. Appealing to Washington with no success, G overnor Calvin 
Coolidge of M assachusetts prevailed on the company to open the canal. This 
it did on M arch 4, but by a tem porary arrangement with the canal’s superin­
tendent that did not prejudice its legal position.11
The condemnation proceedings and the prospect of a new trial brought the 
Corps of Engineers once again back into the chain of events. Upon orders 
from Secretary Baker, the Chief of Engineers instructed Colonel Edward 
Burr, a form er Boston District Engineer, to undertake a thorough examina­
tion of the history and operation of the canal to assist the government in 
judicial proceedings and guide Congress in determining the value of the 
waterway. Beginning in February 1921, Burr completed his investigations in 
November 1922. The canal had been a failure, he reported, because of strong 
currents, insufficient width and depth, shoaling caused by the erosion of its 
banks, low and narrow bridge passages, and the psychology of mariners who 
felt safe only when their vessels had plenty of sea room. He did not think 
that tolls deterred much traffic. He dwelt at length on the reasons why the 
canal was of value and recommended that the government purchase it since
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private capital was incapable of providing necessary im provem ents and 
maintenance. The United States should pay a reasonable price for the canal, 
he advised, and improve it by installing a set of locks, which he saw as the 
only practicable solution to the problem of the current, and increasing its 
bottom width to 200 feet and its depth to 35 feet. This work would cost 
between $14 and $17 million. W ithout locks, the canal would have to be at 
least 300 feet wide to provide safe navigation, and the cost of improvement 
would run from $11 to $14 m illion.12
While Burr was making his study, the government and the canal company 
came to an agreement. Rather than face the expense, delay, and uncertainty 
of further condemnation proceedings, the company offered to  sell its prop­
erty for $11.5 million, and on July 29, 1921 a contract was signed by the 
Secretary of War. The government would pay the com pany $5.5 million in 
cash and assume the com pany’s $6 million bond obligation. It was agreed 
that until Congress approved the contract and appropriated the money, the 
company would operate the canal and the government would be responsible 
for the interest on the bond issue.13
Seven more years were to pass, however, before the canal became the 
property of the United States. On seven occasions bills to carry out the 
contract were introduced in Congress, only to die in House com m ittees, in 
conference committee, or in the Senate because of haggling over the terms 
of the sale or, more often, because of indifference or opposition. The pur­
chase was finally authorized in Section 2a of the River and H arbor Act of 
January 1, 1927. Senate approval of the bill was won, however, only with an 
amendment providing that the governm ent should pay interest on the canal 
bonds from the date of transfer of title rather than from the date of contract, 
which meant a loss of nearly $2 million to  the canal company. An appropria­
tion for the purchase was lost in the shuffle of that session of Congress, but 
was quickly passed when Congress reconvened the following December. 
Meantime questions arose over the validity of canal company land titles, 
which took a year of legal work to settle. But finally, on M arch 30, 1928, the 
Attorney General notified the Secretary of W ar that title to the Cape Cod 
Canal was vested in the United States in fee sim ple.14
The Boston Engineer Office now took over the operation of the canal. 
Colonel Cheney kept the old employees and retained Captain Harold L. 
Colbeth, who had managed the canal for the company, as superintendent. 
But it was quickly apparent that the canal was under new ownership. Late in 
July a leased dredge went to work on shoals ju s t west of Sagamore Bridge, 
and in September the United States hopper dredge Minquas began m ainte­
nance operations that were to continue steadily for the next six years. Due 
to severe erosion of the canal’s banks, however, it was found impracticable 
to maintain continuously a depth in excess of twenty-two feet. Meantime the 
United States seagoing dredge Marshall cleared out the Buzzards Bay ap­
proach channel. Hired labor was put to work repairing bulkheads, bridges, 
and the lighting and signal system s, and placing riprap and slope pavement 
on banks where it was most urgently needed. When barge companies asked 
for the repair of dolphins at each end of the canal, the district’s response was 
so prompt that one company sent a letter of appreciation. Tolls were of 
course abolished, and cargo tonnage passing through the canal jum ped from
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894,763 in 1927 to 1,405,782 in 1928; to 2,154,465 in 1929; and to 2,498,943 in 
1930. Colonel Cheney, with all the initiative of a private entrepreneur, wrote 
in January 1929 to  some forty companies engaged in coastal shipping to im­
press on them that if the canal was to be really useful, it should carry still 
more traffic.15
Yet the canal could never attract the great bulk of shipping compassing the 
cape without major im provements. The River and Harbor Act of July 3, 1930 
called for an examination and survey of the canal, the reports of which were 
sent to Congress the following March. District Engineer Cheney was con­
vinced, as Colonel Burr had been, that a locked canal was the only solution 
to the problems of dangerous currents, constant bank erosion, and tows hav­
ing to wait for the tide. He therefore recommended the construction of twin 
locks about midway in the land cut of the canal, each cham ber to be 110 feet 
wide, 1,000 feet long, and 40 feet deep over the sills, which would be capa­
cious enough to accom m odate the largest ships. A single-chambered lock, 
Cheney contended, could not handle summer traffic and would have to be 
closed for maintenance for about three months every four years. Dual cham ­
bers were also a valuable precaution from the viewpoint of national defense. 
Cheney proposed deepening the canal to 35 feet and widening it to 300 feet 
at the bottom through its land cut, which would be sufficient width for safe 
two-way traffic in a slack-water channel. To eliminate two turns in the Buz­
zards Bay approach channel that mariners considered hazardous, he recom ­
mended a straight channel through the bay, 500 feet wide to Wings Neck and 
700 feet wide beyond the neck to deep water. To replace the two hazardous 
highway lift bridges, Cheney proposed the construction about midway on the 
canal of a six-lane high-level bridge with a vertical clearance of 150 feet. As
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for a new railroad bridge, Cheney concluded that the grades of a high-level 
bridge would be too heavy and that some type of drawbridge with a span of 
at least 300 feet would have to do. Lastly, Cheney recom m ended the con­
struction of a harbor of refuge at the western end of the canal. He estimated 
that these improvements would take seven years to complete and would cost 
$34,233,000.
In the process of review within the Corps, C heney’s recom m endations 
were cut back by officers habituated to planning projects with an eye on 
keeping them both worthwhile and within the limits of appropriations likely 
to be forthcoming. Division Engineer Colonel W. J. Barden agreed with the 
proposals, except that he believed a channel 32 feet deep and 250 feet wide 
in the land cut would be ample. The Board of Engineers further reduced the 
depth to 30 feet, reduced the channel width in Buzzards Bay to Wings Neck 
to 400 feet, and recom m ended a single tidal lock, claiming that it would be 
adequate to handle the traffic. The Chief of Engineers concurred with the 
views of the board, whose recom m endations were sent to Congress with a 
cost estimate of $23,250,000.16
The Boston District placed a model of the proposed reconstructed canal 
on exhibition at the Boston Army Base in May 1932 and awaited action by 
Congress. How long it would have waited in normal times is impossible to 
say. But the year 1932 was not normal. As the economic depression that 
began in 1929 grew worse and unemployment soared, demands for federal 
public-works program s becam e increasingly insistent. In July 1932 the 
Emergency Relief and Reconstruction Act appropriated over $322 million for 
public works, including $30 million “ for the prosecution of river and harbor 
projects heretofore authorized.” The Eastern Steamship Company, which 
w as planning to  run  la rg e r sh ips th ro u g h  th e  can a l, suggested  th a t 
Emergency Relief funds be used to improve the waterway, and Congressman 
Charles L. Gifford of M assachusetts requested Chief of Engineers Major 
General Lytle Brown to allot $500,000 for this purpose. Brown replied that 
while a substantial sum under the act would be applied to renewing riprap 
and straightening channel approaches to Sagamore Bridge, Emergency Re­
lief funds could not be used for enlarging the canal since the project had not 
been approved by Congress. The National Industrial Recovery Act of June 
1933 rem oved this obstacle. U nder the public-works title of the act, river and 
harbor improvements could be carried out provided they had been “ adopted 
by Congress . . .  or recommended by the Chief of Engineers.”  On Septem ber 
6, 1933 the Public Works Administration authorized the construction of three 
bridges over the canal and the widening of its land cut to 205 feet, allotting 
$5,783,500 for the work.17
Construction began in December, under the direction of District Engineer 
Colonel John J. Kingman, with contractors laying the foundations for the 
bridges. In accordance with PWA regulations, work was distributed as 
widely as possible and wherever practicable hand labor was used in lieu of 
m achinery. The plan for erecting a single highway bridge had been altered, 
fortunately for future automobile traffic to the cape, because of contentions 
that it was inconsistent with obligations imposed on the United States in 
acquiring the canal. In designing and supervising the construction of two 
high-level highway bridges, the Boston District contracted the services of
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the engineering firm of Fay, Spofford, and Thorndike of Boston, who in turn 
retained the Boston architectural firm of Cram and Ferguson to advise upon 
architectural details and the appearance of the structures as a whole. The 
Sagamore Bridge was constructed about two and a half miles from the east­
ern end of the canal, and the Bourne Bridge about one and two-thirds miles 
from the western end. Identical in design, the bridges each have a main span 
measuring 616 feet between centers of supports, with a vertical clearance of 
135 feet above high water. Each flanking span is 396 feet long, and the road­
way width of the bridges, designed for four-lane traffic, is 40 feet between 
curbs. Built more or less simultaneously, the bridges were dedicated on June 
21, 1935 and opened to traffic.
The railroad bridge was constructed close to the w estern end of the canal, 
near the site of the old bridge. A vertical-lift bridge, it has a 544-foot hori­
zontal span, at the time of its construction the longest lift span in the world, 
supported by tow ers 210 feet high. The span is normally kept in the raised 
position, 135 feet above mean high water. In preparing plans for the bridge, 
the B oston D istrict em ployed the engineering firm o f P arsons, K lapp, 
Brinckerhoff, and Douglas of New York, who were advised on architectural 
m atters by Mead and White of that city. W ork on the bridge began on De­
cem ber 18, 1933, and almost exactly two years later the first train rolled 
across it on Decem ber 29, 1935.18
Meantime, the widening of the land cut of the canal was begun. Before 
work had progressed very far, however, further experience in operating and 
improving the waterway forced a reconsideration of existing plans. The 
winter of 1933-34 was unusually severe, choking Buzzards Bay with a mass 
of ice from Wings N eck to Bourne Neck. Since even icebreakers could not 
crash through the channel, shipping was interfered with for weeks at a time. 
But the canal itself did not freeze. Therefore when the House Committee on 
Rivers and Harbors requested the Board of Engineers, in June 1934, to re­
view its recom m endations for the im provem ent of the canal, Colonel 
Kingman proposed modifying the existing project to provide for an open 
waterway.
Motor Barge L.T.G. No. 3 frozen in the ice in Buzzards Bay, March 1934.
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The ice conditions in Buzzards Bay during the past winter made it appar­
ent, Kingman reported, that in the still waters of a locked canal there would 
be serious trouble with ice formations every few years. The widening of the 
canal to 170 feet near Sagamore Bridge the previous year, he continued, had 
resulted in greater current velocities, yet tugboat operators had found that 
most of the navigation difficulties for one-way traffic had been removed. The 
trouble with the canal had not been the current, but the narrow width of the 
channel. A 500-foot-wide channel, even with the current, Kingman figured, 
would be amply safe for two-way navigation. A canal this wide had not been 
considered earlier, he assum ed, because of the high cost of earth removal. 
But with equipment now available, and by doing m uch of the work in the 
dry, costs would be lower. They would be considerably less than building a 
lock, which recent experience indicated would be a troublesom e project. In 
driving sheet metal piling for the foundations of the new bridges, he ex­
plained, the contractors had run into serious difficulty with boulders. In view 
of the necessity of installing sheet piling under the walls and miter sills of a 
lock, so that it might be drained to make repairs, construction difficulties 
would be extremely expensive to overcome. The problem  of bank erosion 
and consequent shoaling, Kingman also concluded, had not been due princi­
pally to the current but to wave wash, which would be less in a 500-foot- 
wide canal. These considerations, together with the hazards to vessels enter­
ing a lock during high winds and the loss of time to ships spent in lockage, 
made an open canal, in Kingman’s view, decidedly preferable to a locked 
one.
Kingman presented plans for a canal 32 feet deep and 540 feet wide at the 
bottom through the land cut. He recom m ended the 540-foot width so that a 
channel 40 feet deep and 500 feet wide could be excavated at some future 
time without impairing revetm ents and other works on the banks of the 
canal. He proposed a straight channel in Buzzards Bay 500 feet wide to 
Wings Neck and 700 feet wide beyond the neck, mooring basins at either end 
of the land cut, a harbor of refuge for small vessels at the w estern end of the 
canal, an improved lighting system , and such other accessory features as 
might be deemed necessary. The division engineer, the Board of Engineers, 
and the Chief of Engineers concurred  in K ingm an’s recom m endations, 
which were sent to Congress on Decem ber 26, 1934. Eight months later 
Congress authorized the im provem ents in the R iver and H arbor Act of 
August 30, 1935.19
Work began with the construction by hydraulic engineers at the M assa­
chusetts Institute of Technology of a 111- by 34-foot concrete model of the 
canal and its approaches with which to study tidal actions, currents, and 
erosion effects. The new straight approach channel at the head of Buzzards 
Bay was the subject of considerable experim entation as engineers tested 
ways of reducing crosscurrents and preventing erosion. They found that the 
gaps between Rocky Point, Hog Island, and M ashnee Island, which lay 
along the sou thern  side of the p roposed  channel, w ould cause strong 
crosscurrents and consequent silting of the channel. The solution was to 
close these openings with dikes built from material excavated from the w est­
ern end of Hog Island, which lay athw art the line of the new channel. To 
prevent the channel current from swinging too far north beyond Stony Point,
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on the opposite side of the passage, the district built another dike over two 
miles long from Stony Point to a ledge opposite Wings Neck. The construc­
tion of the dikes and dredging formed the “ Hog Island C hannel,” a passage 
500 feet wide, 32 feet deep, and 4.7 miles long. Beyond Wings Neck the 
“ Cleveland Ledge Channel” was cut 700 feet wide to the same depth for a 
distance of 4.1 miles.
View of the canal during reconstruction by the Corps of Engineers, 1935-40, showing 
simultaneous wet and dry digging.
To enlarge the land cut of the canal, dredges worked from the existing 
channel into the banks, while dry excavation equipment worked from the 
outside of the new prism toward the center. Totally they removed some 
fifty-four million cubic yards of material. Because of the boulders that pep­
pered the sands of the cape and the depth of the cut, dipper dredges did 
about fifty-five percent of the work. Hydraulic dredges handled about thirty 
percent, and the remaining fifteen percent—every bit that was possible—was 
done in the dry. Dry excavation had many advantages: it was cheaper, boul­
ders could be more easily handled, riprap could be laid on dry banks more 
efficiently, and a larger num ber of unskilled workers could be employed, an 
important consideration during depression years. The surface width of the 
canal was cut to about 700 feet, but the bottom  width was reduced from the 
proposed 540 feet to 480 feet. More gradually sloping banks, it was decided, 
would reduce erosion, help keep the riprap in place, and provide greater 
safety if a ship ran aground.20 With a land cut about 7.7 miles long, and 
extended approach channels reaching to the new 32-foot depth, the total 
length of the canal became 17.5 miles.
Mooring basins, formed by carving elongated concaves into the sides of 
the channel, were constructed at either end of the land cut in case ships were 
delayed from making the passage and forced to tie up. At the eastern end the 
basin was located on the north side of the channel at Sandwich, a t the west-
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em  end it was on the south side between Hog Island and Rocky Neck. To 
provide refuge for smaller craft a harbor 13 feet deep and about 217 acres in 
extent—the East Boat Basin—was constructed opposite the east mooring 
basin, and a channel 15 feet deep and 100 feet wide was dredged into Onset 
Bay opposite the west mooring basin. To pierce the ground fog that had 
plagued the canal and permit nighttime navigation under all atmospheric 
conditions, experts designed a new lighting system. Sodium vapor and white 
lamps were installed alternately at 500-foot intervals on both sides of the 
passage.
By 1940, when the reconstruction of the canal was essentially completed, 
the government had spent $6 million of Public W orks Administration funds, 
$4.8 million of Emergency Relief Administration funds, and about $8.8 mil­
lion of regular funds for im provem ents. Including the original cost, im ­
provements, and m aintenance, the United States had spent about $37 million 
on the waterway. The improved canal was attracting shipping to the extent 
that in 1940 three times as many ships and over eight times as much cargo 
tonnage passed through it than had gone through the old canal in 1927, the 
last year of private ownership.
Aerial view of the Cape Cod Canal from the western approach.
Work on the canal was completed in time for the waterway to be of enor­
mous benefit during World W ar II. Cargo tonnage through it doubled as 
convoys bound for Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom assembled 
in Buzzards Bay and all but the deepest ships sailed through the passage. 
Other m erchants ships, whose peacetime routes passed wide of the cape, 
sought the safety of the canal. Naval vessels of the lighter classes used it 
extensively. At the height of submarine activity in the Atlantic, as many as 
eighty m erchantm en and warships passed through the canal in a single day. 
Nearly nineteen million cargo tons passed through it in the year 1944. Al­
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though during the war the Army Engineers turned the operation of the canal 
over to the Coast Guard, they were still responsible for its maintenance, and 
the increased traffic of heavily ladened ships made the preservation of the 
canal’s project depth an absolute necessity. At first the Engineers assigned 
dredges tem porarily to the canal, but after July 1943 they operated a dredge 
on it continuously.21 How many ships, cargoes, dollars, and lives were 
saved by the canal during the w ar cannot even be guessed. It is certain, 
however, that government dollars and Corps of Engineer labors were well 
invested.
After the war, im provem ents of the canal’s facilities were made in the 
interests of small boating and recreation. To provide additional anchorage 
space and reduce the hazards of grounding and collision in Onset Bay, which 
was used extensively by a sizable local recreational fleet as well as afford­
ing a harbor of refuge for the thousands of small craft that passed through 
the canal every year, a project for the harbor was authorized by Congress in 
1945. It provided for enlarging an existing 15-foot-deep inner channel and a 
turning basin near the town wharf and for dredging a new 8-foot-deep an­
chorage area adjacent to them, for which local interests were to contribute 
one-half the cost. Delayed by budgetary considerations and then the Korean 
War, the project was begun in 1957 and completed in 1959. At the other end
East Boat Basin, Cape Cod Canal.
of the canal, local interests requested the enlargement of the East Boat Basin 
to relieve crowded conditions and provide a more adequate stopping place 
and harbor of refuge for transient craft. A project for extending the basin by 
several acres was authorized in 1958, with the proviso that local interests 
contribute twenty percent of the cost, furnish all necessary lands and ease­
ments, relocate utility lines, and build a suitable m arina.22 This work was 
carried out in 1962 and 1963, with the Commonwealth of M assachusetts con-
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William D. Donovan (left), marine traffic controller, and Wilfred W. Norris (right), 
engineering equipment operator, are veteran members of the New England Division 
at the Cape Cod Canal. Both men were on the staff of the canal when it became the 
property of the U.S. Government in 1928.
structing the marina. Two years later an access road, a comfort station, and 
parking areas were completed by the New England Division.
By 1975 the United States had spent over $80 million on the Cape Cod 
Canal, including the purchase price and m aintenance, making it the most 
expensive single civil work of the Corps in New England. The widest sea- 
level canal in the world, the waterway has in recent years carried an average 
of about 11.7 million cargo tons annually. It is also one of New England’s 
outstanding public recreation facilities. It is acclaimed one of the best salt 
water fisheries per mile of shoreline in the world, and the Scusset Beach 
State Park Area is heavily stocked with pheasants by the M assachusetts Di­
vision of Fisheries and Game. The New England Division has provided ac­
cess and parking areas throughout the length of the canal; and the Corps 
leases two major recreation areas, the Scusset Beach State Park and the 
Bourne Scenic Park, to the M assachusetts Departm ent of N atural Resources 
and the Town of Bourne Recreational Authority respectively. Over a million 
visitors annually enjoy the opportunities offered by the canal’s land and 
water areas for fishing and hunting, for swimming, picnicking, and camping, 
and for just plain relaxing and watching the ships go by.
NEW HARBOR DEFENSES
As the Civil W ar drew to a close, Army Engineers were examining Fort 
Adams, Fort W arren, Fort Knox, and all the rest of the great casem ated 
forts of the Third System and wondering if they were useless piles of stone. 
The wooden sailing ships they had been designed to contest were passing 
from the seas, replaced by warships driven by steam and shielded with iron. 
For about three decades the United States and European maritime nations 
had been experimenting with new battlecraft, but these efforts had been des­
ultory. It took the coming of age of the Industrial Revolution and the spur 
of war to alter drastically the character of naval weaponry. The Crimean 
War of the mid-1850s had speeded naval advances in Britain and France, and 
by 1861 each nation had a small fleet of armor-plated frigates in commission, 
though they were yet to be tested in battle. The Civil W ar prom pted similar 
developments in America as both sides, served by naval secretaries of great 
ability, hastily fitted out ironclad vessels armed with recently developed 
heavy ordnance. The arm ored steamships of the Union were mostly John 
Ericsson’s strange-looking monitors, class-named after the “ tin can on a 
shingle” that had met and stopped the deadly Merrimac. Though small craft 
carrying few guns, m onitors in onslaughts against casem ated forts held by 
the Confederacy breached their walls, destroying with them  prevailing con­
cepts of seacoast fortifications. Exposed masonry scarps were now as vul­
nerable on sea fronts as they had been for centuries on land fronts. M ean­
while the maritime powers of Europe had continued to develop their naval 
weapons, and by the end of the war were equipping their sea forces with 
powerfully engined, iron-plated ships armed with rifled guns of greatly in­
creased range, accuracy, and destructiveness. Almost overnight masonry 
seacoast defenses had become as obsolete as medieval castles.1
In 1864 and 1865 the Engineer Departm ent appointed special boards to 
exam ine ev e ry  p e rm an en t fo r tif ic a tio n  along  the  co as t and p ro p o se  
modifications. In New England, as elsewhere, the boards’ recommendations 
resulted in few changes beyond the rebuilding of gun platform s to mount 
ordnance of heavier caliber. Originally designed for guns no larger than 
forty-two pounders with 7-inch bores, em placem ents were now to take 
weapons no smaller than 10- to 15-inch bore. Experim ents were begun on 
the use of iron shields to protect or replace masonry scarps, but meanwhile 
work on uncom pleted forts in New England continued mostly according to 
original plans.2
In 1867 the Engineer Departm ent established a new perm anent Board of 
Engineers for Fortifications to conduct studies and experim ents on the struc­
tures and weapons required for a thoroughly revised system of defense. 
Submitting its recom m endations in 1869, the board concluded that until more 
could be determined about continuing rapid improvements of ordnance and 
arm or, expensive types of defenses employing iron tu rre ts  and shields 
should remain on the drawing board. For the present, reliance should be
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placed on heavy-caliber barbette batteries shielded by massive earthen 
parapets, these to be so constructed as to accommodate disappearing gun 
carriages when they were perfected. The guns and gunners should be pro­
tected from infilading and reverse fires by traverses on either side of each 
gun platform  and parados behind where needed, each structure being a 
thick, high wall of earth. Where barbette batteries were impracticable be­
cause of the configuration of the harbor or the nature of the surrounding 
terrain, heavy floating batteries should be employed. The board also recom ­
mended the installation of large caliber m ortar batteries for shelling the vul­
nerable thin decks of heavily armored ships and the obstruction of harbors 
by submarine mines—or torpedoes, as they were then called—that could be 
electrically detonated by signal.3
The proposals of the boards were carried out in New England in the first 
years after the war by engineers assigned on an ad hoc basis. The engineer 
districts then being established were primarily for the oversight of river and 
harbor improvement. Although Thom at Portland and Houston at Newport 
directed some small amount of fortification work, most of the military con­
struction in their districts was supervised by other officers. Foster at Boston 
directed no defense work in his own district, but was for several years in 
charge of fortifications at Portsm outh, New Hampshire.
Fortification construction in Boston H arbor was directed by Henry Ben- 
ham and Major Charles E. Blunt in 1865 and 1866, and after that solely by 
Benham until his retirem ent in 1882. When Benham ended his long stint, his 
responsibilities, which for a half-dozen years past had been confined wholly 
to maintenance, were taken over by Blunt, now lieutenant colonel in charge 
of fortifications in Maine and New Hampshire. A few months later, upon the 
reopening of the Boston District Office under Major Charles E. Raymond 
early in 1883, defense work in the harbor was placed under district control.
Elsewhere in New England the assignment of officers to fortification work 
during the first half-dozen years after the war defies analysis. Occasionally 
one or two forts were under the charge of a single officer, but usually two or 
more engineers shared the supervision of several works. Yet seldom were all 
forts in a region under the same combination of officers. In this kaleido­
scopic fashion seven officers at one time or another directed fortification 
work on New England’s south shore until 1871. More orderly administration 
was then instituted by placing all military construction under the supervision 
of Newport District Engineer Gouverneur Warren.
In northern New England eight officers supervised fortification construc­
tion during the immediate postw ar years. In 1871 all military work was 
placed under the direction of a single engineer, but apparently because of 
more extensive military and civil construction in the area than in southern 
New England, the supervision of defense work was entrusted to Lieutenant 
Colonel James C. Duane rather than to Portland District Engineer George 
Thom. The military and civil functions of the Corps in northern New Eng­
land thus continued to be separately administered for another dozen years. 
They were finally fused, about the same time as at Boston, when Lieutenant 
Colonel Charles E. Blunt, Duane’s successor in charge of military work 
since 1879, became the Portland District Engineer in 1883.
The new defense system elaborated by the Board of Engineers for Fortifi­
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cations in 1869 meant that barbette batteries, formerly accessories of Third 
System forts, now became their primary elements of defense. Parapets made 
of sand, sodded to prevent erosion and faced inside with brick, were con­
structed forty feet thick—four times the dimension considered sufficient only 
a decade before. Guns were usually grouped in pairs, and traverses and 
parados were designed to afford emplacements maximum protection. Am­
munition magazines with thick masonry and earth coverings were built into 
the traverses, nearer to gun emplacements than formerly had been the prac­
tice, to save the transportation of heavier charges. To bear the weight of the 
heavy ordnance with which the defenses were to be armed, old-style gun 
platform s o f pieced g ran ite  w ere rep laced  w ith m onolithic m asses of 
concrete.4
A 15-inch Rodman gun mounted at Fort Warren. Boston Harbor, about 1863. 
Courtesy of Gerald Butler.
It was along these lines that Colonel Benham began reconstructing old and 
building new barbette batteries for Boston Harbor at Forts W arren, Win- 
throp, and Independence. The armament planned for these defenses was 
formidable. Fort Warren would mount thirty-six heavy guns—which plans 
usually specified as 15-inch smoothbore guns or “ equivalent rifles” —and 
127 10-inch guns en barbette. It would also retain considerable casem ate 
armament. Fort Winthrop would bristle with fifty-seven heavy guns, thirty- 
four 10-inch guns, and six heavy mortars. Fort Independence would boast 
five heavy guns, twenty 12-inch rifles, and six 10-inch rifles en barbette, plus 
fourteen guns in casem ates.
Like most pre-Civil War fortifications, whose relatively short-range guns 
were most effective on narrow channels, Forts Independence and Winthrop 
were located close to the city they were designed to protect. The increased 
range of naval guns, however, now made it imperative to oppose attacking 
ships from more advanced positions, like that of Fort Warren on Georges
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Island. A tem porary board of engineers examining Boston H arbor in 1865 
had therefore recommended the construction of a new outer battery on Long 
Island, whose guns, like those of Fort W arren, could bear on all entrance 
channels from a position on the harbor’s outer rim. This was what Major 
Joseph Swift had unsuccessfully urged on the War Departm ent nearly sixty 
years before. The new perm anent Board of Engineers endorsed the plan in 
1867, title to the site was acquired, and in 1871 Benham began building the 
new defense. An open barbette battery protected by traverses and parados, 
it was designed to mount twenty-eight heavy guns.
At Portland H arbor work on Forts Gorges, Preble, and Scammell was re­
directed in accordance with the new defense system. Since Fort Gorges, 
located on a wave-washed ledge, could carry barbette batteries only above 
its casem ates, the plans for it called for only fourteen heavy guns en barbette 
and the retention of all casem ate ordnance. Fort Scammell was also to retain 
considerable casem ate armam ent, but would mount thirty-six heavy guns 
and four heavy m ortars en barbette. At Fort Preble, the casem ate batteries 
were wholly dispensed with and emplacements were started for forty-one 
15-inch and two 10-inch guns en barbette.5
Since Portland H arbor required new outer defenses, the Board of En­
gineers designed a battery of thirty-four heavy guns for Portland Head, a 
promontory three miles below the city. The battery could sweep all ap­
proaches to the main channel into the harbor and command the seaward side 
of a large island from behind which enemy ships might shell the city. The 
project was prepared in 1870, but difficulties in securing the land delayed the 
start of construction until 1873. The Board of Engineers also prepared plans 
for three more batteries on outer islands of the harbor that would guard all 
approaches to it and prevent enemy occupation of Casco Bay. But no ap­
propriations were made for these defenses, and they were never begun.
North of Portland work on Forts Knox and Popham was suspended in 
1869. Both forts required more extensive changes than their value to current 
defense plans warranted. W ork was also stopped at Forts Constitution and 
McClary at Portsmouth Harbor. O uter defenses for Portsm outh were now 
more im portant, and in 1873 Colonel Duane began the construction of two 
new batteries, each for twelve heavy guns, farther down the harbor. One 
was on Jerrys Point on the south side of the estuary, the other on Gerrish 
Island across the way.
At New Bedford construction on the still unnamed fort on Clarks Point 
was continued until 1870, when everything was completed except the bar­
bette emplacements over the casem ates. But the fort had been outmoded 
almost before it was begun. The Board of Engineers recom m ended that noth­
ing further be done on it and that an earthen battery of twenty-six heavy 
guns be placed on an elevation behind it. Plans for the battery were ready in 
1875 but were never implemented.
At Narragansett Bay the Board of Engineers decided to leave the case- 
mated portions of Fort Adams as they were and construct a new exterior 
battery of twelve heavy guns behind it. The board also proposed a battery of 
twelve heavy guns on Dumpling Rocks, which would cross fire with the guns 
at Fort Adams, and recommended three detached batteries for thirty guns on 
Dutch Island, commanding the western passage into the bay. Colonel W ar­
I l l
ren began work on the Fort Adams and Dutch Island batteries in 1871-72, 
but the emplacements on Dumpling Rocks never came off paper.
For New London H arbor the board prepared plans for modifying the old 
barbette battery at Fort Griswold to receive eight heavy guns, but these too 
were never implemented. Somewhat more success attended its plans for re­
building the exterior batteries of Fort Trumbull to accom m odate twelve 
guns. Operations begun in 1874 resulted in the near completion of one bat­
tery before funds for the project were exhausted the next year.
None of the postw ar defenses planned for New England was ever com ­
pleted, some were hardly begun, and several were never started at all. While 
Congress multiplied the civil works of the Corps with a lavish hand, it sys­
tematically pared back appropriations for seacoast fortifications. After 1875 
it ceased to vote anything for new construction and provided so little for 
maintenance that the Engineers could do scarcely more than watch the un­
finished batteries fall into decay. Even scantier provisions had been made to 
arm the new defenses. While European nations were arming their warships 
with rifled guns of from 9- to 14-inch bore, the largest gun in American serv­
ice was the 15-inch Rodman smoothbore, developed in the 1850s. The most 
powerful service cannon in the world at that time, it was by the 1870s 
hopelessly outclassed. Beyond a range of 1,200 yards it was less powerful 
than a 9-inch rifle. “ Any guns we could mount in hastily thrown up earth­
works would be u se less ,”  com plained the Chief of Engineers in 1876. 
“ The projectiles from such batteries would fall harmlessly from the side of 
the enem y.” He could lie beyond their range and destroy them. M oreover, 
there were only 325 of the big Rodmans available for all fortifications on 
American coasts. Four years later the Chief of Engineers reported that the 
only modern guns in the United States were 8-inch rifles, of which only 110 
were on hand.6
Critics of defense preparations voiced a familiar litany of complaints. 
Permanent fortifications were quite unnecessary, they said, since defensive 
m easures could be quickly taken when they were needed. Fortifications 
were also a waste of money considering the rapidity of technological change. 
Worst of all, they were the instruments of sinister militarists planning to use 
them to overawe our cities, and their construction furnished the pretext for 
raising a large standing army to be used to destroy the liberties of the country.
Replying to these criticisms year after year in annual reports and before 
committees of Congress, Chiefs of Engineers deplored the “ sand hill” phi­
losophy that lay behind some of them. M odern earthen fortifications and 
modern armam ents were so massive, they explained, that defenses could no 
longer be thrown up on short notice. Before effective works could be impro­
vised at a harbor, an enemy with his ironclads would have destroyed it and 
departed for some other equally vulnerable port. “ Unfinished earthen bat­
teries,”  Major General Andrew H. Humphreys warned in 1878, ” . . .  provided 
with a small fraction only of the num ber of guns for which they were 
designed, and those of insufficient caliber, and m ortar batteries without 
mortars, though aided by torpedoes, will form but a feeble defense against 
the powerful fleets prepared and now being prepared to take the high seas.” 
Some years later, in reply to the reckless assertions of anti-militarists that 
the forts would be used against the cities they were supposed to protect,
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Major General John Newton painstakingly explained the nature and position 
of the forts and the m anner in which they would be garrisoned in an 
emergency by militia-type gunners recruited from the local citizenry.7 Had 
critics been of a different mind, his statem ents could have raised questions 
about the vulnerability of the forts on their landward sides and the efficiency 
with which they would be manned.
Warnings cast in vague generalizations that never identified any foe likely 
to ravage American coasts had little force. When congressional attitudes to­
ward fortifications took a new turn, it was in response to currents of thought 
in the country that began to make them selves felt in the early 1880s. Sensing 
a need to protect or expand American interests abroad in the face of growing 
international political and economic competition, a num ber of vocal Ameri­
cans began to clamor for a more active foreign policy. This demanded naval 
muscle. But after the Civil W ar the government had dismantled its wartime 
fleet with such haste and thoroughness that the American Navy had become 
an embarrassing collection of museum pieces. Goaded by conscientious Sec­
retaries of the Navy and by concerned men in its own houses, Congress 
made its first appropriation for building modern warships in 1883. By the 
same act it established a joint panel of Army and Navy officers, the Gun 
Foundry Board, to see what could be done about the fact that American 
industry did not possess the facilities for producing a single modern gun or 
piece of arm or plate. Ranging beyond this problem when it reported the next 
year, the board directed attention to the defenseless state of Am erica’s coastal 
cities and harbors where the Navy would have to be based and urged the 
adoption of a com prehensive scheme for their defense. In M arch 1885 Con­
gress referred this question to a special civilian and military Board of Fortifi­
cations and O ther D efenses, chaired  by S ecretary  of W ar W illiam C. 
Endicott.8
Submitting its report in January 1886, the Endicott Board laid down the 
same general principles to govern a scheme of defense that Chiefs of E n­
gineers had been suggesting for a decade. It urged Congress to make pro­
visions for the m anufacture of modern weapons and arm or plate and to au­
thorize the immediate construction of gun em placements so that weapons 
could be mounted as rapidly as they came out of the factories. The board 
estimated that under the most favorable conditions it would take at least five 
years to produce and prove the first heavy gun, and it wanted no further 
delay. Getting down to details, it specified the types and quantities of arm a­
ment required for the protection of each of twenty-seven harbors listed in 
order of urgency of need. Nine were in New England. All were to be de­
fended with m odern rifled guns of from 8- to 16-inch bore shielded by 
earthen or armored works, all with submarine mine apparatus, most with 12- 
inch rifled m ortar batteries, and several with fleets of torpedo boats.9
The recom m endations of the Endicott Board were never precisely fol­
lowed. The flotillas of torpedo boats were never provided, partly because of 
changes in naval strategy and partly because newly developed rapid-fire 
guns of 3- to 6-inch caliber, suited to deal with m inesweepers and beach 
attacks, filled some of their intended functions. Advances of unpredicted 
magnitude in the power and range of rifled guns allowed the use of smaller 
calibers and reduced by nearly half the num ber of weapons required. The
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perfection of a disappearing gun carriage suitable for heavy guns permitted 
the substitution of open em placements for the expensive turrets and armored 
casem ates the board had proposed for more im portant harbors like Boston 
and N arragansett Bay. The real significance of the Endicott Report was that 
it constituted a statem ent of policy initiated by Congress itself, which that 
body was willing to underw rite. A lthough the legislature balked at the 
board’s estim ates of over $127 million, it nevertheless accepted the report as 
the basis for a scheme of defense followed for the next twenty years.
The Endicott Report was taken off paper in 1888. Congress established a 
Board of Ordnance and Fortifications to review plans of the Corps of En­
gineers; it voted appropriations to begin the m anufacture of m odern seacoast 
ordnance at the W atervliet Arsenal in New York and to assist steel manufac­
turers in procuring necessary plant equipment; and it provided for the con­
struction of mining casem ates and cable galleries at Boston, New York, and 
San Francisco.
Mining casem ates were not really “ casem ates,” but were apparently so 
called because in early experim ents with mining equipment, operating rooms 
had been installed in casem ates of old fo r ts .10 They were small, squat 
bombproof structures made of reinforced cement covered with thick layers 
of sand. From them submarine mines could be detonated by electric cables 
running through tunnels, or galleries, to the water. In 1888-89 two of these 
simple buildings were constructed at Fort W arren. N ot a particularly dra­
matic beginning for a great new defense system, their construction nevertheless 
launched a fortification-building program in New England that was to con­
tinue until it was essentially completed about 1906.
In 1890 Congress passed its first bill for the construction of modern gun 
and m ortar batteries. Upon the recommendation of the Corps of Engineers it 
authorized emplacements at Boston, New York, and San Francisco for the 
first high-powered breechloading rifles and m ortars scheduled to come from 
the factories in January 1892. The Boston D istrict thus began building 
emplacements for three 10-inch disappearing rifles on Long Island Head and 
for sixteen 12-inch rifled m ortars at a new site, later named Fort Banks, 
perched on W inthrop Highlands on the harbor’s north flank.
Gun and m ortar batteries of the “ Endicott period” were similar in concept 
to those begun after the Civil War, but more massive and complex. Gun 
batteries generally consisted of two or three weapons, but each gun platform 
was a unit in itself, enclosed on the sides as well as the front by concrete 
walls fifteen to twenty feet thick. These concrete em placements were nestled 
into parapets of sand about forty-five feet thick, the whole structure in its 
resistance to the penetration of shells being designed as the equivalent of 
seventy feet of sand. Although the new defenses were hardly visible from 
the sea, with the iow-lying silhouettes of the embankments blending incon­
spicuously into the shoreline, the interior crest of a parapet was usually 
about twenty feet above the general lay of the land, with the gun platform 
approximately ten feet below the crest. Ammunition magazines were located 
under the parapet adjacent to the gun platform, but sunk to a lower level to 
allow for a thick roofing of concrete and earth while still retaining a low 
profile for the whole work. Mechanical hoists hauled up the heavy charges 
of pow der and shell stored in these vault-like rooms to waiting ammunition
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carts on the platform  level. Galleries, guard rooms, office room s, and other 
chambers were d istributed in the rear of the magazines under the gun 
platform.
Mortar emplacem ents were similarly constructed, but were fully enclosed. 
Four mortars were grouped together in a pit, and two or four pits into a 
battery. This arrangem ent was worked out by General Henry L. Abbot of 
the Corps of Engineers. A fter an analytical study of experim ents with 
mortars abroad, Abbot devised a system of firing four m ortars simultane­
ously so that the high-arcing shells would form a shotgun-like pattern, in­
creasing the chances for a hit. The best results were obtained by four pits 
located at the corners of a rectangle, and this type of battery was adopted 
whenever sites were suitable.11
Twelve-inch mortars installed at Fort Banks, Boston Harbor. 
Courtesy of Gerald Butler.
Several of the gun and m ortar batteries built in New England were located 
adjacent to old forts whose sites were still useful. At Fort W arren, where 
space on Georges Island was limited, three of the largest gun emplacements 
were built right over the east front of the old masonry work. M ost of the 
batteries, however, were constructed on the new sites selected after the 
Civil W ar and at o ther ou ter positions. Com m anding broad w ater ap­
proaches, their long-range rifles could guard harbors form erly requiring 
many more guns on narrow er channels closer to the cities. Groups of these 
sprawling batteries, or even single batteries, were still designated as forts, 
but forts now became merely pieces of real estate over which the new de­
fenses were scattered according to how best to obtain effective fields of fire. 
Simple in design and m aterials, the batteries took far less time and money to
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Fort Warren, Boston Harbor. The outer works at the bottom of the photo were de­
signed to protect the masonry scarps of this Third System fort from the fire of guns 
an enemy might mount on nearby Gallops and Lovells islands. The Endicott period 
barbette batteries appear at the top of the photo. Courtesy of Gerald Butler.
construct than the masonry citadels of the pre-Civil W ar era; it was their 
enormously improved guns that became comparatively more expensive and 
time-consuming to fabricate.12
For several years the new defense program, geared to the expanding but 
still small quantity of modern weapons coming from the government arsenal 
at W atervliet and the shops of private contractors, seemed hardly to move. 
Until 1896 the only construction started in New England was a m ortar bat­
tery at Boston, four 10-inch gun emplacements at Boston and three at Port­
land, and three mining casem ates at each of these harbors and two at New­
port. Large-scale construction was finally authorized in 1896 and 1897. This 
work was getting under way when, on February 15, 1898, the Maine went 
down in Havana Harbor. Three weeks later a bellicose Congress unani­
mously voted $50 million for war preparations, part of which the War D epart­
ment earm arked for a crash program of coastal battery construction. The 
reports of the district engineers reveal that by July, about two months after 
the start of the brief w ar with Spain, New England’s major harbors were at 
least approaching a condition where they might put up some defense.
Lieutenant Colonel Samuel M. Mansfield at Boston had built and armed 
em placem ents for eight 10-inch guns, two rapid-fire guns, and sixteen 
mortars. He also had platforms ready to receive five 12-inch, two 8-inch and 
two rapid-fire guns. Major Richard L. Hoxie at Portland had turned over five 
10-inch rifles to the artillery and was rushing along em placements for sixteen 
m ortars, two 12-inch guns, six 8-inch guns, and one rapid-fire gun. At 
Portsmouth Hoxie had completed and armed emplacements for two 8-inch 
rifles. Major David Lockwood at Newport had transferred to the artillery
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emplacem ents in N arragansett Bay for three 10-inch guns and sixteen 
mortars. He also had platforms ready for two 12-inch guns, two 10-inch 
guns, one of which was m ounted, and three rapid-fire guns. Lockwood had 
also finished platforms for two 8-inch guns at New Bedford. The ordnance 
for which they were designed was not yet available, but at the request of the 
governor of M assachusetts the Commanding General of the Departm ent of 
the East had sent to New Bedford two 8-inch converted rifles on converted 
carriages. The converted rifles were 10-inch sm oothbore guns converted into 
muzzle-loading rifles by sleeve insertions. The converted carriages were 15- 
inch smoothbore mounts strengthened to bear the additional strain imposed 
by rifle discharges.
No perm anent batteries were constructed  at harbors in Long Island 
Sound. Here the quick outdating of the Endicott Report was dramatically 
illustrated. The board had specified gun and m ortar batteries for New Lon­
don and New Haven and had suggested the deploym ent of heavily armored 
floating batteries at broad passages like the eastern entrance to the sound. 
But none of these defenses ever reached the planning stage. The rapid de­
velopment of long-range rifles made it possible to mount guns at the mouth 
of the sound that could bring all parts of the passage under fire. N ot only 
would the manufacturing towns along the north shore of the sound be pro­
tected, but New York City would be made secure from attack from that 
quarter. By July 1898 Major Smith S. Leach at New London had essentially 
completed emplacements on islands at the mouth of the sound for two 12- 
inch, four 10-inch, and two 8-inch rifles and for a rapid-fire gun. Only one 
10-inch rifle and the rapid-fire gun, however, were mounted.
A few weeks before the war with Spain began New England’s Engineers 
had also started mining harbor channels. Unlike gun and m ortar batteries, 
which were turned over to the artillery as soon as com pleted, mining equip­
ment remained under the command of the Corps of Engineers, which had 
developed the defense. It was not until the Army Reorganization Act of Feb­
ruary 1901 that mining operations were transferred to the newly created 
Coast Artillery Corps. By 1898 bom bproof mining casem ates had been built 
at several harbors, and tem porary casem ates hastily constructed at others. 
Using specially adapted vessels, the district engineers had by early May 
planted mine fields at Boston, Portland, Portsmouth, New London, New 
Haven, and Bridgeport harbors and at the entrances to N arragansett Bay 
and the Penobscot and Kennebec rivers.
The moment the war began congressmen, business interests, and the pub­
lic in general, after years of indifference toward coastal fortifications, set up 
a clamor for the immediate erection of defenses. So weak were the harbor 
defenses of the Atlantic coast, and so apprehensive were coastal com ­
munities of bom bardm ent, that the North Atlantic fleet was divided: the 
one-half blockading Havana and the other, reassuringly called “ the Flying 
Squadron,”  stationed at Hampton Roads. Against some other power such a 
strategy might have been disastrous; but fortunately for the United States, 
while the Spanish navy was believed to be formidable, it was unconceivably 
neglected, ill-armed, and untrained. Tem porary land defenses were also 
thrown up at more than a dozen places on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. 
Lacking enough modern rifles to arm even the perm anent fortifications being
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hurriedly prepared, the W ar Departm ent provided comfort, if little actual 
protection, to the citizenry of a num ber of localities by ordering old-style 
arm am ent pressed into service.
At Bar H arbor, Maine, M ajor Hoxie set up on tem porary wooden plat­
forms two 10-inch Rodman smoothbores and two 8-inch converted rifles. He 
overhauled old guns at Fort Knox and mounted four 15-inch Rodmans and 
an 8-inch breechloading rifle on a converted carriage at Fort Popham. At 
Portsm outh H arbor he supplemented the single m odern 8-inch battery, lo­
cated at Fort Constitution, with three 15-inch Rodmans at Fort McClary and 
two 8-inch breechloading rifles on converted carriages at Jerrys Point. At 
Portland he supported the skimpy modern arm am ent in the harbor with two 
8-inch converted rifles on Great Diamond Island and two 15-inch Rodmans 
at Fort Scammell. Meantime Major Leach erected tem porary batteries at 
communities on Long Island Sound, caught nearly defenseless with its single 
m odern rifle. He mounted three 15-inch Rodmans at Fort Trumbull at New 
London, two of which were shipped in from Fort W ashington in Maryland. 
To defend other towns along the sound, he stripped the old battery at Fort 
Griswold of eleven 10-inch Rodmans, mounted six at New Haven, four at 
Bridgeport, and one at Stonington. Hardly did Hoxie and Leach have these 
weapons in place, than the ten-w eeks’ war was over. The tem porary de­
fenses were soon dismantled, and the sm oothbores, already relics of another 
military age, were stored or sold.
Unlike after the Civil W ar the construction of perm anent seacoast de­
fenses, however, did not slacken. New sites were acquired at Boston, Port­
land, N arragansett Bay, and the eastern end of Long Island Sound, and guns 
and m ortars for them continued to pour from private factories and govern­
ment arsenals. By 1906 most of the batteries contem plated for New England 
under the Endicott program were com pleted, and by 1910 the last of them 
were transferred to the Coast Artillery. Once more American coasts were 
protected by a vast body of fortifications, and again New England had the 
heaviest concentration of defenses. Of eighteen fortified positions on the At­
lan tic  co as t, seven  w ere w ith in  the ju risd ic tio n  o f the N ew  England 
d istricts.13
Boston H arbor lay behind the guns of seven forts. Fort Banks and Fort 
Heath occupied W inthrop Highlands on the northern flank of the harbor, and 
Fort Revere lay on N antasket Head on the southern flank. Between them, 
scattered across the harbor’s broad opening to the sea, were Fort Strong on 
Long Island, Fort Standish on Lovells Island, Fort W arren on Georges Is­
land, and Fort Andrews on Peddocks Island. Castle and Governors islands, 
by congressional resolutions of 1890 and 1902, had been turned over to the 
city of Boston for park purposes. The city did nothing to improve or protect 
these historic sites, and while Fort Independence was retained for some 
years by the W ar Departm ent as a storage place for the mine defenses of the 
harbor, Fort W inthrop soon fell prey to vandals and thieves. Totally the 
forts of Boston H arbor contained thirty-one batteries housing thirty-two 
mortars and seven 12-inch, fourteen 10-inch, thirteen 6-inch, and thirty 3- to
5-inch guns.
Portland H arbor was defended by five forts. Fort Preble on Spring Point, 
whose primary batteries were m ortars, was the only older work incorporated
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Fort Standish. Lovells Island, Boston Harbor, as it appeared in 1934.
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into the new system. Fort Lyon on Cow Island, Fort M cKinley on Great 
Diamond Island, Fort Levett on Cushing Island, and Fort Williams on Port­
land Head formed an almost straight north-south line separating Portland 
H arbor from Casco Bay. Obsolete Fort Gorges was utilized as a mining 
equipment storehouse. The harbor’s arm am ent consisted of twenty-five bat­
teries containing twenty-four m ortars and seven 12-inch, seven 10-inch, eight 
8-inch, fourteen 6-inch, and thirteen 3-inch guns.
N orth of Portland, light defenses were placed at the mouth of the Ken­
nebec River, on which ten miles upstream  lay the Bath Iron Works where 
warships were built for the United States Navy. In 1902 the government had 
purchased a tract of land on Sabino Hill, an elevation behind Fort Popham, 
as the site for Fort Baldwin. Construction began in 1905, and in 1908 three 
batteries housing three 6-inch guns and two 3-inch guns were transferred to 
the artillery. At Fort Knox on the Penobscot River nothing was done except 
build a storehouse for mining materials.
Pointing down Portsm outh H arbor were the rifles of eight batteries at 
three forts. Fort Constitution on Newcastle Island on the New Hampshire 
side of the estuary was armed with two 8-inch and two 3-inch guns. Fort 
Stark on Jerrys Point at the southern extrem ity of the island was provided 
with two 12-inch, two 6-inch, and four 3-inch guns. Fort Foster on Gerrish 
Island on the Maine side of the harbor’s mouth boasted three 10-inch and 
two 3-inch guns.
At New Bedford, where the military reservation on Clarks Point had fi­
nally been nam ed Fort Rodman in 1893, five batteries flanking the old 
masonry fort contained two 8-inch, two 5-inch, and four 3-inch guns.
The entrances to N arragansett Bay were commanded by five forts. Fort 
Adams, with a half dozen new gun and m ortar batteries behind the old fort, 
and Fort W etherill, across the way on Conanicut Island near Dumpling 
Rocks, guarded the eastern passage. Blocking the western passage was Fort 
Greble on Dutch Island, flanked on the east by Fort Getty on Conanicut 
Island and on the west by Fort Philip Kearny on the mainland. M ounted in 
the twenty-three batteries of the five forts were twenty-four m ortars and 
seven 12-inch, ten 10-inch, sixteen 6-inch, four 4.7-inch, and twelve 3-inch 
guns.
Five forts also covered the eastern entrance to Long Island Sound. Four 
were strung on a direct line extending southwesterly across the mouth of the 
sound: Fort Mansfield on N apatree Point, Rhode Island; Fort H. G. Wright 
on the western end of Fishers Island; Fort Michie on Great Gull Island; and 
Fort Terry on Plum Island, ju st off Orient Point, Long Island. Fort Tyler 
was located on Gardiners Point, actually a small island, a few miles south­
east of Fort Terry. Along this line of defense were twenty-nine batteries with 
sixteen m ortars and four 12-inch, six 10-inch, four 8-inch, seventeen 6-inch, 
eight 5-inch, and sixteen 3-inch guns.14
Within two decades New England’s Engineers had built 27 forts contain­
ing 124 batteries with em placements for 96 m ortars and 247 guns. By 1906 
the great surge of fortification building was about over. Military construction 
still continued on a limited scale, but now centered mainly on providing the 
batteries with various accessory equipment. Already under way for some
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time, this work was accelerated for a few years by the recom m endations of a 
new coast defense board.
At the suggestion of Chief of Engineers M ajor General George L. Gillespie 
that it was time to create another panel similar to the Endicott Board to 
review defense projects for the U nited S tates and its new insular pos­
sessions, President Theodore Roosevelt, in January 1905, appointed a N a­
tional Coast Defense Board of army and navy officers chaired by Secretary 
of W ar William Howard Taft. Reporting in February 1906, the Taft Board 
recommended the construction of insular defenses, which was done, and the 
installation of additional guns and m ortars on continental coasts, including 
seventy-one new weapons in New England, which was not done. More im­
portant to continued defense construction in New England were the board’s 
proposals for further developing the adjuncts of coastal batteries, which in­
cluded fire control system s, submarine mine defenses, searchlights, power 
plants, and lighting systems. The Endicott Board had contem plated only 
mine defenses and searchlights to cover the mine fields, but by the turn of 
the century other accessories, and especially fire control system s, were re­
garded as equally necessary elements of a modern and adequate defense 
system .15
References to fire control systems first appear in the reports of New Eng­
land district engineers betw een 1900 and 1902, when the districts built 
twenty or more fire control stations for the precision aiming of guns and 
mortars. Prior to this time guns had been aimed individually with elementary 
sighting instrum ents, and accuracy of fire against moving targets had been 
largely a m atter of experience and educated guessing. The new aiming sys­
tem, in contrast, employed sighting with precise optical instrum ents, the 
rapid calculation of mathematical data, and the electrical communication of 
target-sighting and gun-pointing information. The installations of the first 
system s, however, were quickly called to a halt. Many details of fire control 
had not yet been worked out by the artillery, and a vertical method of sight­
ing was used that required high towers near the batteries, furnishing perfect 
targets for enemy fire. In 1904 the Coast Artillery adopted a horizontal-base 
system of position finding. This employed two or more “ base-end” stations 
off a considerable distance on either side of a battery, from which simul­
taneous optical bearings were continuously taken on a moving target. The 
angles of sight were constantly communicated by telephone and telautograph 
to a battery plotting room, which com puted the target’s position at the mo­
ment a projectile would reach it and transm itted aiming directions electri­
cally to each gun emplacement or m ortar p it.16
In 1905 the Engineer and Ordnance departm ents selected Boston, Port­
land, and New York for the first installations of this system. A special army 
board planned the fire control stations for Boston, which the district had 
ready for operation in Decem ber 1907. Forty-eight base-end stations, with 
generally two to four stations serving different batteries housed in a single 
building, were precisely positioned on fort sites and on new military reser­
vations on either side of the harbor. Small, simple structures of wood or 
brick, the stations contained only observation room s and spartan living quar­
ters. During the next half-dozen years fire-control system s were installed at 
all New England fortifications.
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Mining casemate at Fort Constitution, Portsmouth Harbor. The addition on the left is 
a harbor defense telephone switchboard room constructed in 1942. Courtesy of 
Gerald Butler.
The New England districts had been constructing mining casem ates and 
appurtenances such as mine storehouses, cable tanks, and loading wharves 
since 1888. This construction continued on a small scale after 1906, with one 
new com ponent of the mine defense system added. This was the mine ob­
serving or control station, used like the fire-control stations to get better 
fixings on ships entering harbors. At Boston H arbor six of these small, box­
like structures were built and turned over to the Coast Artillery in 1907.
References to equipping batteries with electric power plants and lighting 
systems first appear in the reports of the New England districts in 1898. The 
first installation of searchlights took place in 1901 and 1902, when several 
lights were set up at the entrance to Long Island Sound. Experim ents had 
been made off and on with searchlights since 1872, but among the most 
significant were a series of tests conducted in the Portland District in the 
summer of 1904. The m ajor recom m endations coming from the Portland 
experim ents were that no useful purpose was served by illuminating a water 
area much beyond the maximum range of fire, and that to put lights so far to 
the front of fortifications that they could not be defended was to waste them. 
T hese findings w ere quite  the opposite  o f ideas held at th a t tim e by 
prominent artillery officers.
O ther work by the New England districts on the auxiliaries of the defense 
system included the construction of tide observing stations, the installation
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of improved mechanical ammunition hoists in gun em placem ents, and the 
building of district wireless stations, the first of which were constructed at 
Fort Andrews at Boston and Fort Levett at Portland in 1908. Related also to 
the Taft Board Report was the responsibility given to the Boston Engineer 
Office to purchase m aterials for fortifications under construction in the 
Philippine Islands.17
Defense preparations of the “ Taft period” involved New England districts 
in still other activities. By order of the W ar Departm ent in 1907, boards of 
officers were appointed to meet in the Artillery Districts of New England to 
consider the protection of seacoast forts from attack on their landward sides. 
The upshot of this was the planning of land defenses around Boston, be­
tween May and N ovem ber 1909, by Captain Gilbert A. Youngberg and 
troops of Company B, Corps of Engineers, in consultation with Boston Dis­
trict Engineer Edward Burr. Plotting a vast semicircle around the city and 
harbor, the Engineers established a defense line more than seventy miles 
long. Touching the sea at Lynn on the north and Hingham on the south, it 
extended inland at its farthest point about twenty miles. Earthen fieldworks 
were designed for strategic places along the line, to be raised by local citi­
zens if ever needed. Three thousand soldiers, it was figured, could hold this 
defense perim eter against any force an enemy would be likely to land .18
During wartime the seacoast forts would have to be garrisoned by reserve 
army units as well as by the regular Coast Artillery. Therefore between 1911 
and 1914 Congress provided over a half million dollars for the installation of 
equipment in state armories for the instruction of Coast Artillery militia 
companies. Six of the nine cities in which these funds were expended were 
in New England. At the South Armory in Boston the Boston District set up a 
10-inch gun on a disappearing carriage, a 12-inch m ortar, a 3-inch rapid-fire 
gun, two sets of fire-control stations, and a thirty-inch searchlight. Similar 
training equipment was installed by the other New England districts in ar­
mories at Portland, Bridgeport, Providence, Pawtucket, and W oonsocket.19
The forts built on American coasts at the turn of the twentieth century 
were unexcelled anywhere in the world. Their batteries were mostly widely 
spaced and carefully hidden. M ost of their heavy guns were exposed above 
their protective parapets only for the brief moment of firing. Their heavy 
m ortars were totally invisible from the sea. M oreover, their fire control sys­
tems were more accurate than those of ships, giving the shore batteries a 
huge edge in long-range duels. So not only were guns and gun crews almost 
invulnerable because of their concealed and protected positions, but it was 
unlikely that any ship could fight its way close enough to be effective.
But the years of the Endicott period forts were numbered. Around the 
beginning of World War I great advances were made in naval weapons and 
tactics. A ccurate shipboard ranges increased with better fire-control tech­
niques. Improved battleship turrets perm itted ships to fire at higher angles, 
greatly extending maximum ranges and making it possible, by curved trajec­
tory fire, to drop shells behind parapets. Overhead bursts, a minor danger 
before the war, became a serious threat. Shore guns mounted on disappear­
ing carriages, as seven out of every eight American heavy seacoast guns 
were m ounted, in contrast, were limited to about twenty degrees elevation, 
with consequent restriction in range. Outranged and lacking overhead cover,
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Endicott batteries were already obsolescent almost before some of them 
were finished. “ When designed and constructed our seacoast batteries were 
thoroughly m odern and fully adequate for the purpose for which they were 
intended,” reported Chief of Engineers Brigadier General Dan C. Kingman 
in 1915, “ but the work of battery construction has in the past few years been 
allowed to practically cease and has not kept pace with recent progress in 
naval developm ent.” 20
The question of what should be done prompted the W ar Departm ent to 
convene a special Board of Review in February 1915. The board’s major 
proposal was to increase the effective range of harbor defenses by the instal­
lation of a considerable number of 12- and 16-inch guns. Although planning 
in cooperation with district engineers began immediately, the United States 
entered the war in Europe before any construction was started. Its attention 
was then directed primarily to m atters more urgent than defending shores 
that were never seriously threatened. Nevertheless, the construction of a 
few new batteries was begun during or immediately after the war. Of the ten 
localities on continental coasts where new batteries were erected, four were 
in New England.
Batteries were constructed at Boston, Portland, New Bedford, and Long 
Island Sound. Except at Long Island Sound, the fortification works were of 
new and extremely simple design. The guns were not provided with cover of 
any sort, but relied for protection against naval fire solely on wide separation 
of the em placem ents and concealm ent from sea-level observation. The 
emplacements were merely large circular platforms of concrete, designed to 
permit the guns at their centers to turn a full 360 degrees. Ammunition was 
stored in underground concrete magazines between them.
Two batteries were erected at Boston. One was on Nahant, a boot-like 
peninsula jutting into M assachusetts Bay a few miles northeast of Winthrop 
Highlands. The site had been acquired in 1904 for m ortar batteries, a project 
that was later eliminated from Boston defense plans. Fire control stations 
were erected there in 1907, and in 1915 a sixty-inch searchlight was installed. 
The construction of the battery began in Novem ber 1918. It was for two 
12-inch guns mounted on newly designed high-angle barbette carriages that 
increased the range of existing model Endicott period 12-inch rifles from 
about eight miles to more than seventeen miles. The battery was completed 
in Decem ber 1921, and a new fort, Fort Ruckman, was added to the roster of 
Boston’s defenses.21
Boston’s second new battery was constructed on Hog Island, a small spot 
of land concealed from the sea behind N antasket Head. Purchased in 1917, 
the island was originally slated for two 12-inch guns. Work on the emplace­
ments began in April 1920, but before the armam ent for them was supplied, 
the project was revised and the platforms were modified to accommodate 
16-inch guns. Hog Island was the third site in Boston H arbor to be selected 
for this size armament. Great Brew ster Island, lying about a mile and a half 
seaward of Georges Island, had been purchased in 1917 as the site for two 
16-inch guns mounted in a naval turret. Nothing more was done to further 
the project, and in 1920 it was abandoned in favor of locating the guns on 
Calf Island. Lying a quarter-mile north of Great Brewster, Calf Island had 
also been selected in 1917 for the location of two 16-inch guns. In 1922 this
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Fort Duvall, Boston Harbor. A harbor defense of the post-World War I generation, 
its two 16-inch rifles were not provided with any material cover.
One of the pair of Army Model 1919 rifles installed at Fort Duvall 
Courtesy of Gerald Butler.
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site was in turn discarded in favor of Hog Island, which lay protected behind 
N antasket Head. The 16-inch rifles that were finally mounted in 1925 were 
Army Model 1919 weapons, the most powerful service cannon ever pro­
duced in the United States. Fort Duvall, with weapons capable of hurling 
projectiles weighing more than a ton for about twenty-eight miles, was thus 
also added to Boston’s defenses.22
At Portland the Board of Review’s recommendation for the installation of 
two 12-inch rifles on barbette carriages resulted in the construction of a bat­
tery of the new type at Fort Levett on Cushing Island. Provided for in 1917 
estim ates, the battery was com pleted and turned over to the artillery in 
January 1921. A similar recom m endation for New Bedford was implemented 
by the construction of another two-gun 12-inch barbette battery at Fort 
Rodman, transferred to the artillery in May 1921.
To cover the broad entrance to Long Island Sound the Board of Review 
proposed six 16-inch guns, with batteries at Forts W right, Michie, and 
Terry. The only battery constructed, however, was at Fort Michie on Great 
Gull Island, nearest the center of the passage. During the w ar plans were 
adopted for mounting two 16-inch guns in a naval turret at Fort Michie, but 
the war ended before work had progressed beyond the blueprint stage. In 
July 1919 the project was modified to provide for the installation of one 
16-inch gun mounted on a disappearing carriage. This work was completed 
in M arch 1922. M eantime Forts Mansfield and Tyler, located on the edges of 
the sound and armed with only a few small guns, were abandoned and their 
ordnance rem oved.23
The airplane, although still in a primitive stage of developm ent, was a 
weapon that had to be reckoned with in World W ar I. American coastal 
defenses and cities could conceivably be subject to aerial observation or 
attack. The United States itself had pioneered in naval aviation and shown 
that it was possible. On January 18, 1911, in San Francisco Bay, a daring 
civilian pilot flying a Curtiss biplane had made the first landing and take-off 
from a warship, the U .S.S. Pennsylvania, fitted out with a rickety wooden 
platform on her afterdeck. The next year a naval aviator flew a plane shot 
from a com pressed-air catapult, and the year after that an aviator made the 
first scouting flight for the fleet and the Navy established an aviation station 
and school.24 Since other navies could use airplanes as well, the coastal 
defense plans drawn up in 1915 included antiaircraft batteries. When the 
United States entered the war in 1917 the New England districts began in­
stalling two 3-inch antiaircraft guns at almost every fort. But since the guns 
were in short supply the last of the batteries were not transferred to the 
artillery until O ctober 1921. The districts also built emplacements for anti­
aircraft guns in and around the major cities of New England. Boston, for 
example, was ringed with pairs of concrete foundations at Lynn, Cambridge, 
Brighton, and Braintree; and platforms were built on Castle Island and Bos­
ton Common. Guns had been mounted, however, only on the Common and 
at Brighton before work was stopped by a telegram from the Chief of E n­
gineers five days after the signing of the arm istice.25
It soon became apparent after the United States entered the w ar that its 
coasts were not likely to be attacked and that some seacoast guns could be 
pu t to b e tte r  use elsew here. T herefore the N ew  England d istric ts d is­
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mounted a num ber of weapons designated for arming transports or mounting 
on railroad carriages for service abroad. Boston H arbor was stripped of nine 
10-inch guns, thirteen rapid-fire guns, and ten m ortars; and other harbors 
were similarly pruned of a portion of their armament. Few weapons, how­
ever, were actually shipped away before the war ended.
During and after the w ar the districts also carried out renewed programs of 
modernizing and improving the auxiliaries of fortifications. Powerful sixty- 
inch searchlights were installed, some temporarily on private property, as on 
the estate of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge at Nahant. New mining casem ates 
were built. Ammunition hoists were modernized. Post telephone systems 
were installed. New fire-control stations were erected, and fire-control sys­
tems were improved by the construction of protected switchboard and plot­
ting rooms and the installation of new communications equipm ent.26
In 1923 the W ar Departm ent, recognizing that its harbor defenses offered 
no protection against aerial bom bardm ent and that most seacoast guns were 
outranged by naval armam ent, made another study of coastal defense re­
quirements. It recom m ended the abandonment of a num ber of works that 
were no longer of military value and concentration on improving the remain­
ing defenses, particularly by providing them with new long-range guns and 
more antiaircraft protection. It designated eighteen coastal areas where per­
manent defenses should be retained, including Portland, Portsm outh, Bos­
ton, New Bedford, the entrances to N arragansett Bay, and the eastern en­
trance of Long Island Sound. The most important factor determining this 
selection was the insistence of the Navy on the defense of its shore installa­
tions and fleet anchorages.
Between 1930 and 1932 the Army drafted new defense projects for each of 
the eighteen harbor areas and established a H arbor Defense Board to super­
vise the execution of the projects. During the 1930s, however, funds voted 
for harbor protection were meager, and the growing tension between the 
United States and Japan determ ined that what little was available would be 
spent mostly on im provem ents along the Pacific coast. Not until the threat 
of w ar in Europe was imminent in 1939 were larger appropriations forthcom ­
ing and was work resumed on gun installations along the Atlantic front. In 
M arch 1940 the H arbor Defense Board began a resurvey of harbor defense 
needs, which soon took on new urgency with the downfall of France in June. 
Naval attacks on American coasts had until then been only a remote possi­
bility, but with the fate of the French and British fleets suddenly made un­
certain and serious Am erican naval inferiority in either the Atlantic or 
Pacific a disquieting prospect, the danger took on new dimensions. The sur­
vey of the Harbor Defense Board broadened into a complete reassessm ent of 
harbor defenses.
Reporting on July 27, 1940, the board recom m ended the replacem ent of 
practically all pre-W orld W ar I heavy armament with 16-inch guns. These 
weapons, already available, were Mark II naval guns originally intended for 
capital ships whose construction had been cancelled by the W ashington 
Naval Treaty of 1922. Almost as powerful as the Army’s Model 1919, only a 
few of which had been produced, they had a range of about twenty-six miles. 
The board proposed the construction within the continental United States of 
twenty-seven two-gun 16-inch batteries, all to be emplaced in casem ates. It
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recommended similar air cover for ten 16-inch and thirteen 12-inch batteries 
that had been installed since World W ar I or were already approved for 
construction. It also proposed the construction of fifty twin-gun 6-inch bat­
teries. With ranges of about fifteen miles, they could deal with cruisers and 
other light ships and would reinforce sixty-three existing secondary batteries 
of small caliber that were to be retained in the defense system .27
This modernization program had to compete from the beginning with other 
and m ore pressing requirem ents of the Arm y and N avy. M oreover as 
American air and sea pow er expanded, the less likely it seemed that coastal 
defense guns would ever be used. Consequently in each of the next three 
years the program was cut back, especially as it related to the primary bat­
teries. By the end of the w ar nineteen 16-inch and forty-eight 6-inch batteries 
had been installed.28 Eight of the 16-inch and sixteen of the 6-inch batteries 
were constructed by the New England districts.
The newly installed 16-inch guns and the heavy batteries retained from the 
interw ar period were emplaced within casem ates from which only the gun 
barrels protruded. Twenty- to twenty-five-feet-thick coverings of concrete, 
steel, and earth protected the guns and carriages from direct hits. Thick 
canopies of reinforced concrete projected over the front openings of the 
casem ates, and in some instances the forward part of the carriage was sur­
rounded by a four-inch steel shield that almost completely closed the case­
m ate opening. The guns of a battery  were generally spaced about five 
hundred feet apart, and between them, also protected by reinforced concrete 
and earth, were strung cham bers housing the battery’s magazines, power 
generators, air conditioners, communications equipment, and storage and 
service facilities. To transport the one-half or one ton shells along galleries 
to the guns, overhead trolleys ran on tracks suspended from the ceiling. The 
6-inch guns were not casem ated but were enclosed in cast-steel shields four 
to six inches thick. The guns of a battery were spaced about two hundred 
feet apart, and between and slightly behind them  was constructed an earth- 
covered, reinforced-concrete magazine complex similar to those that serv­
iced the big guns.29
Batteries of these types were built by the Boston District at Boston, Port­
land, and Portsmouth. For the defense of Boston H arbor, the district placed 
a 16-inch battery on East Point, Nahant, and another on D eer Island, the 
harbor’s northern chop. The latter site, purchased from the city in 1907 for 
the installation of fire-control stations, was now christened Fort Dawes. The 
district casem ated the 16-inch battery at Fort Duvall and the 12-inch battery 
at Fort Ruckman. To supplement this heavy artillery it built 6-inch batteries 
on E ast Point, Nahant; on O uter Brew ster Island; at Fort Dawes; and at 
Fourth Cliff, a new military reservation established at Scituate on the har­
bor’s south flank. At Portland H arbor it constructed a 16-inch battery on 
Peak Island, casem ated the 12-inch battery at Fort Levett on Cushing Island, 
and  bu ilt 6-inch b a tte r ie s  on C ape E lizab e th  and  Jew ell Is lan d . At 
Portsmouth it erected a 16-inch battery at new Fort Dearborn, ju s t outside 
the harbor in Rye, New Hampshire, and built 6-inch batteries at Fort Dear­
born and Fort F oster.30
The Providence District was equally busy in southern New England. At 
Narragansett Bay it installed 16-inch batteries at Fort Church on Sakonnet
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Point and at Fort Greene on Point Judith. Located about sixteen miles apart 
on the outerm ost edges of the bay, these four guns practically supplanted the 
five forts within the bay once armed with nearly sixty 6- to 12-inch rifles and 
heavy m ortars. The big guns were supported by three 6-inch batteries con­
structed at Fort Church, Fort Greene, and Fort Burnside, the last located on 
Beavertail Point on the southern tip of Conanicut Island. The district also 
built, at Fort Church, the only modern 8-inch battery constructed within the 
continental United States. A smaller version of the 16-inch casem ated bat­
teries, even to its guns being surplus Navy pieces transferred to the Army 
after the Washington Naval Treaty, it was completed before the war began 
when defense work was first resumed on the Atlantic coast.31 At the eastern 
end of Long Island Sound the district constructed a 16-inch battery at Fort 
Wright on Fishers Island and another at Fort H ero on M ontauk Point, Long 
Island. It also built 6-inch batteries at Fort Wright and at W ilderness Point 
on F ish ers Island , at F o rt H ero , and at F o rt T erry  on Plum  Island. 
Additional coastal defense construction by the district consisted of casemat- 
ing the open 12-inch battery at Fort Rodman, New Bedford, and erecting a 
6-inch battery on Mishaum Point in South Dartmouth, M assachusetts, to 
command the entrance to Buzzards Bay and the w estern end of the Cape 
Cod Canal.
A 155-mm. gun on a Panama mount at the Salisbury Beach, Massachusetts, Military 
Reservation. Courtesy of Gerald Butler.
At a num ber of forts and military reservations the districts also built con­
crete platforms for lighter artillery: 3-inch antiaircraft guns, 90 millimeter 
an ti-torpedo boat batteries, and 155 m illim eter field pieces. The la tter 
weapons, which had a range of about fifteen miles, were provided with the 
scope of traverse required of seacoast guns firing at moving targets by 
mounting them on circular platforms with steel rails around the rims, along 
which the guns’ trails could easily be moved. Such “ Panam a”  mounts were 
constructed at several places, including four at the Salisbury Beach Military
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Reservation, two at Sagamore Hill at the eastern end of the Cape Cod Canal, 
and two at East Point, Nahant.
Each of the larger gun installations was served by a network of up to a 
dozen fire-control stations strung along the coast for miles in either direction 
of a battery. The base-end stations for the harbor defenses of Boston, for 
example, stretched from Gurnet Point in Plymouth Bay to Plum Island on 
the south side of the Merrimack River, a straight-line distance of about sixty 
miles. A station on the Salisbury Beach Military Reservation on the north 
side of the Merrimack began a series of sighting posts serving the batteries at 
Portsmouth that extended to York, Maine. From there base-end stations for
Fire-control stations o f  the Boston Harbor defenses
Emerson Point, Rockport, M assachu­
setts. Courtesy of Gerald Butler.
*
Fire-control tower camouflaged to re­
semble a church tower. Halibut Point, 
Cape Ann, Massachusetts. Courtesy of 
Gerald Butler.
Strawberry Point, Scituate, Massachu- Point Allerton, Hull, Massachusetts,
setts. Courtesy of Gerald Butler. Courtesy of Gerald Butler.
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the Portland Harbor defenses spread along the coast to the Kennebec River. 
Existing base-end stations were retained, and many new ones were con­
structed, each serving three or four batteries and most of them disguised. 
For the Boston H arbor defenses the Boston District built over twenty sta­
tions made to look like beachfront cottages and about a dozen steel or ce­
ment tow ers, some camouflaged to resem ble church tow ers and one a 
windmill.
The artillery installations them selves were also camouflaged. Although 
both the Endicott period batteries, some of which were retained in service 
until 1943, and the batteries completed after World W ar I were well con­
cealed against observation from ships at sea, their gun em placements in the 
center of well-groomed grass areas and slopes distinctively marked by road­
ways presented perfect bull’s-eyes for m odern aircraft whose observation 
and attack capabilities were being dramatically illustrated in the war theaters 
abroad. To reduce their vulnerability through disguise, the Army General 
Staff in 1941 directed the Corps of Engineers to conduct camouflage training 
schools in each Coast Artillery District. The school for the First Coast Artil­
lery District was held from Septem ber to N ovem ber that year at Fort Heath 
in W inthrop. The instructor was First L ieutenant W alter Krotee, sent from 
the faculty of the Engineer School at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The students, 
about thirty in number, were Coast Artillery officers with engineer training 
and noncommissioned officers selected from the harbor defense units. The 
officer assigned from the H arbor Defense of Portsm outh was First Lieuten­
ant Wilbar M. Hoxie, now Safety Engineer of the New England Division.
Learning by experim entation and the development of new techniques, the 
school concealed the three 12-inch disappearing guns of Fort H eath and dis­
torted the distinctive outlines of the whole fort by means of removable net­
ting, painting, and landscaping, and by remodeling structures to create the 
illusion of an area of private homes and commercial properties. Extensive 
use was made of nonreflective paints, including formulas designed to reduce 
reflectivity to infra-red light by which photography could penetrate some 
camouflage techniques.32
Returning to their duty, stations, the students of the school camouflaged 
the older batteries, procuring supplies and equipment from the Boston and 
Providence engineer districts. M eantime the engineers of the districts were 
themselves camouflaging the new gun installations they were constructing. 
The earthen blankets of the casem ates were somewhat irregularly shaped 
and planted with grasses and shrubs to blend in with natural surroundings. 
At Fourth Cliff all the barracks and other structures were constructed so as 
to present the appearance of a typical seaside resort community, and similar 
techniques were employed at other military reservations.
Along with the gun batteries and fire-control stations, the New England 
districts constructed the various ancillaries of a coastal defense system, such 
as up-to-date reinforced concrete mining casem ates and harbor entrance 
command posts that were both bom bproof and gasproof. Some of these in­
stallations represented sizable projects. The placing of an extremely sophis­
ticated mining casem ate on Great B rew ster Island required the additional 
construction of barracks, quarters, and m esses, a reservoir, and platforms 
for 90 millimeter rapid-fire anti-torpedo boat batteries. The installation of the
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A 6-inch barbette battery at Fort Standish, Boston Harbor, camouflaged with netting.
Courtesy of Gerald Butler.
The military installation at Fourth Cliff, Scituate, Massachusetts, 
disguised to resemble a seaside resort community. 
Courtesy of Gerald Butler.
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Harbor Entrance Command Post at Fort Stark, Portsmouth, New Hampshire. 
Courtesy of Wilbur Hoxie.
6-inch battery and a searchlight on Outer Brew ster Island similarly necessi­
tated the construction of living accom m odations and a desalination plant.
With far fewer but far more powerful guns, the New England districts had 
by the close of World W ar II armed the region’s harbors more formidably 
than ever in their history. Within three years of the w ar’s end, however, the 
entire concept of harbor defense by long-range artillery was abandoned. The 
technology of amphibious invasion had been developed during the war to the 
point where whole armies could be landed without the use of port facilities, 
and if heavy shipboard guns were used at all in another war, they would be 
used to support such open-beach landings rather than to bomb coastal cities 
or naval bases, w hich could m ore easily  be a ttack ed  from  the a i r .33 
Moreover, the era of missiles had begun. Therefore, when Army Engineers 
within a few short years again turned their skills to defense construction, it 
was to be of a much different character.
Bunker Hill Monument.
Local flood protection, Woonsocket, Rhode Island.
Fox Point Hurricane Barrier, Providence, Rhode Island.
Charles River Dam under construction.
Bourne Bridge, Cape Cod Canal.
Cliff Walk Restoration, Newport, Rhode Island.
Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Chapel at Fort Devens, Massachusetts.
Townshend flood control reservoir, Vermont.
White water canoe race at Knightville Dam, Massachusetts.
A LARGER MILITARY MISSION
On N ovem ber 27, 1940 the Boston Engineer District took over from the 
Army Q uarterm aster Corps the construction of Grenier Air Force Base in 
Manchester, New Hampshire. The transfer marked the beginning of a new 
military mission for the Corps of Engineers and the abandonm ent of a mili­
tary practice dating back to colonial times. In the tradition of the British, the 
Corps of Engineers had customarily built fortifications and military roads 
and bridges, while the Q uarterm aster Corps had erected the camps, depots, 
and other facilities that sheltered and supplied the Army. Even at seacoast 
fortifications, the Engineers had built the batteries and Quarterm asters had 
put up the barracks. The one corps took care of com bat construction, the 
other quartered the Army.
Although the Q uarterm aster Corps was essentially a supply rather than a 
construction agency, this division of responsibility raised no great problems 
throughout the nineteenth century, for not much construction was required. 
Peacetime armies were insignificant, and wartime armies were m ustered in 
small units and almost immediately sent into the field. World W ar I, how­
ever, relegated militia methods to history. The mobilization and training of 
large armies and the mass production of w ar materiel required the building of 
training camps, munitions plants, supply depots, and other facilities on a 
vast scale and at breakneck speed. A Cantonm ent (later, Construction) 
Division, nominally a part of the Q uarterm aster Corps but for all practical 
purposes an independent unit within the W ar D epartm ent, was hastily 
established, and, heavily staffed by bigwigs from the coun try ’s leading 
construction firms, it got the huge job  done. But the agency also drew 
criticism for inefficiency, waste, and corruption. And throughout the war, a 
struggle went on within the Army and Congress over whether to transfer the 
Construction Division to the Corps of Engineers, create a perm anent Army 
Construction Division that would absorb the civil function of the Corps of 
Engineers, consolidate all federal construction into a new federal departm ent 
of public w orks, or, after the war, return the division’s function to the 
Quarterm aster Corps. With army officers, contractors’ associations, and 
congressmen tugging in all directions, the issue was papered over in 1920 by 
the compromise of establishing a Construction Service as a separate branch 
of the Q uarterm aster Corps.
Between World Wars it again did not m atter much where responsibility for 
military construction lay. The Army was as usual pared to a token force, and 
most of the huge wartime military plant was sold or allowed to decay. But 
when the realities of events unfolding in Europe and Asia in the 1930s were 
finally faced and the United States belatedly began to rearm  in 1939, it 
geared up a military construction program that was to dw arf the efforts of 
1917-18. The Construction Division of the Q uarterm aster Corps, despite a 
high level of com petence and extraordinary achievem ents, soon began to 
stagger under the strain. Twenty years of national inattention to considera­
tions of security and the makeshift character of a hastily assembled and
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understaffed organization were handicaps not easily overcom e. Once more the 
question of the proper agency for military construction was debated, and this 
time the logic of the Corps of Engineers’ unique technical com petence, es­
tablished nationwide field organization, and long experience in directing 
large construction enterprises prevailed. In Septem ber 1940 Congress au­
thorized the Secretary of W ar to transfer any part of defense construction to 
the Engineers, and in N ovem ber the Chief of Staff assigned to them  all Army 
Air Force work. A year later, by a m easure put into effect D ecem ber 16, 
1941, Congress placed all Army construction, and responsibility for m ainte­
nance and real estate as well, under the Corps of Engineers.1
In addition to Grenier Field in M anchester, the first project in the country 
to pass from the Quarterm asters to the Engineers, Air Force construction by 
the Corps in New England included a half-dozen other m ajor air bases. At 
Bangor, Maine, the Boston District transform ed the municipal airport into 
the Dow Air Force Base. More than a hundred miles north of Bangor, in the 
northeastern corner of the United States, it built two more fields at Presque 
Isle and Houlton. These were w estern terminals of the North Atlantic route 
of the Air Transport Command. Construction of the fields was authorized in 
August 1941, and by October the Presque Isle base was ready for limited 
operations. It became the main point of departure for the thousands of 
American aircraft ferried over the Atlantic to Britain, either directly across 
Newfoundland or by the stepping-stone route of Labrador, Greenland, and 
Iceland. Houlton became an alternate landing field. At Falm outh on Cape 
Cod, the Boston District turned Otis Field, a form er M assachusetts National 
Guard installation with two turf airstrips, into another large Air Force base. 
In 1940 the Army leased the National Guard property for the construction of 
Camp Edwards, and in the fall of 1942 the district laid the first concrete 
runways on the portion retained for an airfield. During the war Otis was used 
successively by the 14th Antisubmarine Patrol, the Civilian Air Patrol, and 
the Naval Air Force. In the Connecticut R iver Valley, the Providence Dis­
trict built W estover Field in Chicopee, M assachusetts, and Bradley Field at 
W indsor Locks, Connecticut. W estover Field, planned in 1939 and begun 
early in 1940 by the Constructing Quarterm aster, was the first Air Corps 
base located in New England. Bradley Field, together with Grenier Field, 
was part of an accelerated Air Force program drawn up in 1940.2
When taken over by the Engineers, the airfield construction program was 
in chaotic condition. In selecting sites the Air Corps had followed the easy 
path of accepting tracts donated by communites, and they frequently turned 
out to be soggy or subject to flooding or in some other way unsuitable. No 
basic data necessary for proper design had been collected, no criteria existed 
for constructing paved runways, and not much information was available on 
airfield drainage. Plans for buildings had been drawn with insufficient clarity 
and detail, and no attention had been paid to passive defense m easures of 
camouflage and dispersion.
One of the toughest nuts to crack was designing runways that could stand 
up under the great weight and pounding vibrations of the heavy bombers 
developed during the war. Before the em ergency, commercial planes of 
25,000 pounds gross weight, with wheel loads of 12,500 pounds, were the 
heaviest in use. Now runw ays had to be constructed  for superbom bers
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weighing as much as 140,000 pounds, and no precedents for such loads 
existed in either airport or highway engineering. To push research on both 
rigid cement and flexible asphalt pavements, the Corps assembled a crack 
team of specialists, including two experienced soils men, Reuben M. Haines 
and D. Dana Leslie, from the New England Division. Assisted by personnel 
in many districts, the researchers within two years designed airfields capable 
of handling the heaviest planes of World W ar II and developed methods for 
meeting the challenge of much heavier planes in the future. Among the many 
experiments conducted were those at Bradley Field, where deflection tests 
were made on asphalt pavements with static loads ranging from 20 to 112.5 
tons, and at Grenier Field, where data was collected relating to pavements 
laid on sand.3
The Q uarterm aster Corps had prepared standard plans and specifications 
for the barracks, mess halls, and num erous other structures that make up a 
military base. But when the Engineers unrolled them  at the airfields, com ­
plaints came in thick and fast. They were “ too general” and therefore “ am ­
biguous and confusing,” reported the acting district engineer at Providence, 
Lieutenant Colonel Harley Latson. They were poorly prepared, improperly 
organized, and difficult to read, he continued. Both he and Lieutenant Colo­
nel Leonard B. Gallagher at Boston were among the district engineers who 
compiled long lists of recommended changes in response to the request of the 
Chief of Engineers to review the plans and offer suggestions for revision.4
Another feature of the bases that bothered the Engineers was their high 
visibility from the air. W estover Field, for example, stood out starkly from 
the surrounding tobacco farmland that characterized much of the lower 
Connecticut River Valley. C onstruction forces, tackling a tract of 5,000 
acres in April 1940, had bulldozed away all vegetation and proceeded to 
labor in great clouds of dust. The buildings of the base were crowded into 
about one-third the space available, their close, regular form ations un­
mistakably those of a military post. In the same way other bases along the At­
lantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts stood out in bold relief, offering splendid 
targets for possible enemy air strikes.
Less than three weeks after taking over the Air Force projects, the En­
gineers started blocking out plans for a com prehensive program of camou­
flage and concealment. But they were soon drawn up short by the War De­
partment, which took a cool attitude toward the additional expense involved. 
Without increased allotments district engineers were unable to employ dis­
persed layouts or expensive camouflage measures. Generally the best they 
could do was preserve vegetation at the fields.
Bradley Field, some twenty miles down the Connecticut R iver Valley 
from Westover, was the one notable exception. Providence District Engineer 
Lieutenant Colonel John S. Bragdon, upon taking over the project in De­
cember 1940, discarded an unsatisfactory site at Hartford selected by the Air 
Corps and chose one near W indsor Locks. The new location was ideal for an 
airport, and Bragdon wanted to make the most of it. With the help of the 
Assistant Chief of Engineers in charge of construction, he persuaded the Air 
Corps’ Chief of Buildings and Grounds Division to agree to a dispersed and 
camouflaged layout, even though longer utility  lines would add some 
$500,000 to costs. The General Staff was reluctant to spend the money, but
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finally consented on the basis that the scheme was experimental. With ad­
vice from the Engineer Board, Bragdon blended Bradley Field into its 
tobacco-farming environment. He scattered the buildings for housing per­
sonnel and equipm ent over the entire reservation, concealing some in heavy 
woods and gullies; and by such expedients as butting regulation army bar­
racks buildings end to end and painting them a dark reddish-brown, made 
larger buildings out in the open look like the tobacco sheds that dotted the 
countryside. He allowed no unnecessary clearing, grading, or cutting of 
trees, left all existing paths and roads intact, and designed most new roads to 
follow the general contour of the ground. Bradley Field was about as in­
visible from the air as it could be made, and on the day of Pearl Harbor it 
was the only field in the United States built on a dispersed layout. When, a 
few days after the attack, the Air Corps prescribed passive protection for all 
air stations, Bragdon’s plan was reproduced and distributed as a m odel.5
Bradley Field as it appeared from the air in the 1950s. The landing strips are visible at 
the upper right.
Concurrently with taking over Air Corps w ork, Army Engineers also 
began constructing civilian airfields. When H itler’s blitzkrieg across W estern 
Europe in the spring of 1940 heightened apprehensions in the United States 
over its own vulnerability to attack, Air Corps bases were few and widely 
scattered, and not many municipal airports in the country were suitable for 
the use of air com bat groups. Therefore in October 1940 Congress appro­
priated $40 million for the improvement by the Civil Aeronautics Authority 
of airports designated by the W ar and Navy departm ents as important to 
national defense. A list of these airports was worked out in joint confer­
ences, and the Secretary of Commerce arranged with the Secretary of War 
for the Corps of Engineers to do the survey and construction work. Con­
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gress later appropriated almost $295 million more for this upgrading of civil­
ian airfields.6 Under this program, which was nearly completed by the end 
of 1943, the Boston and Providence districts built twenty airstrips in Maine, 
New Hampshire, Vermont, and M assachusetts. The work consisted mostly 
of laying paved runways of about 5,000-foot length. At Eastport and Bar 
Harbor, Maine, the airfields included seaplane ramps used by the Navy.
CIVIL AERONAUTICS AUTHORITY AIRFIELDS
Boston District
Augusta, Maine 
Bar H arbor, Maine 
Eastport, Maine 
Greenville, Maine 
Norridgewock, Maine 
Oldtown, Maine 
Sanford, Maine 
W interport, Maine
Concord, New Hampshire 
Laconia, New Hampshire 
Portsm outh, New Hampshire
Beverly, M assachusetts 
Norwood, M assachusetts
Providence District
Burlington, Vermont Claremont, New Hampshire
Coventry, Vermont Keene, New Hampshire
Rutland, Vermont Lebanon, New Hampshire
Athol-Orange, M assachusetts7
Early in 1942 the New England districts prepared civilian airports at Gro­
ton and Bridgeport, Connecticut, and at Boston for immediate occupation by 
fighter squadrons. At the same time they constructed several aircraft warn­
ing radar stations for the I Fighter Command. These installations, which 
included access roads, power facilities, and housing, were part of an initial 
Atlantic coast radar net of fifteen stations from Maine to Virginia designed to 
cover vital industrial cen ters.8
When all military construction was transferred to the Corps of Engineers 
on December 16, 1941, the office of the Constructing Quarterm aster for the 
New England zone was incorporated into the Boston Engineer District, and 
the workloads of both New England districts were further enlarged. Can­
tonment work accounted for a large measure of the new activity. The E n­
gineers continued construction at New England’s two large Army camps— 
Fort Devens in Ayer, M assachusetts, built in World W ar I, and Camp Ed­
wards on Cape Cod, begun in Septem ber 1940—both of which had been 
scenes of large-scale building by the Q uarterm aster Corps. In Taunton, Mas­
sachusetts, they constructed Camp Myles Standish, the Boston Staging Area 
for troops departing overseas. Begun early in 1942, the camp was in opera­
tion within a few months. With large railroad yards and seven cantonment 
areas, it accommodated up to 50,000 soldiers at a time as they poured in
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from all over the country on their way to Europe. The Engineers also built 
Camp Wellfleet on the Atlantic shore of Cape Cod, an adjunct of Camp 
Edwards used for gunnery practice; they rehabilitated Fort E than Allen in 
Colchester, Vermont, an old Field Artillery post called into service for train­
ing purposes; and they performed cantonm ent work at each of the harbor 
defense areas, where sizable camps were necessary for the crews manning 
around the clock the installations scattered all along the coast.
Other military work involved a variety of facilities. The Engineers made 
renovations and alterations at the W atertown Arsenal and the Springfield 
Armory, remodeled mill buildings in Lowell, M assachusetts, for an ordnance 
plant, and co n stru c ted  an o rdnance depo t of igloo-type m agazines at 
Maynard, M assachusetts, for storing ammunition for Fort Devens. They re­
paired the Boston Army Base, a shipping terminal constructed during World 
War I; and since the base could not handle all the shipping scheduled from 
Boston, they constructed  a new term inal at nearby Castle Island. The 
biggest port facility in New England, the Castle Island Terminal involved the 
construction of thousands of feet of wharfage, the laying of miles of railroad 
track, and the erection of num erous warehouses, barracks, and other build­
ings. The districts constructed several prisoner of w ar camps, built tem po­
rary structures or converted buildings in most major cities for use by the 
United Services Organization, and converted civilian buildings in numerous 
places for Army occupation.9
Castle Island Terminal. Fort Independence appears on the lower left and the Boston 
Army Base on the upper right.
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The construction of military facilities in the United States peaked in 1942 
and then rapidly declined as men, resources, and equipm ent were shifted 
from homefront preparations to supporting com bat operations in the war 
theaters. The New England districts continued to shoulder heavy workloads, 
but there was greater concentration on improving existing facilities than 
building new ones. Notable exceptions, however, were several large hospi­
tals constructed to care for the sick and wounded returning from overseas. 
In addition to station hospitals at the air bases and army camps, the districts 
constructed a general, two regional, and two convalescent hospitals. The 
hospitals were of the cantonm ent type. The wards, clinical rooms, quarters, 
messes, and other components of a plant were separate one-story buildings, 
with all except utility buildings joined by covered corridors. Hospitals con­
structed on this plan reduced fire hazards and were safer for patients, more 
efficient for arranging clinical facilities, more easily expandable, and less 
costly than conventional multistoried plants.
Although constructed on an emergency timetable, some hospitals were 
planned with an eye to postwar use by the Veterans Administration and 
were therefore of semipermanent type. Such was the Cushing General H os­
pital in Framingham, M assachusetts, completed by the Boston District in 
February 1944. Located on 110 acres of rolling countryside carved from two 
private estates, it was a complex of seventy-nine buildings. It had an au­
thorized bed capacity of 1,800 and cost $5 million. “ It is the finest physical 
layout of any hospital of its kind in the country ,” was the opinion of Colonel 
Edward A. Noyes, its commanding officer, after completing an inspection of 
hospitals for the Surgeon General. The project set the standards thereafter 
demanded by the Office of the Chief of Engineers for similar hospitals built 
throughout the United States. After the war it was transferred to the Vet­
erans Administration. The Waltham Regional Hospital in W altham, M assa­
chusetts, was also a Type A hospital, as plants of this semipermanent design 
were called. Completed late in 1944, it was a 950-bed unit costing $2 million. 
L ater it was co n v e rted  in to  a g en e ra l h o sp ita l— the M urphy Arm y 
Hospital—and in 1958 it became the headquarters of the New England En-
View of the Murphy Army Hospital, Waltham, Massachusetts, shortly after it be­
came the headquarters of the New England Division in 1958.
Boston V.A. Hospital Manchester V.A. Hospital
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gineer Division. Both hospitals were constructed of red brick and were de­
signed by consulting architects from plans from the Surgeon G eneral’s Office 
to conform to New England colonial-type arch itecture .10
When the war came to an end, the New England Division settled back to 
major concentration on its norm al peacetim e m ission of navigation im­
provement and flood control work. Yet a healthy percentage of its workload 
continued to be m ilitary-related construction. Hospitals were the largest 
projects. In February 1946 the Veterans Administration requested the Corps 
of Engineers to design and construct some seventy hospitals with a capacity 
of about 40,000 beds. The criteria for the hospitals were worked out jointly 
by the Corps and the Veterans Administration, and design work was dele­
gated to selected architect-engineer firms. In Septem ber 1946 construction 
began on the first hospital, a 418 bed, multistoried unit at Providence, Rhode 
Island. This was followed by further construction by the New England Divi­
sion of 1,000-bed hospitals at Boston and at West Haven, Connecticut, and a 
150-bed plant at M anchester, New H am pshire.11 Construction for the N a­
tional Guard and the Air National Guard also contributed im portantly to the 
division’s military workload in the late 1940s. It built armories for the Na­
tional Guard at a num ber of cities throughout New England and installed 
facilities for the Air National Guard at Air Force fields and at the Burlington, 
Verm ont, A irport, B arnes Field located near W estover A ir Base, and 
Thomas Greene Field at Providence, Rhode Island.
By June 1950, while military projects continued to comprise nearly 40 per­
cent of the workload of the division, few were of any significant size. 
Twenty military construction contracts and three architect-engineer con­
tracts for the military program were in force, with a value of $3,974,687 and 
$901,292 respectively. In contrast, nine flood control contracts, valued at 
$4,287,153, and eighteen river and harbor projects, valued at $3,468,550, 
were in effect. The large organization that had functioned during the war had 
shrunk to 556 people, only 95 of whom were on military w ork.12
This pattern of activity, almost somnolent by war-year standards, was 
suddenly shattered when North Korean forces struck across the 38th parallel 
in the early morning hours of June 25, 1950, in a well-organized surprise 
attack on the Korean republic to the south. Within hours President Truman 
called for action by the United Nations Security Council, and within days 
the P resident ordered U nited S tates naval, air, and ground forces into 
Korea. Intelligence reports over the next few months reinforced suspicions 
that the attack in Korea was part of a broader Soviet plan of pressure on the 
West, and on Decem ber 15 Truman declared a national emergency and a 
program  of national p reparedness. The C ongress and the nation were 
shocked into reversing the policy of hasty and severe military retrenchm ent 
that had been demanded at the close of the war and galvanized into support­
ing defense measures recom m ended by the National Security Council to bal­
ance the still growing military might of the USSR.
In the new age of long-range aircraft and missiles, New England was of 
prime strategic im portance. Its harbors, naval stations, industries, and cen­
ters of dense population had in the past merited the heaviest concentration 
of coastal fortifications in the country. Now a new strategic element was 
added. Air attacks and retaliations, if they should come, would be made over
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the arctic circle, which pinpointed New England as a key area for measures 
both of defense and deterrence. The workload of the New England Division 
quickly reflected the new situation. By Septem ber 1951 the num ber of mili­
tary construction  co n trac ts  had jum ped to  fifty-six and th e ir value to 
$55,420,174, and the num ber of architect-engineer contracts for military 
projects had increased to thirty-three, with a value of $2,169,495. Con­
versely, contracts for flood control and river and harbor work had dropped 
from twenty-seven to twenty-two, with a value of $3,673,506 and $1,832,097 
respectively. The personnel of the division had been nearly doubled in size, 
with two-thirds of a force of 1065 people employed on military projects.
The Cold War building program so hastily put into force continued without 
letup for nearly a decade, during which the New England Division con­
structed a congeries of military installations and allied facilities the mag­
nitude of which could not have been visualized even in the years of World 
W ar II.
The urgency of the enlarged military program m eant putting new policies 
into effect, many of which were established by the Office of the Chief of 
Engineers. Reverting to practice followed during the war, the division began 
to use negotiated contracts on large military jobs in order to minimize the 
risk of unsatisfactory perform ances at a time when speed and successful 
prosecution of projects was essential. Competition was still maintained by 
soliciting proposals from a num ber of carefully selected contractors whose 
capabilities and resources made it reasonably certain that they could finish 
their projects within specified time limits. The New England Division En­
gineer could select contractors without reference to the Chief of Engineers 
and could award contracts up to $15 million. This greatly exceeded even the 
decentralized practices followed at the height of wartime building activity, 
when division engineers had been empowered to approve negotiated con­
tracts up to $5 million. To limit as much as possible the expansion of the 
normal engineering organization of the division in the new burst of military 
construction, greater use was made of architect-engineer firms, with whom 
the division engineer could negotiate contracts up to $500,000.13
In the selection of architect-engineers and contractors, New England firms 
were chosen whenever possible, and efforts were made to give contracts to 
firms in the general vicinity of a project. Since jobs were often larger than 
local contractors could handle, the policy could not be rigidly applied, but 
this fact did not prevent complaints about the use of out-of-state contractors. 
A case in point was the Loring Air Force Base in Lim estone, Maine, the 
largest single project of the New England Division. Maine officials were 
openly critical of the award of multimillion-dollar contracts on the base to 
firm s from M assachusetts and o ther states. W riting to  the governor of 
Maine, Division Engineer Colonel Henry J. W oodbury pointed out that if all 
Maine contractors registered with the division devoted their entire construc­
tion potential to nothing but Corps projects, they would be capable of ac­
complishing only about 25 percent of the C orps’ program  in that state. 
M oreover, W oodbury continued, Maine contractors, singly or in combina­
tion, were invariably invited to submit proposals for work in the state and 
were awarded contracts when they subm itted the lowest proposals. The
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governor, at least, was apparently convinced that Maine contractors were 
not being shortchanged.14
A major com ponent of the defense program in New England was the con­
struction of Air Force bases. The heart of each base was its long runway, 
but it took a gigantic framework of support facilities to make it operational. 
Control towers, hangars, hardstands, taxiways, communications equipment, 
airfield lighting, maintenance shops, warehouses, fuel storage areas, and 
numerous other structures were necessary to operate and service airplanes. 
Barracks, quarters, mess halls, family housing, hospitals, dental clinics, ad­
ministration buildings, readiness rooms, and training facilities were required 
for base personnel. The amenities of civilized living dem anded chapels, 
libraries, laundries, commissaries, recreational facilities, and water-supply, 
heating, and sewage-treatment plants.
Five New England airfields were constructed or almost wholly rebuilt for 
the Strategic Air Command, whose long-range planes capable of delivering 
nuclear bombs were for some time the nation’s principal weapons of deter­
rence. Loring Air Force Base in Limestone, M aine, was the first and largest 
of the bases constructed. Located at the northeasternm ost point of the 
United States, it was started in May 1947, before the emergency program 
was inaugurated, and was the first air base in the country designed for the 
B-36 bomber, a plane of 12,000-mile range and a gross weight of 300,000 
pounds.
Loring was constructed on 9,000 acres of scrub woodland previously in­
truded upon only by a few scattered potato farms and two dirt roads. The 
project was far from labor m arkets, and it was necessary for contractors to 
import practically all the skilled mechanics and much of the common labor 
employed. To house at least a portion of the work force, barracks, mess 
halls, and recreation buildings were moved from the abandoned wartime air 
base at Houlton, sixty-five miles away. Because of Lim estone’s rem ote loca­
tion and severe winter climate, many workers were reluctant to accept jobs 
there, and of all projects of the division, it was Loring which suffered the 
most severe manpower shortages. When the military construction program 
was accelerated in 1951, efforts to recruit engineers and inspectors in the 
vicinity of Boston resulted in eight out of ten prospects declining to work at 
Limestone. A recruiting officer of the division, whose trip was preceded by a 
campaign of newspaper publicity, spent two weeks in Maine trying to hire 
construction inspectors. Since most employees had to find living accommo­
dations off the base, the shortage and quality of rooms for rent in the nearby 
small towns did not ease the task of recruiting. In M arch 1951 a single room 
could be obtained in Limestone for $5 a week. In Septem ber the same room 
cost $15.15
The runway at Loring, a strip more than two miles long and one hundred 
yards wide, was designed for wheel loads of 150,000 pounds. This normally 
would have required the most careful construction, with top quality m ate­
rials, of a pavement and subgrades over two feet deep. But conditions at 
Limestone necessitated a runway depth three times greater. Much of the soil 
in New England is glacial till. It is subject to frost action, which heaves 
pavements and greatly weakens bearing capacities during spring thaws. The
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average annual snowfall in the area of Lim estone is over ninety inches, and 
the temperature drops to minus thirty degrees. The freezing period normally 
extends from N ovem ber to April, with the destructive frost melting period 
ending about the middle of May. These conditions meant that the average 
frost penetration was about seventy inches. Therefore in building the run­
way, aprons, and taxiways of the base, earth was removed to a depth of six 
feet, entailing more than two million cubic yards of excavation, and replaced 
with a base course of gravel. Explorations turned up an adequate source of 
aggregates about two miles from the base, which could be procured without 
excessive costs. The gravel had to be washed to reduce fines smaller than 
.02 millimeter, which would be subject to frost action. But it was physically
Washing the face of gravel deposits before excavating to reduce fines subject to frost 
action in materials used in the base courses of the runway, taxiway, and aprons of 
the Loring Air Force Base.
impossible to wash in commercial gravel treatm ent plants, in one working 
season of five m onths, the huge amount of gravel required. Yankee ingenuity 
solved the problem. A beaver pond in a nearby stream was enlarged to supply 
water, which was directed by hydraulic je ts  against the face of the deposits 
before excavating, thus washing the gravel to a gradation within allowable 
limits. The gravel was laid in approximately twelve-inch layers and compacted 
with rollers. Over this was laid nine inches of crushed stone topped by three 
inches of hot asphalt pavem ent. Perforated pipe drains were laid in the 
subgrade under both edges of the pavement for the length of the runway to 
provide an outlet for any possible seepage, thereby insuring a dry base course.
The main hangar at Loring is a mammoth arch-ribbed monolithic structure 
of reinforced concrete, with an unobstructed interior 300 feet square. When 
completed in 1949, it was one of the largest hangars in the world, big enough 
to accom m odate two B-36s. The design was adopted to provide maximum
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Aerial view of the runway and taxiway, Loring Air Force Base, October 1950.
Arch-ribbed concrete hangar at Loring Air Force Base under construction, Sep­
tember 1948.
fire resistance and minimum form cost. Its huge ribs, 5 to 7 feet deep and 20 
to 24 inches wide, are spaced 25 feet on center and have a clear span of 240 
feet and a clear height of 90 feet. They were poured one after another in a 
single form mounted on tracks and jacks, which was slid down the length of 
the hangar, with a pour being made about every three weeks.
Eventually twenty-six steel-shelled multipurpose hangars were also built 
at Loring, each large enough to enclose the nose and wings of a big bomber 
needing maintenance or repair. To supply the base with fuel, a 200-mile-long 
pipeline was laid to Searsport, Maine, where a tank farm was constructed to 
receive oil from tankers. O ther buildings and utilities made the field a self­
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sufficient community. Barracks were constructed for 4,600 airmen and hous­
ing for 1,750 families. A 100-bed hospital, a dental clinic, a grade school for 
1,750 pupils, a community center, a commissary, a 1,000-seat theater, a 
gymnasium, and various other facilities provide essential services. Heating is 
supplied through a unique high-pressure hot water system by which w ater of
New England Division personnel on an inspection tour of Loring Air Force Base, 
1951. Left to right: (front) John Wm. Leslie, Chief, Military Branch; Christopher 
Murray, Chief, Construction Division; Eugene Groden, Chief, Design Branch; John 
Allen, Chief, Engineering Division; (behind, clockwise) Ralph Hitchings, Mechanical 
Engineer; Leonard H. Foley, Mechanical Engineer; John Eklund, Chief, Supervision 
and Inspection Branch; Donald Mills, Resident Engineer; Lt. Col. E. Flanders, Area 
Engineer; William Smith, Jr., Construction Division; Richard Payzant, Construction 
Division. Eklund, Smith, and Payzant (in uniform) were on active duty with the U.S. 
Army Reserve. Courtesy of William Smith, Jr.
A double cantilever hangar of the type first constructed at Pease Air Force Base, 
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, dwarfs the original main hangar at Loring Air Force 
Base, September 1956.
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Laying concrete pavement at Loring Air Force Base, August 1958.
temperatures to 400 degrees Fahrenheit is pumped from a central heating 
plant to the buildings, where it passes through heat exchangers that reduce 
its pressure and can adjust its tem perature for heating or convert it to steam 
for cooking and other uses. W ater is furnished by deep wells capable of 
supplying 1.8 million gallons a day. It is pumped from the wells through 
carbon purifying tanks into an underground reservoir of one million gallon 
capacity and from the reservoir by booster pumps into the distribution sys­
tem. These and other facilities, including an Air Force communications 
center, Globecom, located offsite, represented a government investment of 
more than $100 million.16
At Bangor, Maine, New England Division engineers rebuilt Dow Field 
into another massive SAC base for modern je t aircraft. After World W ar II 
the base had been returned to the City of Bangor, but the exigencies of the 
Cold W ar caused  the A ir F orce  to  take it o v e r again. The d iv ision 
strengthened its runway and lengthened it to 13,500 feet, constructed new 
buildings, and in other ways carried out a multimillion-dollar project of en­
largement and modernization. W estover Field, which became the headquar­
ters of SAC’s 8th Air Force, was similarly modernized by the rebuilding of 
runways and the construction of giant hangars, reconnaissance technical 
laboratories, and other facilities. N earby, as an adjunct to the command 
headquarters, the division installed an underground com bat operations 
center. At Presque Isle, the division transformed the World W ar II airfield 
into a modern SAC fighter support base .17
Pease Air Force Base at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, started in 1954, 
was the fifth base constructed by the division for the Strategic Air Com­
mand. Located only three miles from the heart of the city, it was built on the 
site of the municipal airport and adjacent farmland. The base boasts a run­
way 11,320 feet long and 300 feet wide, a main parking apron 8,800 feet long 
and 1,100 feet wide, and smaller hangar aprons covering 120,000 square
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yards. Including 1,000-foot-long warm-up pads at each end of the runway, 
parking areas for planes at Pease cover 1.5 million square yards. In keeping 
with latest Air Force criteria, they were constructed with fourteen-inch-thick 
Portland cement concrete pavements. Because of the large spillage of fuel 
and oil on aprons, bituminous concrete did not stand up as well as portland 
cement, and the Air Force was willing to pay the extra cost of construction, 
which the Engineers had determined would be less than five percent.
View of Pease Air Force Base under construction, June 1956. showing the enormous 
size of the main parking apron. Automobiles are parked on the far end.
The project at Pease included the numerous buildings and utilities required 
for operating scores of airplanes and quartering thousands of airmen. But the 
most impressive structure of the base is its 600-by-250-foot double cantilever 
hangar. The vertical supports of the hangar are four steel-frame towers, each 
about 60 feet square, located along the center line of the building. From  the 
tops of the towers, cantilever trusses ju t out 93.5 feet on either side. Con­
necting the cantilever trusses are longitudinal arch trusses, each spanning 
120 feet. A roof of steel decking, steel siding, and six electrically operated 
sliding steel doors, each 65 feet high, enclose the hangar. The concrete arch 
hangar completed at Lim estone a half-dozen years before was at that time 
considered huge because it could accommodate three medium or two heavy 
bombers. The double cantilever hangar at Portsmouth can house six medium 
or five heavy bom bers.18
The SAC bases constructed by the New England Division were instru­
ments in that com m and’s mission of posing the primary deterrent to enemy 
aggression through retaliatory strike capability. For more purely defensive 
m easures, the division constructed three major types of installations. These 
were airfields for the Air Defense Command and other air units, aircraft 
warning stations, and missile batteries.
Otis Field on Cape Cod, Laurence G. Hanscom  Field at Bedford, M assa­
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chusetts, and Ethan Allen Field at Burlington, Vermont, were the major in­
stallations of the Air Defense Command. At each field the division con­
structed runways and hangars, adm inistration buildings and m aintenance 
shops, airm en’s dormitories and family housing, and all the other operational 
and living facilities that make up a large air base. At Ethan Allan Field the 
operational facilities of the fighter base were built across the runway from 
the Burlington Airport buildings, while the housing area was located at Fort 
Ethan Allen, about four miles away in Colchester. Of nineteenth century 
vintage, the form er Field Artillery post possessed substantial brick buildings 
that were renovated, and new structures, including a modern hospital, were 
added. At Grenier Air Force Base, and at a num ber of Air National Guard 
installations, the division carried out similar but less extensive projects of 
modernization.19
Alert Hangars for fighter planes at Ethan Allen Field, Burlington, Vermont.
Air National Guard facilities at Barnes Field, Massachusetts.
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The aircraft warning stations were elements in the first and southernm ost 
of three radar lines constructed across the continent—the Pine Tree Line, 
lying wholly within the United States, the Mid-Canada Line, and the Distant 
Early Warning (DEW) Line. Construction on the Pine Tree Line began be­
fore the outbreak of hostilities in Korea and was accelerated in the fall of 
1950 on instructions from the Office of the Chief of Engineers. The stations 
built by the New England Division looped around the eastern and northern 
perimeters of New England from N orth Truro on Cape Cod to Saint Albans 
on Lake Champlain, with intermediate stations at Charleston, Bucks H ar­
bor, and Caswell, Maine, and at N orth Concord, Vermont. At Topsham, 
Maine, the division constructed a large control center that tied together the 
eastern stations of the Pine Tree Line. Each station, in addition to its search 
and tracking radar towers, was equipped with various buildings and utilities 
to accommodate about one hundred airmen. Between the manned stations 
and at several interior locations, the division later constructed “ gap fillers.”
Aircraft warning station. North Truro, Massachusetts.
These were rem ote-controlled installations consisting of a radar tower and a 
small cement equipm ent building, positioned so as to detect planes that 
might penetrate under the radar sweeps of the main stations by coming in 
low from the sea or along major river valleys. In 1957 the aircraft warning 
stations became part of the defense mechanism of the N orth American Air 
Defense Command (NORAD), when that command was created to combine 
United States and Canadian defense units into a single system .20
Early in the 1950s the New England Division constructed emplacements 
for radar-controlled 75 millimeter antiaircraft batteries, called Skysweeps, 
near Loring and Dow Air Force bases; and it strung facilities for 90 milli­
meter antiaircraft guns in a ring around Boston extending from Lynn on the 
north to Hull on the south. These defenses were soon succeeded by Nike 
Ajax missiles. The first surface-to-air guided missile to go into service in the 
United States, the Nike Ajax became operational in 1953. Named after Nike, 
the Greek Goddess of Victory, and Ajax, a fleet-footed hero of the Trojan
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War, the missile was a finned cylinder twelve inches in diam eter and twenty 
feet long, fired by a booster rocket, that could travel at supersonic speed for 
a range of approximately twenty-five miles.
Each Nike battery had its own acquisition and tracking radar facilities for 
picking up a target, locking on it, and guiding the missile designated to de­
stroy it. While each battery could thus operate independently, and battery 
commanders were responsible for the decision to launch a missile, all battery 
capabilities were norm ally coordinated through a fire direction system  
known as “ Missile M aster.” This was a command installation with an elec­
tronic brain for integrating the fire of Nike missiles throughout an extensive 
defense area. Its com puters collected  and stored  and instan taneously  
evaluated and transm itted essential target data to consoles manned by bat­
tery commanders.
Nike Ajax missiles guarding the Boston Defense Area poised on a launching rack at 
Nahant, Massachusetts.
During the mid-1950s the New England Division constructed thirty-five 
Nike Ajax batteries that encircled the strategic military or industrial areas of 
Limestone, Boston, Providence, H artford, and Bridgeport. Each battery 
consisted of a launcher site and a control site, located about a mile apart on 
high ground to provide uninterrupted radar sweeps and a direct line of sight 
between them. Facilities at the launcher site included underground storage 
pits with elevators to lift missiles onto launching racks, towers for acquisi­
tion and tracking radars, a fallout shelter, and various service buildings. The 
control site contained operational and living facilities for the battery’s eight 
officers and 101 enlisted men. At Quincy, M assachusetts, and New Britain, 
Connecticut, the division constructed Battalion and Group Headquarters for 
the Boston and Bridgeport-Hartford defense areas respectively. At Fort
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Heath in W inthrop, M assachusetts, it built a bombproof, fallout-proof Mis­
sile Master unit for coordinating all Nike batteries in the N ortheast.
In 1960 the New England Division, because it had already assembled con­
siderable data on the subject, was selected by the Office of the Chief of 
Engineers to propose measures for controlling hazards to construction posed 
by the electrom agnetic radiation em itters of the Nike sites and aircraft
The control area for the Hull-Weymouth Nike installation was built on the World 
War II casemates of Fort Duvall in Boston Harbor. Courtesy of Gerald Butler.
Missile Master at Fort Heath, Winthrop, Massachusetts.
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warning stations. In the same year the division began converting some ten 
Ajax sites to accom m odate the more potent Nike Hercules, a missile that 
could carry a nuclear warhead and had more than triple the range and al­
titude capabilities of its predecessor. Since the Hercules was larger than the 
Ajax and had an improved guidance system, modifications were made on 
both launcher and radar facilities.21 Both generations of Nike missiles, how­
ever, soon became obsolete as the threat from air strikes shifted in the mid- 
1960s from aircraft to intercontinental ballistic missiles.
The Nikes were weapons of the Army Air Defense Command. The Air 
Force also developed missiles, its first surface-to-air weapon, the Bomarc, 
becoming operational in 1959. Forty-seven feet long, with a wing span of 
eighteen feet, and propelled by twin ram-jet engines, the Bomarc could at­
tain an altitude of 60,000 feet and strike at incoming aircraft at distances of 
over 200 miles. Believing it vital to national defense, the Air Force urged 
installation of the weapon at top speed. Accordingly, the New England Divi­
sion rushed construction of Bomarc batteries at Dow and Otis fields, turning 
them over to the Air Force late in 1959 and early in 1960. At Otis Field the 
Air Force immediately converted the Bomarcs from liquid to solid fuel pro­
pulsion, entailing additional work on the launcher facilities that was com­
pleted in February 1962.22 Twenty-eight launcher shelters were constructed 
at each field, and each battery was equipped with a power, heating, and 
air-conditioning plant and other service buildings. The shelters, measuring 
about sixty feet long, tw enty-four feet wide, and twelve feet high, were made
Bomarc launcher shelters nearing completion at Otis Air Force Base, July 1959.
of reinforced concrete and fitted on top with massive steel biparting doors. 
The doors were opened and the big missile was raised into firing position in 
about ten seconds by a mechanism of w atchm aker’s precision, powered by 
hydraulic rams, designed by the Boeing Aircraft Company, which developed 
the Bomarc. N ot all engineering problems, however, had been fully solved. 
Getting the mechanism to work properly, and making the doors weather- 
tight, essential to maintaining a precise air-conditioned environment for the 
missiles, required considerable cooperative effort by division engineers and 
Boeing representatives. Among the most hastily constructed projects, the 
Bomarcs were also among the most ephemeral of Cold W ar installations.
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They were hardly completed when, like the Nike batteries, they were made 
obsolete by ICBMs.
At the same time the division was installing Bomarcs at Dow and Otis 
fields, it was constructing facilities for Snark missiles at Presque Isle Air 
Force Base. The first American intercontinental missile, the Snark was a 
weapon of the Strategic Air Command. Over sixty-seven feet long, with a 
diam eter of fifteen feet and a wing span of forty-two feet, it had a range of 
about 5,000 miles. The Snark installation at Presque Isle, the only one con­
structed  in the country , consisted essentially  of several assem bly and 
m aintenance buildings with nearby launcher pads from which missiles 
mounted on mobile launchers could be fired. The Snark, however, was a 
guided missile with limited speed and capabilities, and in the rapid evolution 
of missile technology it was outmoded almost before the Presque Isle instal­
lation was completed.
The airfields, the aircraft warning stations, and the missile batteries built 
in the 1950s attested to the. highly technical nature of modern military estab­
lishments. N ot only did the armed services rely on sophisticated weaponry 
and equipment, they had to be prepared to operate in climates and under 
conditions in which their experience was limited. Consequently, a large part 
of the military program of the New England Division after 1950 was the 
construction of research facilities for the Air Force and the Army. Even 
before this, however, New England engineers had them selves become en­
gaged in a vital research activity.
At airfields constructed in northern states during the war, Army Engineers 
had combatted frost action by highway methods of insulating subgrades with 
blankets of w ell-drained sand and gravel. Som etim es this w orked and 
sometimes not, and no one knew for certain why. Upon building roads and 
airfields in northwestern Canada and Alaska, the Engineers encountered a 
phenom enon new to their experience—perm anently  frozen ground, or 
“ permafrost.” Permafrost carries over it a thin layer of soil that thaws in the 
summer and freezes again in the winter. Construction operations disturbed
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the delicate natural thermal regime of the annual freeze and thaw cycle, 
which triggered actions and reactions that were complex and unpredictable. 
The Engineers were beset by mudflows, landslides, cave-ins, gullies, cracks, 
and blisters, which they overcame only by the hard way of trial and error. 
The first Corps studies of frost and permafrost began on a small scale in 
1943, when the Missouri River Division investigated several airfield failures 
caused by heaving and thawing and the Office of the Chief of Engineers 
produced a prim er on perm afrost compiled from Russian sources. The next 
year the Corps launched a vigorous effort to find out how to build on 
permafrost.
Early in 1944 General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Corps, 
forecast the North Pole as the future center of strategy and declared cold 
regions research “ most im portant and urgent.”  The response of the Corps of 
Engineers was immediate. Beginning with frost investigations at Dow Field 
in Bangor, Corps research activity quickly m ushroomed to include observa­
tions and tests at ten northern air bases, experim ents at H arvard University, 
and various theoretical studies—all under the direction of the chief of the 
Boston District Soils Laboratory, Harvard-trained soils engineer William L. 
Shannon. Continuing to expand, Corps efforts soon included wholesale 
translations of Soviet publications on perm afrost, the collection of soils and 
meteorological data at Alaskan air bases and subarctic w eather stations, 
geological explorations north of the arctic circle, attem pts to locate perm a­
frost by aerial photography and geophysical m ethods, and soils studies at 
Purdue University and the University of M innesota.23
By the end of 1944 what had begun as a crash program of investigation 
was metamorphasizing into perm anent institutions of research. A Soils, 
Foundation and Frost Effects Laboratory, headed by Shannon, was estab­
lished at Boston, and the next year the Corps set up a Perm afrost Division in 
the St. Paul District. In 1953 the two research centers were consolidated into 
the Artie Construction Frost Effects Laboratory (ACFEL), located in the 
Boston District. A C FE L ’s mission, like that of the earlier laboratory at Bos­
ton, was to conduct investigations relating to the design, construction, oper­
ation, and maintenance of installations on frozen ground and ice.24
At airfields in northern states, in Greenland, Alaska, and other regions of 
the arctic and subarctic, members of the Boston-based laboratories carried 
out studies on the properties and behavior of frost, frozen soils, snow, and 
ice. They experimented with the construction of airfields, roads, and build­
ings on ice and permafrost, and they developed an arctic construction man­
ual for the guidance of engineers tackling jobs in cold regions. Putting their 
know-how directly to use, they advised the N orth Atlantic Division on con­
struction problems at Thule Air Force Base, built in the early 1950s in north­
ern Greenland, nine hundred miles from the North Pole. Buildings at Thule, 
to prevent their thawing the permafrost beneath them and sinking into the 
ground, were insulated from the soil by air. The lighter buildings were 
erected on wooden, non-heat-conducting stilts, and were anchored with con­
crete weights to prevent their being blown away by the region’s hurricane 
winds. Heavier steel-framed structures like hangars and machine shops were 
also built on wooden pilings, and their floors were further insulated by 
thousands of feet of twelve-inch pipe, which was closed in the sum m er to
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keep the warm air out and opened in the winter to let the cold air in .25 The 
New England Division’s cold region specialists also advised the N orth At­
lantic Division on the installation of DEW Line aircraft warning stations on 
the Greenland icecap and contributed to the design of an experim ental 
nuclear-powered undersnow city constructed by the Corps on the icecap 138 
miles from Thule.
In 1951, when the threat of attack over the North Pole came even more to 
the forefront of concern after the invasion of South Korea, the Corps of 
Engineers created another research organization, the Snow, Ice, and Perma­
frost Research Establishm ent (SIPRE) at W ilmette, Illinois. SPIRE’s mis­
sion was research in the mechanical and physical properties of snow and ice. 
In 1963 SIPRE and A CFEL were combined into a single research center 
known as the Cold Regions R esearch and Engineering L aborato ry , or 
CRREL, located at Hanover, New Hampshire.
Construction of the new laboratory for the CRREL team at H anover was 
begun by the division in April 1960 and completed in June 1963. Conspicu­
ous among the laboratory’s furnishings is a series of cold rooms for testing 
military m aterials in which tem peratures can be lowered to -58 degrees 
Fehrenheit by an environmental system containing 175 tons of refrigerant.26
Although costing $3 million, the CRREL laboratory was a small project 
compared to the Q uarterm aster Research and Engineering Center at Natick, 
M assachusetts, built by the division for the Army M ateriel Command. The 
original installation, begun in 1952, was a group of laboratories designed for 
developing clothing, equipment, and materials suitable for worldwide mili­
tary operations. Included in the facilities was a Climatic Research Cham ber 
consisting of experiment rooms and living quarters equipped with air condi­
tioning systems that could simulate either arctic or tropic conditions. In 1963 
the center was expanded to include laboratory facilities for the Chicago 
Food and Container Institute, which developed and tested food and packag­
ing materials for military use and space explorations. Continuing to add re­
search tools to the center, the division had by 1970 constructed an animal 
laboratory, a heavy equipment laboratory and developm ent building, a blast 
freeze facility, a microbiology laboratory, an environmental medicine labora­
tory, and a solar furnace, the last being a system of m irrors for concentrating 
the sun’s rays to produce trem endously high tem peratures.27
O ther laboratories for the Army were constructed at the W atertown Arse­
nal. The division remodeled buildings of the ordnance plant, which was 
wholly phased out in 1967, and installed facilities for basic metalurgical re­
search. An im portant aspect of this work was the construction of a nuclear 
reactor for utilizing neutrons in investigations o f the prim e structure of 
m atter.28
Construction of research facilities for the Army was more than matched 
by the kindred program carried out for the Air Force. The division’s initial 
project was a Climatic Projects Research L aboratory on the summit of 
Mount W ashington, New Hampshire, built for the Air Force Research and 
Development Command. Its purpose was to test je t engines under icy storm 
conditions. Planning for the laboratory began in fiscal year 1951, and work­
men started construction on the windy mountaintop in June 1953. The labo­
ratory and an accom panying two-story dorm itory to house its personnel
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This photo gives an idea of the size and complexity of CRREL’s main refrigeration 
unit.
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A laboratory of the Army Quartermaster Research and Engineering Center, Natick, 
Massachusetts.
Nuclear reactor under construction at the 
Watertown Arsenal, November 1959.
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were designed to withstand winds up to two hundred miles an hour and 
temperatures that fall far below zero. Concrete foundations two feet thick 
were anchored to rock by steel rods, and metal-covered panels of corrugated 
insulating material were welded to steel frames to form the walls and roofs of 
the buildings. Doors thirty feet square on either side of the laboratory al­
lowed test engines to be exposed to the icy blasts generally prevailing on the 
barren summit. In addition to the construction of the laboratory and dormi­
tory, the project required the rehabilitation of the famous Mount Washington 
cog railroad and the automobile road to the summit in order to carry up 
materials, the erection of tem porary barracks on the top for workmen, and 
the construction of base operations buildings at the foot of the m ountain.29
In fiscal year 1952 the division began work on a very much larger Air 
Force research center at Hanscom Field in Bedford, M assachusetts. En­
larged upon several times in succeeding years, the center consists of two 
groups o f g eo p h y sic s  and  e le c tro n ic s  lab o ra to r ie s . O ne com plex  o f 
laboratories, libraries, shops, and administration buildings became the per­
manent home of the Air Force Cambridge Research Center, which probes 
into such areas as meteorological and astronomical phenom ena and optical 
and solid-state physics. The o th er group of labora to ries and ancillary 
facilities, known as the Lincoln Laboratory, was constructed for use by the 
M assachusetts Institute of Technology, which under contract to the Air 
Force conducts basic and applied research in radar and electronics.
The Bedford Research Center was nearly matched in size by the Connect­
icut Aircraft Nuclear Engine Laboratory (CANEL), constructed between 
1955 and 1957 in M iddletown, Connecticut. A complex of over a dozen labo­
ratory, service, adm inistration, and utility buildings, the facility was de­
signed for use by the Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Corporation for developing 
nuclear aircraft propulsion plants. Since research was to focus heavily on 
liquid-metal circulating systems, several laboratories were equipped with 
large liquid-metal furnaces and with special apparatus for testing, under a 
large range of simulated conditions, liquid-metal to air radiators and liquid- 
metal to liquid-metal heat exchangers.30
Another research facility constructed by the New England Division for the 
Air Force was the New Boston Tracking Station, designed to receive infor­
mation from satellites. Located in a small town in rural New Hampshire, the 
installation included both sophisticated radar equipment and dining accom ­
modations for a sizable contingent of Air Force personnel. Provisions for 
quartering the station’s personnel were made by renovating buildings at 
Grenier Field in M anchester, some fifteen miles away.
Huge airfields, missile batteries, and research laboratories were among the 
more notable military projects of the 1950s and 1960s, but the New England 
Division also busied itself extensively with renovating and improving more 
commonplace Army installations. Soon after the outbreak of hostilities in 
Korea, the division constructed emergency-type infantry training facilities at 
Camp Edwards and Camp Wellfleet, while at Fort Devens it built rail train­
ing facilities for personnel of the Transportation Corps. At Camp Myles 
Standish it constructed new w arehouses, shops, and other buildings in addi­
tion to rehabilitating the cam p’s utility system s, roads, and railroads. At the 
Springfield Armory it built new test ranges, constructed a new railhead, and
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Plasma Laboratory of the Air Force Cambridge Research Center, Hanscom Air 
Force Base.
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A radome under construction at the New Boston, 
New Hampshire, Tracking Station, May 1961.
rebuilt structures to adapt them to new production methods. It constructed 
NCO family quarters and four new Type A wards at the Murphy General 
Hospital in W altham .31 At Fort Banks in W inthrop, M assachusetts, it con­
structed administrative, housing, and other buildings necessary to headquar­
ter the region’s Army Defense Command.
Fort Devens became the scene of a large amount of work by the division. 
Almost every year of the 1950s and 1960s saw new construction to imple­
ment an Army plan for replacing the hastily built facilities of the two World 
Wars with improved perm anent structures. Every type of post facility, from 
barracks to fire stations, from commissaries to hospitals, was included in the 
program. This upgrading of facilities was motivated in part by a desire to 
encourage longer careers in a service becoming increasingly technical and 
specialized. Indicative of this aspect of the program was the supersedure of 
traditional sixty-three-man open barracks by dormitory-style buildings. The 
first of the new type quarters accommodate eight men to a room; later dor­
mitories constructed at Devens house only two men to a room. Air Force 
bases saw the same changes. Dormitories constructed by the division at 
Hanscom Field house two enlisted men to a room and provide a fully 
equipped tile bath and shower for every four men.
Longer careers did become more common as the military became more 
challenging and rewarding, which increased the need for family housing at 
military posts. At Fort Devens the division provided accommodations for 
2,400 families. Half of these homes were so-called “ Capehart H ousing” 
units. In 1955 Congress extensively amended the National Housing Act of 
1943. Under one section of the act, drafted by Senator Hom er E. Capehart 
of Indiana, the Secretary of Defense was authorized to enter into contracts 
with eligible builders for the construction of urgently needed housing on or
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A Chapel at Fort Devens.
Enlisted men’s barracks at Fort Devens.
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near military reservations. To finance this construction of large but uncertain 
size without direct federal appropriations, the law provided for the negotia­
tion by the builders of private loans guaranteed by the government. As in 
other projects, the Corps was responsible for designing the houses and act­
ing as the supervisory agent between the builder and the Army command 
receiving the Capehart units. The 1,200 units built at Fort Devens were 
turned over to the Army in April 1962. The division also supervised the 
construction of 540 Capehart units at twenty-six locations for personnel as­
signed to Nike batteries, and another 35 units at Hudson, M assachusetts, for 
soldiers attached to the Q uarterm aster Laboratory at N atick.32
Capehart housing units at Fort Devens.
Another aspect of the preparedness program launched in the early 1950s 
was the construction of Army Reserve Training Centers. The division built 
them in some twenty-eight towns and cities, in all six New England states. 
Most of the centers, which were designed to accom m odate from 200 to 1,000 
reservists, were substantial brick-faced edifices equipped in the manner of 
school buildings with classroom s, auditorium s, gym nasium s, and other 
facilities. In some instances large buildings, such as form er autom obile 
dealers garages, were leased and renovated. The division also continued im­
proving National Guard installations by constructing headquarters, renovat­
ing armories, and adding service buildings, motor pools, and utilities.33
A project more challenging from an engineering point of view was the 
rehabilitation of the Boston Army Base in 1955-56. Built during World W ar I 
as a storage and shipping terminal, it consisted of an eight-story warehouse 
1,638 feet long and 126 feet wide, a two-story wharf shed the same length 
and 100 feet wide, a pier shed 924 feet long and 100 feet wide, a four-story 
administration building, a powerhouse, and a wharf and pier that stretched 
along the Reserved Channel of Boston H arbor for 5,400 feet. Its construc­
tion had been an engineering marvel of speedy accomplishment. Begun in 
April 1918, it was more than 90 percent completed by December.
While most of the buildings of the base rested on cement caissons or con­
crete piles sunk into fill on reclaimed flats, the wharf and pier, because of 
the need for haste, were built on wooden piles. Oak piles were usually used
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Boston Army Base under construction, 1918.
in Boston H arbor, but because they could not be obtained in sufficient 
quantity—30,000 were needed—piles of untreated southern pine were em­
ployed.34 The piles might still have lasted for years had not a crustacean 
borer, whose activity had been at a low level for some time, moved back 
into Boston H arbor in force. By 1935 the piles had been so badly attacked 
that the wharf was repaired as a WPA project under direction of the Con­
structing Quarterm aster. Hundreds of piles were replaced or repaired, a steel 
sheet pile bulkhead was placed along the whole 5,600-foot perim eter of the 
wharf and pier, and the enclosed area was packed with sand. In 1945-46 
further repairs were made; but in 1953 trouble was again discovered. The 
sheet piling had corroded, sand was washing out through holes, and marine 
borers were again attacking the wooden piles. Investigations by the New 
England Division revealed that corrosion of the bulkhead was progressing 
too rapidly to be halted by any stopgap method, and rehabilitation would be 
expensive. Since the base had been leased at the close of World W ar II to 
private parties and was not considered necessary for government use, the 
Army considered abandoning it. Thereupon Boston interests, faced with the 
loss of a major shipping facility, hastened to W ashington. Their entreaties, 
the fact that repairs were necessary in any case since the base could not be 
left to fall into the channel, and the possibility that it might again be useful in 
a national emergency, prom pted Congress to take action. The Army was 
authorized to rehabilitate the w harf and pier structures at a cost not to ex­
ceed $11 million and lease the facilities to the Commonwealth of M assachu­
setts, which was to bear 10 percent of the expense.
Division engineers explored a num ber of rehabilitation schemes, boiled 
them down to four for further study, and finally decided upon a concrete 
gravity-type seawall placed against the existing steel sheet pile bulkhead.
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The wall, more than a mile long and fifty-two feet high, rises from thirty-five 
feet below mean low w ater to seventeen feet above that mark. Supported by 
steel H piles driven into rock, it m easures twenty-seven feet wide at the 
base, slopes back on its front face to a thickness of eight feet at the mean 
high w ater line, and then ju ts back out for twenty-seven feet to form a can­
tilever deck. According to the chief engineer of the contractor for the job, 
the physical proportions of the wall and the problems involved in building 
the underw ater molded form made the project a unique construction “ first” 
in term s of underw ater concreting.35
Throughout the 1950s the New England Division expended an average of 
about $100 million annually on military and civil work. From $25 million in 
FY 1950, the annual workload rose to a peak of $137 million for FY 1956. 
Military work that year accounted for $105 million, while civil work, which 
took a big leap with the revival of flood control and navigation projects, ran 
to $32 million. Military construction then began to shrink; first that for the 
A rm y, which reached  its m axim um  in 1956 at the height o f the N ike 
program, followed in the next few years by drastic drops in the Air Force 
program, which had been over three times as large. In April 1960 Division 
Engineer Alden K. Sibley wrote to the Chief of Engineers: “ For the first 
time in m any years my civil w orks personnel requirem ent exceeds the 
military personnel requirem ent.” 36
Except for the installation of ICBM facilities in certain areas, the military 
building program in the United States was tapering down, and the workload 
of the New England Division inevitably declined with it. By FY 1964 the 
workload had dropped to $44 million. Civil work, representing $29.2 million, 
had remained fairly steady; but military work was down to $14.8 million. 
The next year the military workload was only $10 million; and in FY 1966, 
because of a sudden cancellation of work by the Departm ent of Defense in 
Decem ber 1965, it dropped to about $5 million.37
The division’s personnel had by 1964 been trimmed from the 1958 peak of 
1,750 people to 945, and further reductions in force had to follow. Worried 
over loss in capability in its Engineering Division, the division sought work 
in and from other engineering districts. In April 1965 Acting Division En­
gineer Colonel Edward J. Ribbs reported to the Chief of Engineers that 
twelve of his people had spent ninety days at the San Francisco District 
helping with post flood work, three had been in Alaska for ninety days, and 
one was currently in Okinawa investigating a proposed w ater supply dam, 
for which the division would prepare the survey report for the Okinawa Dis­
trict. Engineers had also been sent on short periods of duty to Somalia and 
to Korea to give engineering assistance in construction, Ribbs further re­
ported, and ten engineers were reviewing the design of the Keban Dam in 
Turkey for the Agency for International Development. When the dam  in 
Okinawa was constructed, the resident engineer was assigned from the New 
England Division. The division also designed the Bloomington Dam on the 
upper Potomac River for the Baltimore District and planned the underground 
electrical distribution system  for the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory 
at Mount Hopkins, A rizona.38
More im portant in offsetting the losses in Army and Air Force construc­
tion were two large projects taking shape at home. One was an Emergency
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Operating Center for the Office of Civil Defense, Region I; the other was an 
E lec tron ics R esearch  C en ter for the N ational A eronau tics and Space 
Administration.
Construction of the Emergency Operating Center began in October 1966 
and was com pleted in M arch 1968.39 Located underground in M aynard, 
M assachusetts, the center was built by cutting away the side of a hill, con­
structing a two-story reinforced concrete building, and moving earth back 
over the structure. One of ten such centers in the United States, it was 
designed to become the headquarters of civil defense, military, and gov­
ernmental operations throughout the N ortheast and Caribbean territories in 
the event of an extrem e military emergency. Fitted with all necessities from 
its own power source and w ater supply to dormitories and a kitchen, and 
equipped with communications systems supported by multiple back-up units 
to guard against failures, the Emergency Operating Center can provide living 
and working facilities for three hundred people.
The Electronics Research Center was a far bigger project, with promise of 
becoming one of the largest in the division’s history. Preconstruction plan­
ning on the center began in the summer of 1963, when NASA requested the 
division to conduct studies of eighty-nine suggested sites for a location in the 
Boston area. For a few m onths, however, the studies remained in low gear 
until a political storm  in Congress over the center subsided. Since millions 
would be spent on constructing the center and more millions annually on 
research, and because questions arose as to why NASA was doing so much 
for M assachusetts, Congress ordered NASA to justify the undertaking and 
the choice of Boston. When NASA stuck to its position that “ no place was 
equal to Boston” for a research center and gave assurances that the center 
would farm out research projects to universities around the country, Con­
gress gave its nod to go ahead with the project.40
Throughout 1964 the division continued investigating proposed sites, 
bringing the num ber surveyed up to 160; and it explored the feasibility of ob­
taining a twenty-nine acre site in Cambridge, close by Harvard University 
and the M assachusetts Institute of Technology. Finally in Decem ber it 
awarded an architect-engineer contract for m aster planning at the Cambridge 
location.
Then came “ aches and pains,” as Division Engineer Remi O. Renier put 
it. Clearing the site involved the relocation by the City of Cambridge Re­
development Authority of ninety-four industries, mostly of minuscule size, and 
the inevitable strong opposition developed. Further problem s arose over 
proper appraisals and relocation arrangem ents, and for som e time the 
availability of all land for the site remained uncertain.
Problems also arose over design. The preliminary m aster plan submitted 
by the architect-engineer in the spring of 1965 was an impressive concept 
featuring two high tow ers enclosed in a rectangular plaza bounded by several 
three story buildings, with the whole complex underlaid by an expansive 
ground floor. Although the plan presented several alternative variations in 
design, all cost between $46 and $52 million, while the division’s budget for 
basic construction was $32 million. The m aster plan was quickly revised to 
more modest proportions, but design problems nevertheless continued. De­
tailed planning for the center led to endless debate within NASA, and to
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frequent directives for extensive criteria changes. The upshot was uncer­
tainty over the division’s yearly workloads, delays, cost overruns, and con­
tractual difficulties with the architect-engineer. “ My Chief of Engineering 
and m yself,”  Renier reported, “ spend much of our time in conference with 
the ERC staff to resolve problems and offer guidance to them .” 41
Revised plans called for a thirteen-story edifice of considerably less height 
than the towers of the original design, flanked by several one- to three-story 
buildings also of less ambitious dimensions. Longer-range plans provided for 
the expansion of the center in stages until it comprised eighteen buildings 
housing laboratories, offices, and other facilities. Foundation work for the 
high-rise program management building, two low-rise laboratories, a person­
nel services building, a power plant, and a warehouse began in October 
1966, and by Decem ber 1967 superstructures were under way. By early 1970
Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge, Massachusetts. This building complex 
was originally constructed to house an Electronics Research Center of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration.
the buildings were nearing completion. Then it was suddenly announced that 
authorization for the Electronics Research Center would be term inated on 
June 30. Designs had been completed for another building to contain a com ­
puter facility, and the division was about to request bids for the job, when 
prospects of further NASA construction thus evaporated. Remaining work 
on the project, with some deletions, was finished, the division’s NASA area 
office was phased out by the deadline date, and the buildings of the center 
were transferred to the United States Departm ent of T ransportation.42
Meantime the division’s military construction program, after continuing at 
rock-bottom level through FY 1967, began to revive. Major projects in the 
next tw o years included a barracks com plex, a 116-bed hospital, and a 
w ater-treatm en t p lan t at F o rt D evens; officers q u arte rs , cold storage
facilities, and an emergency electric power plant at W estover Field; an Air 
N ational Guard squadron operations building at Burlington Airport; remodel­
ing at the Watertown Arsenal for the Army Materials Research Agency, a 
laboratory  support building at N atick; and a com putation laboratory at 
H anscom  Field. One of the largest projects, code-named GRAVEL, was a 
crash  operation carried out for the Army Ammunition Procurem ent and 
Supply Agency. Awarding cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts, which were fre­
quently used by the Engineers for urgent projects during World W ar II but 
alm ost never employed since, the division renovated old buildings, con­
structed  new ones, and rebuilt railroad facilities at the Hingham Naval An 
nex, located south of Boston, for the installation of a government-owned, 
contractor-operated munitions plant. Initially estim ated to cost about $1 mil­
lion, GRAVEL grew through modifications requested by the Army into a 
project valued at over $3 million.43
A nother large military project— potentially the largest since the mid- 
1950s died aborning. This was the construction of a Sentinel Ballistic Mis­
sile Defense System for the protection of Boston and its environs, the loca­
tion of the heaviest concentration in the country of vital electronics and 
other highly technical industries. Work on a Sentinel em placement, the first 
started in the country, began late in 1967 when soils and w ater supply inves­
tigations at possible sites were carried out for the Army Ballistic Missile 
Agency headquartered at Huntsville, Alabama. Like a Nike battery, each 
Sentinel facility would normally occupy two sites. By 1969 sites had been 
acquired at North Andover and on the Reading-Wakefield line; division en­
gineers were designing support facilities for both installations on the basis of 
standard plans developed at Huntsville; and excavation and foundation work
had been started. . . . . . .
The decision by the government to proceed with antiballistic missile de­
fenses, however, had from the beginning come under fierce attack from 
groups opposed to the program. And in January 1969 the Departm ent of 
Defense suspended construction at the New England sites pending high-level 
review of policy. Locally, smouldering opposition to missile deployment 
broke out into full flame at a public meeting held in Reading on January 29. 
The meeting was held to discuss m atters relating to construction, but the 
audience, mostly composed of protesters from all over the Boston area, in­
sisted on discussing the justification for the entire ABM program a m atter 
of government policy beyond the authority of the Engineers. The following 
May word was received from W ashington that the Sentinel project was 
term inated.44
After the very lean years of 1966 and 1967, the military workload of the 
New England Division had taken a decided upturn. For FY 1968 military 
construction, including the NASA project, accounted for $18.4 million out of 
a total workload of $40.9 million. For FY 1969 expenditures on military con­
struction, exclusive of NASA, came to $17 million; NASA added $9 million 
and civil works $21 million for a total workload of $47 million. And for FY 
1970 the military program contributed $25.4 million to a total workload of 
$47.9 million. Yet the volume of defense work was insufficient to insure 
re ten tion  by the division of its m ilitary m ission. M ilitary construction  
throughout the country was at a low level, and as part of an economy
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reorganization m easure affecting ten o ther d ivisions and d istric ts , the 
Department of the Army on June 30, 1970 transferred military work in New 
England to the New York Engineer D istrict.45 After two hundred years of 
n o tab le  ach ie v em en t in co n s tru c tin g  m ilita ry  d e fen ses  fo r N ew  
England—from the earthen redoubts of Colonel Gridley to the airfields and 
missile batteries of the N ew  England D ivision—N ew E ngland’s Army 
Engineers would, until perhaps another military em ergency, concentrate 
almost exclusively on the civil functions of the Corps.
FLOOD CONTROL
The winter of 1935-36 was one of the most severe New England had ever 
seen. Snow piled high on the northern hills, and rivers and stream s were 
choked with ice. Early in M arch cam e a week o f unseasonably  warm 
weather, melting snow on the hillsides and thawing ice in the rivers. On 
March 13 a torrential rainstorm  worsened the sudden runoff, and a second 
pelting rain followed a few days later. New England’s rivers became swollen 
and then leapt their banks, forcing two hundred thousand workers from 
closed factories and thousands more from their homes. By M arch 19 life in 
the Connecticut River Valley, where the floodwaters raged the highest, was 
virtually paralyzed. N ot a railroad was running, the Coast Guard, the Boston 
Navy Yard, and Gloucester fishermen sent flotillas of boats to rescue the 
flood’s victims, and the National Guard moved into almost every major 
town. Hartford was practically in a state of siege: a curfew was imposed and 
everyone entering the area had to be inoculated. In M assachusetts a Flood 
Relief Adm inistrator was given dictatorial powers to seize food, clothing, 
and medical supplies. By the time the floodwaters subsided they had taken 
twenty-four lives and left 77,000 people hom eless.1
It was the worst flood in at least three centuries, and most of the eastern 
and central sections of the United States were lashed by the same storms 
and suffered similar devastation. The damage and disruption was more wide­
spread than the country had ever experienced, and for the first time de­
m ands for aggressive federal action to  p reven t such tragedies reached 
nationwide dimensions. The upshot was the Flood Control Act of 1936, 
which assigned new responsibilities to the federal governm ent and new 
duties to the Corps of Engineers. The measure established a national policy 
of flood control, to  be carried out by the Engineers, and authorized some 220 
flood control works and an additional 220 flood control surveys.2
The interest of the Corps of Engineers in flood control was by no means 
new. But prior to 1936 the C orps’ authority had been limited, and there had 
been little public or congressional sentiment to extend it. Federal concern 
with flood control had been restricted almost wholly to the Mississippi River 
and the Sacram ento River of California, where protective work had de­
veloped out of interest in navigation and debris control.
It was not until 1927 that Congress authorized surveys of most of the na­
tion’s major rivers and stream s for purposes that included flood control. One 
of the most im portant acts relating to water resources in the nation’s history, 
this legislation was inspired less by specific congressional interest in flood 
control than by concern with hydroelectric power developm ent during a dec­
ade when the electric pow er industry was doubling in size and output. The 
River and H arbor Act of M arch 3, 1925 had directed the Corps of Engineers 
and the Federal Power Commission to prepare an estim ate of the cost of 
making surveys of those navigable stream s and their tributaries on which 
power development appeared feasible, with a view to formulating general 
plans for improving navigation, developing power, controlling floods, and
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providing irrigation. The next year the estim ates were presented for the con­
sideration of Congress in House Document No. 308. The River and H arbor 
Act of January 21, 1927 authorized the surveys, and over the next decade 
the Corps completed com prehensive studies of nearly two hundred rivers 
and streams, including seventeen in New England. The resulting “ 308” re­
ports were not prepared as recommendations for specific projects, but were 
basically inventories of the water-resource potentialities and problem s of the 
river basins, with broad com prehensive plans of improvement. Nevertheless 
they formed the bases for subsequent congressional authorization of flood 
control work, they provided a valuable reservoir of emergency relief projects 
during the depression of the 1930s, and they remained for years the major 
source of information for all public and private agencies concerned with the 
nation’s water resources.3
Hardly had the surveys been started when the rivers of the Mississippi 
Valley badly flooded, and a few m onths later, in N ovem ber 1927, the 
streams of New England went on a disastrous rampage. For a time Congress 
appeared about to enact nationwide flood control measures, but all that fi­
nally resulted was authorization for more protective works in the Mississippi 
Valley. To this, no spokesm an for New England objected. The region re­
garded flood control wholly as a m atter of state concern and indeed viewed 
federal intervention as intolerable. The most popular solution for flooding 
was to encourage private power companies to build more storage reservoirs, 
and no one suggested that perhaps the federal government should build multi­
purpose dams for power generation and flood control.4 M eantime the Bos­
ton and Providence districts went ahead with their “ 308” surveys, com plet­
ing most of them in 1929 and 1930. The survey of the Housatonic River was 
finished in 1932, and the survey of the Connecticut—the most extensive and 
the most handicapped by inadequate funds—was wrapped up in February 
1936, ju st before the valley was again inundated by raging w aters.5
As New Englanders dug out from the debris of a second m ajor flood 
within a decade, hands-off attitudes toward the federal governm ent were for 
the moment overwhelmed by spontaneous demands from the afflicted val­
leys for federal action. And seeking assistance for their region, New England 
congressmen joined in the general cry for national flood control legislation. 
The Flood Control Act of 1936, drawing on the “ 308” reports, authorized 
the construction of ten flood control reservoirs in Vermont and New Hamp­
shire on tributaries of the Connecticut River and “ a system of flood control 
reservoirs” in the M errimack River Basin. The act stipulated that states or 
other local agencies must provide the lands, easem ents, and rights-of-way 
necessary for the projects, hold the United States free from damages due to 
construction, and maintain and operate the completed works. Since river 
basins were no respecters of state lines, states were permitted to enter into 
compacts to allocate these local costs.6 These provisions of local coopera­
tion were to delay construction on the first of the reservoirs for at least two 
years. The compacts had to be drafted before the districts could start work, 
and this proved to be a troublesom e business.
M eantime, since interstate relationships were not involved, the Engineers 
had a freer hand to begin the construction of local flood protection works to 
help safeguard individual communities where flood hazards were most se-
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RIVER BASIN STATES COMPLETED
Kennebunk Maine June 18, 1930
Salmon Falls Maine June 19, 1930
Androscoggin Maine,
New Hampshire
Decem ber 2, 1930
Kennebec Maine Decem ber 2, 1930
Machias Maine Decem ber 2, 1930
Penobscot Maine Decem ber 2, 1930
Presumpscot Maine Decem ber 2, 1930
Union Maine Decem ber 2, 1930
St. Croix Maine, New
Brunswick, Canada
Decem ber 2, 1930
Saco Maine,
New Hampshire
Decem ber 4, 1930
Merrimack New Hampshire, 
M assachusetts
Decem ber 2, 1930
Paw tucket(Seekonk) Rhode Island N ovem ber 26, 1929
Pawcatuck Rhode Island, 
Connecticut
Novem ber 26, 1929
Taunton M assachusetts N ovem ber 26, 1929
Thames Connecticut, 
M assachusetts, 
Rhode Island
December 2, 1930
Housatonic Connecticut, 
M assachusetts, 
New York
February 9, 1932
Connecticut Connecticut, 
M assachusetts, 
New Hampshire, 
Vermont
February 11, 1936
vere. U nder authority of the Emergency Relief Appropriation Acts of 1935 
to 1938, the districts built or improved local protection works on the M er­
rimack River at Lowell and Haverhill, M assachusetts; on the N ashua River, 
a tributary of the M errimack, at Fitchburg, M assachusetts; and on the Con­
necticut R iver at Hadley, Hatfield, Springfield, W est Springfield, Chicopee, 
and Holyoke, M assachusetts, and Hartford and East H artford, Connecticut. 
The districts enlarged channel capacities to prevent flooding of adjacent 
properties, riprapped river banks, constructed earth levees and concrete 
floodwalls, repaired and enlarged existing dikes built by local authorities, 
laid out drainage systems, and installed conduits and pumping plants to carry 
sanitary and storm water through the protective barriers. At Lowell, where 
several of the largest of these emergency relief projects were carried out, the 
river channel was widened or deepened at several places, alm ost a mile of 
earth dike and concrete wall was erected to protect 930 acres of urban land, 
and two pumping stations were constructed. The communities fulfilled the
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first local protection works constructed by the Corps in New England.
same conditions of local cooperation as prescribed in the 1936 Flood Control 
Act, and practically all work was done by government plant and hired labor.
While this work was going on, M assachusetts, Connecticut, New Hamp­
shire, and Vermont appointed commissioners to draft the interstate flood 
control com pacts for the Connecticut and M errimack river valleys. Dis­
agreements immediately arose. The major problem was that while most of 
the flood damage would occur in M assachusetts and Connecticut, the reser­
voirs would be built in Vermont and New Hampshire. The governor of 
Vermont stated flatly that he was not interested in flooding good Vermont 
land merely to benefit other states of the Connecticut Valley. By M arch 1937 
the com m issioners were no nearer to forming com pacts than when they 
started. Secretary of W ar Harry Woodring thereupon bluntly informed the 
states that they must “ put up or shut up”  if they wanted federal flood con­
trol projects. The needs of the Mississippi Basin were more pressing than 
those of New England, he warned, and unless the states produced compacts 
within ten days he would be happy to forget about them. Somewhat jolted, 
the commissioners hammered out com pacts before the month was over, 
which the states ratified early in July. The compacts settled the issue of local 
costs by M assachusetts and Connecticut agreeing to shoulder most of them. 
Then going beyond this problem, they vested ownership of all lands, ease­
ments, and rights-of-way, in effect title to the dams and reservoirs, with the 
states and reserved to the states all rights of pow er development.
These last provisions were bound to be troublem akers. Yet a poorly 
drafted and ambiguous section of the Flood Control Act was in part respon­
sible. The act did not specify where title to the properties would lie, and 
could reasonably be interpreted to substantiate state ownership; it was al­
most exclusively concerned with flood control, with broader reference re­
stricted to the provision that penstocks and other facilities for the possible 
future development of pow er might be installed on dams; and it required the 
states to maintain and operate the projects. In the bitter debates that ensued 
over whether the com pacts violated the Flood Control Act of 1936 and fed­
eral waterpower legislation, both logic and casuistry were evident on each 
side of the argument. The Federal Power Commission and the President op­
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posed the com pacts, and Congress refused to approve them. Although some 
New England congressmen charged that the compacts were written by pri­
vate pow er interests heavily represented on the commissions, the region’s 
congressional delegation on the whole supported the agreem ents. Con­
gressmen and other New England officials warned of federal domination of 
state resources, of invasion of the rights of states, and of violation of Ameri­
can standards. The chairman of the M assachusetts Planning Board solemnly 
told a congressional committee that if the compacts were not approved, 
“ then government of the people, by the people and for the people shall have 
perished from the ea rth .” Flood control was no longer the main concern. 
Currently before Congress were several proposals, one an administration 
measure, for the creation of a number of regional pow er and planning au­
thorities modeled on the Tennessee Valley Authority. To opponents of such 
New Deal schemes, the com pacts were the barriers to the intrusion of this 
type of federal authority in New England.7
While political dificulties held up the construction of flood control dams and reser­
voirs authorized in 1936, the New England districts carried out tests and experimen­
tal work on earthfill dams. Here the Boston District is conducting compaction tests at 
the site of the Franklin Falls Dam.
The debate was finally cut short by the Flood Control Act of June 28, 
1938, which stipulated that dams and reservoirs, unless otherwise provided 
by law, would be constructed entirely at federal cost and would be owned, 
maintained, and operated by the federal government. The act also approved 
new general comprehensive plans for “ flood control and other purposes” 
that had been drawn up by the Boston and Providence districts in accord­
ance with directives for further surveys in the act of 1936. Authorized for 
construction were twenty reservoirs and seven local protection works in the 
Connecticut River Basin and four reservoirs in the Merrimack w atershed.8
During the two-year hiatus between the flood control acts, the districts 
‘lad been carrying out extensive field surveys, foundation investigations, and
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planning work on reservoirs with funds allotted from the 1936 Emergency 
Relief Appropriation Act. Now they could go ahead with the usual proce­
dures of holding hearings, working out necessary arrangem ents with other 
federal, state, and local authorities, and completing designs. Before any of 
these activities had progressed very far, however, New England reeled from 
another flood disaster. Four days of rain in mid-September 1938 were al­
ready threatening floods as bad as those of 1936 when a tropical hurricane 
moving up the Atlantic failed to follow its curve out to sea and raged north­
ward through the New England states. Winds reached up to 186 miles an 
hour and mountainous waves battered the coast. The main square of Provi­
dence was dry one moment and flooded ten feet deep the next, the tidal 
waves tossing huge oil barges onto the city’s downtown streets. The prop­
erty damage was devastating. Buildings were wrecked, boats were splintered 
into driftwood all along the coast—three hundred fifty in Boston H arbor 
alone—crops were destroyed, and two hundred fifty million trees were 
blown down. The damage was in excess of $120 million. Beyond m easure­
ment was the loss of 488 lives.
Rather than hastening reservoir construction, the disaster led instead to 
further delay. The elections of 1938 were only weeks away, and the floods 
offered an irresistible issue. Though no reservoirs authorized in 1936 could 
have been completed in any event, Republican candidates blamed the delay 
in giving New England flood protection on the New Deal generally and on 
the region’s Democratic congressional opponents of the interstate compacts 
in particular. This was deadly campaign stuff at a time when thousands of 
people were still reckoning their losses, and Democratic leaders in Connect­
icu t, New H am psh ire  and M assach u se tts  m ade d esp e ra te  appeals to 
Roosevelt for help. On the President’s order, Harry Hopkins of the Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration, Paul Seavey of the Federal Power Com­
mission, and Brigadier General John J. Kingman of the Corps of Engineers 
met to work out an emergency program of flood control aid for New Eng­
land. The conferees found that they could scrape together $11 million from 
War Departm ent, WPA, and PWA funds, and recommended the immediate 
construction of the local protection works in the Connecticut Valley and 
reservoirs at Knightville and Birch Hill, M assachusetts; Union Village, 
Vermont; and Surry M ountain, New Hampshire. On October 4 Roosevelt 
ordered Hopkins to go ahead with construction. The announcem ent, how­
ever, failed to bolster the New Deal in New England. In the Novem ber elec­
tions every state went Rupublican. Only one of the region’s congressional 
opponents of the com pacts survived, and state offices were filled with men 
who for the most part opposed federal power programs and the federal- 
ownership provisions of the 1938 Flood Control Act. Further delay in build­
ing reservoirs was inevitable.9
Since neither power generation nor federal land-taking was involved in the 
local protection works authorized for the Connecticut Valley, they were 
never at issue. As soon as funds for them were made available early in Oc­
tober, the Providence District under Lieutenant Colonel John S. Bragdon 
sw ung in to  o p era tio n  at H a rtfo rd , E ast H a rtfo rd , S pringfield , W est 
Springfield, C hicopee, H olyoke, and N ortham pton  with plans already 
drafted. These projects, most of which were later extended, were sizable
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Floodwalls and gate structure along the Connecticut River at Holyoke, Massachusetts.
works with final costs ranging from about $1 million to nearly $9 million. At 
Springfield, earth dikes and concrete floodwalls were strung along about five 
miles of the east bank of the Connecticut; five stoplog structures, or remov­
able wooden sections, were placed in the protective barriers where they 
crossed highways or railroads; several wingwalls were built on tributary Mill 
River; and seven pumping stations (six built by the city) were constructed to
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remove interior drainage. Across the river at West Springfield, the district 
built more than seven miles of earth dikes and concrete walls studded with 
six stoplog structures and seven pumping stations. At Hartford it put up over 
seven and a half miles of dikes and floodwalls, punctured them with six 
stoplog structures, laid more than two miles of pressure conduits, and con­
structed three pumping stations to supplement three others built by the city. 
Complex works at Holyoke included nearly five miles of dikes and flood­
walls along the Connecticut and both banks of a power canal, seven pumping 
stations, eighteen stoplog structures, and thirty-six gates at pow er plant con­
duits to prevent high w ater from backing into mills.
Reservoir construction was less easy to get under way. With preparatory 
work on the storage projects well along, the districts were by O ctober 1938 
ready to acquire land. But the states, still digging in their heels against the 
possibility of federal power projects, insisted upon putting restrictions on 
federal authority over properties that would limit them to flood control pur­
poses only. During complicated negotiations to work out arrangem ents, is­
sues sometimes shifted, but behind the stance of the states there was always 
apparent a mixture of genuine if vague sentiments of state sovereignty, hos­
tility toward federal planning authorities, and the influence of power com ­
panies. The federal governm ent could have exercised its unquestioned 
power of eminent domain and taken land without the consent of the states, 
but it was normal government procedure to work out agreem ents with states 
wherever possible rather than employ this right crudely. The Engineers re­
peatedly indicated that they would not built a dam anywhere in New Eng­
land, even with congressional authority, if a state objected. The Roosevelt 
adm inistration, moreover, preferred to avoid arousing more hostility and bit­
terness at a time when the New Deal was already under heavy political fire.
Early in 1939 the administration finally announced that it would build no 
reservoirs within a state unless the state consented to exclusive federal 
jurisdiction over the works. Funds could be used in other states that wanted 
protection. Since it appeared that New England might end up with nothing at 
all, New Hampshire and M assachusetts moderated their stands. On May 31, 
1939 the governor of New Hampshire signed a bill that granted exclusive 
federal jurisdiction over six reservoir projects. The bill represented a com ­
promise. Of six projects submitted by the Engineers, the New Hampshire 
Flood Control Commission had objected to two in the Merrimack Valley and 
one in the Connecticut Valley, and three other projects had been substituted. 
On June 14 the governor of M assachusetts signed a similar bill granting the 
federal government exclusive jurisdiction over four reservoir sites. Vermont, 
however, refused to budge, and no reservoir construction was to take place 
in the state until 1947.10
Ironically, the issue of power development that had delayed the start of 
reservoir construction had little substance. The Engineers were aware of 
this, but few others seem to have been. Power development can be incorpo­
rated into a flood control reservoir project only if a valley is sufficiently 
extensive and unsettled to permit the building of a dam and reservoir large 
enough to provide head and storage for power development and still have 
storage space above the power pool for flood runoff. In New England’s 
populated main river valleys, already saturated with reservoirs constructed
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by power and other industries, this was manifestly out of the question. In its 
narrow and steep tributary valleys, available flood control space is limited, 
which means that a reservoir has to be kept nearly empty in readiness for a 
major flood to strike. Suitable conditions for dual purpose projects exist in 
very few places, and in few er still was the development of hydroelectric 
power economically feasible. In the early 1950s a New England-New York 
Interagency Committee, which made a comprehensive survey of w ater re­
sources in the New England-New York region, found only two sites, one in 
northern Maine and the other in Connecticut, where hydroelectric power 
could be generated in competition with steam plan ts.11
Between August 1939 and June 1940 the districts at last began the con­
struction of five reservoirs: Knightville, Surry M ountain, and Birch Hill in 
the Connecticut Basin by the Providence District, and Franklin Falls and 
Blackwater in the M errimack Basin by the Boston District. In their general 
design and structural features the dams are typical of all Corps of Engineer 
dams built in New England. Since settlem ent and industrial development 
preclude the construction of reservoirs on main river stems, river basin pro­
tective systems must rely on numerous smaller flood storage areas in the 
narrow feeder tributaries, and therefore the dams are generally small in 
comparison to those in other parts of the country. Of rolled earthfill type, 
the dams are built up in layers of twelve inches or less, with each layer 
thoroughly compacted by tractors and rollers. They have cores of impervi­
ous material to minimize seepage and blankets of dumped rock to prevent 
erosion. All have spillways, usually on or in bedrock immediately beyond 
one end of the dam, to prevent excessive floodwaters from overtopping the 
embankments, and all except a few with small drainage areas have gated 
outlet works, also usually located on or in bedrock.12 W ater releases at the 
ungated dams are automatically controlled by designed conduit restrictions. 
About a third of the projects also have earth dikes closing off saddles along 
the perim eters of the reservoirs.
Knightville Dam on the Westfield River, Huntington, M assachusetts, was 
one of the first to be placed in operation late in 1941. One thousand two 
hundred feet across at the top, it rises 160 feet above streambed. W ater is 
released through a 280-foot intake channel and a 605-foot tunnel cut through 
rock. The tunnel is 16 feet in diam eter and controlled by three gates operated 
from a control tow er above. During time of flood the reservoir has a storage 
capacity of 49,000 acre-feet, equivalent to 5.6 inches of runoff from its drain­
age area of 164 square miles. Completely full, it covers 960 acres and ex­
tends about five miles upstream. Since the project was completed at a cost 
of $3.22 million, there have been more than sixty significant reservoir opera­
tions, preventing damages of over $19 million. The most important opera­
tions were in January 1949, when the entire storage capacity of the reservoir 
was utilized, and in August and October 1955, when 58 and 96 percent of 
storage capacity was used.
Franklin Falls Dam on the Pemigewasset River, Franklin, New Hamp­
shire, completed in October 1943, is a key unit in the flood protection system 
of the Merrimack Valley. Its embankment, containing three million cubic 
yards of rock and earth, is 1,740 feet long and 140 feet high. It has two 
22-foot-diameter horseshoe-shaped conduits, each 542 feet long and con-
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Knightville Dam on the Westfield River, Huntington, Massachusetts.
trolled by four gates. The dam can impound 154,000 acre-feet of water, 
which would form a 2,800-acre lake extending upstream  about twelve and a 
half miles. Its drainage area is 1,000 square miles. Located on the main 
tributary of the Merrimack River, the project provides protection along its 
entire length. Costing about $8 million, it prevented damages of $8.8 million 
during the single flood of M arch 1953, when the reservoir reached 76 percent 
of capacity. Since its completion it has prevented $20,162,000 in flood dam­
ages, and with a recurrence of the 1936 basin flood of record would prevent 
$120.6 million in damages.
The construction of these and the other reservoirs involved a raft of re­
lated activities. Many individual parcels of land had to be purchased; high­
ways, bridges, and utility lines had to  be re located ; access roads and 
operators’ quarters had to be built; and power and lighting systems had to be 
installed. Sometimes properties had to be replaced and cemeteries and his­
toric buildings moved to new locations. At Blackwater Reservoir, for in­
stance, the Boston District built new, modern buildings to replace a school 
and a garage that had to be torn down. It relocated the Old Meeting House 
Cemetery of W ebster Village, moving it to the top of a hill over a mile away. 
It also moved the Town Meeting House, a white frame structure over two 
hundred years old, through a mile and a half of woods to a new site. Making 
minor repairs and giving the building a new coat of paint, the district turned 
it over to the townspeople again as good as ever.13
With the completion of the Franklin Falls Dam in 1943, work on reservoirs 
temporarily came to a stop as civil projects not directly related to the war 
effort gave way to more urgent World W ar II military construction. The 
districts continued field surveys, foundation investigations and planning, 
however, so that work could get under way again as soon as the war ended.
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Franklin Falls Dam on the Pemigewasset River, Franklin, New Hampshire, shown 
holding back floodwaters in October 1959 when heavy rains posed flood threats 
throughout New England.
Efforts to reach agreements with the states also went on—with little abate­
ment of form er difficulties. N early every proposed project on upriver 
tributaries raised protests in villages of Vermont and New Hampshire, resi­
dents formed organizations to fight construction, and several newspapers 
mounted opposition crusades. C ontroversies raged in Congress over the 
purpose, the location, and the size and number of dams that should be con­
structed, with New England upriver and downriver interests generally at 
odds. In the Flood Control Act of June 30, 1944, Congress laid down the 
policy that all proposals and plans for flood control and the improvement of 
navigation must be approved by the states concerned. Trying to reach a 
solution that would satisfy conflicting interests in New England and still 
provide adequate flood control, the Engineers studied the merits of numer­
ous alternative schemes and several times proposed new p lans.14
Consequently it was not until 1947 that the New England Division—now 
the operating unit in the region—initiated construction on two more reser­
voirs, both in the Connecticut Basin. The next year it began work on a dam 
in the Merrimack Basin, and in 1949 it got under way the first reservoir 
outside these two w atersheds. Flood control planning for the Tham es, 
Blackstone, Pawtuxet, and Housatonic river basins of southern New Eng­
land had begun in 1938 with funds allotted from the Emergency Relief Ap­
propriation Act of that year for examination and surveys. Several projects 
were authorized in the Flood Control Acts of 1941 and 1944, and in 1949 the 
division began construction on Mansfield Hollow Dam on the Natchaug 
River, a tributary o f the Tham es. A sinuous structure 12,422 feet long 
supplemented by 2,507 feet of dikes, it was completed in 1952.
Reservoir construction now came to a halt for a second time as the mili-
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Intake works of the Blackwater Dam on the Blackwater River, New Hampshire.
Spillway of the Blackwater Dam on the Blackwater River, New Hampshire.
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Mansfield Hollow Dam on the Natchaug River, Connecticut. The spillway and outlet 
works are in the foreground.
tary building programs of the early 1950s again took priority over the Corps’ 
civil works. In the immediate postw ar years four reservoirs had been con­
structed. The num ber of local protection works initiated was five, four of 
which were channel improvement. Thus by 1955, nineteen years after the 
landmark 1936 Flood Control Act, only nine reservoirs and fifteen local pro­
tection works had been constructed in New England, almost all in two river 
basins. The authorized flood control program for the region was only twenty 
percent completed, compared to the national average of about fifty percent. 
The delays occasioned by opposition groups, suspicions of the motives of 
the federal government, and the urgencies of military construction had ap­
parently not disturbed too many people—if indeed many were even aware of 
them. Then suddenly the need for flood protection was again tragically 
demonstrated.
In mid-August 1955 the third tropical hurricane of the season, code-named 
“ Connie,”  passed over New England, seemingly with little damage. Al­
though six to nine inches of rain fell on western Connecticut and M assachu­
setts, the soil was dry and runoff was too small to cause serious flooding. 
The ground was left saturated, however, and streams were raised to high 
levels. About midnight on W ednesday, August 17, heavy rains again began 
to fall in M assachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. As routine proce­
dure, the Reservoir Regulation Branch of the New England Division was 
alerted to the possibility of flash floods in the upper tributaries of major 
rivers, which would be the early indications of serious trouble. The first 
warning of flooding came by telephone at 9:30 the next morning, and im­
mediately a Flood Emergency Mobilization Plan was put into action. Dam 
tenders in the rainfall area were ordered to close the flood-control gates and
H urricane D iane, A ugust 1955
Putnam, Connecticut. Putnam, Connecticut.
Winsted, Connecticut. Southbridge, Massachusetts.
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begin storing water, and liaison was established with federal, state, and town 
officials to coordinate flood-fighting efforts.15
Torrential rains continued throughout August 18 and 19. During those two 
days the storm center of a second hurricane, H urricane Diane, traveled 
eastward across Pennsylvania and New Jersey and then turned northward to 
cross the eastern end of Long Island and rampage along the southern New 
England coast. More than twelve inches of rain, and in places up to eighteen 
and twenty inches, fell across southern New England from the Berkshires to 
the Atlantic. Pouring off the already soggy soil and surging down river val­
leys, it produced flash floods that in many places were two to four times 
greater than anything on record. As upstream  runoff increased, the velocity 
of stream s doubled and trebled. Sweeping over their banks, rivers cut new 
courses, sometimes through the streets of cities and towns. The Mad River 
of Connecticut cut a mile-long channel six to eight feet deep along the main 
street of W insted; and in W aterbury, Torrington, N augatuck, and other 
cities, w ater surged into the second stories of homes and factories. Building 
foundations were undercut, bridges were torn  out, pavem ents were up­
rooted, and blocks of concrete, railroad cars, bridges, and buildings were 
tossed about like cardboard toys. Miles of water supply lines, sewer lines, 
electrical conduits, and railroad tracks were ripped out like string. In dozens 
of towns tumbled buildings, bridges, trucks, and automobiles were piled into 
masses of twisted and battered junk.
Land and rail transportation was brought to a standstill by highway w ash­
outs and bridge failures, and hundreds of people were left homeless. Units of 
the National Guard moved into heavily damaged communities to enforce 
martial law. Municipal departm ents, the armed services, and volunteers 
rescued trapped flood victims with boats, helicopters, and breeches buoys. 
The Red Cross, churches, and other organizations set up relief centers, and 
the Salvation Army sent in mobile feeding units as soon as they could get 
through. H elicopters brought casualties, doctors, nurses, and supplies to 
hospitals, and typhoid inoculations were administered on a voluntary basis. 
In W aterbury alone, more than eighty thousand people took advantage of 
this protection.
Diane’s sock at southern New England caused damages of $540 million 
and took ninety lives. Losses were particularly heavy in the highly indus­
tria lized  and densely  populated  N augatuck  Valley in the H ousaton ic 
watershed, where nearly half the dollar damage and the heaviest cost in lives 
occurred. Devastation in the Connecticut, Thames, and Blackstone river ba­
sins was milder only by comparison. Less than two months later, on October 
15 and 16, heavy rains again fell over western M assachusetts and Connect­
icut, causing additional damage in excess of $50 million and claiming seven­
teen more lives.
The New England Division, under the direction of Brigadier General 
Robert J. Fleming, Jr., had immediately sent field personnel to disaster areas 
to assist local and state authorities in rescue work and give technical assist­
ance. M ilitary equipm ent, including portable electric generators, w ater 
purifiers, and communication apparatus, was rapidly installed in critical 
areas. Bailey bridges—prefabricated and quickly assembled trussed struc­
tures developed by British Engineers during World War II—were obtained
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from supply depots and turned over to state highway departm ents for instal­
lation under Corps supervision on state and national highways. Where town 
bridges were destroyed, Bailey bridges were erected directly by the Corps.
This relief work was soon dramatically expanded. On August 20 President 
Eisenhower declared disaster areas in M assachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode 
Island, New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. He authorized the Fed­
eral Civil Defense Adm inistrator to provide federal relief assistance, an as­
signment that on August 23 was delegated to the Corps of Engineers and 
transmitted to the New England and North Atlantic divisions.16 On that 
same day officers from the advanced class of the Army Engineer School at 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia, were flown to Boston to assist the New England Di­
vision, and Chief of Engineers Lieutenant General Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr., 
arrived to survey the situation. Within a few more days experienced disaster 
teams from Omaha, Vicksburg, and Kansas City and Corps of Engineer 
specialists from forty-three districts throughout the country were also flown 
in. More sets of Bailey bridges and engineering team s experienced in their 
swift erection soon arrived. The First Army Command provided seventy 
jeeps, sedans, and carryalls and arranged for the loan of a helicopter and 
other aircraft from other army areas. Personnel o f the New England Divi­
sion, now armed with greater authority, got in touch with contractors carry­
ing out division military projects and soon had their equipment and operators 
at work in devasted areas. By contract, loan, or rent, they obtained all types 
of heavy equipment from governmental agencies and from private industry 
for coordinated relief efforts. “ Operation N oah” had begun.
A force of 253 Corps personnel, supported by additional personnel at the 
division office, directed Operation Noah. A central D isaster Relief Office 
was established at 224 Albany St., Cambridge, M assachusetts, and Strategic 
Area Offices were set up at W aterbury, Connecticut, and W orcester, M assa­
chusetts. Strategic Area Suboffices were opened in Norwalk, Torrington, 
Washington, Winsted, and Putnam, Connecticut; Chicopee, M assachusetts; 
and W oonsocket, Rhode Island. The demanding task of coordinating the re­
lief efforts of numerous governmental and private agencies was carried out 
largely by the officers from the Engineer School. Cutting red tape to a 
minimum, they maintained close liaison with state governors, army head­
quarters, public works com m issioners, civil defense d irectors, local au­
thorities, and Red Cross and other organization officials.
By order of the Chief of Engineers the responsibilities assigned to the 
division were “ protective w ork ,” “ debris and wreckage clearance,” and 
“ repair and replacement of public facilities.” These deceptively simple des­
ignations covered a broad spectrum of operations. Protective work ranged 
from reinforcing river channels with dikes, ditches, sandbags, and riprap to 
evacuating flood victims; from protecting dams, bridges, roads, and build­
ings by sandbagging and other measures to protecting public health by spray­
ing polluted waters and infected land areas and covering city dumps. Debris 
and wreckage clearance involved clearing stree ts, rivers, dam s, bridge 
abutments, culverts, and public buildings of debris; cleaning reservoirs, 
lakes, and sewer lines; removing damaged bridges; and demolishing build­
ings in danger of collapse. Repair and replacem ent of public facilities en­
compassed work on dams, bridges, dikes, culverts, streets, public buildings,
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Military Engineers from the Army Engineer School at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, get a 
final briefing before starting supervisory duties in “ Operation Noah." Standing left to 
right: Brig. Gen. Robert J. Fleming. Jr.. New England Division Engineer, and Lt. 
Col. Byron G. Belote, Assistant Division Engineer in charge of disaster relief opera­
tions. Captain John P. Chandler, seated second to the right of Col. Belote, became 
New England Division Engineer in 1976.
reservoirs, wells, w ater mains, sewer lines, w ater filtration plants, sewage 
disposal plants, and electric utilities. It included the restoration of river 
channels, the erection of Bailey bridges, the maintenance of emergency 
municipal dumps, and the provision of sites and utilities for emergency hous­
ing. The cost of work performed by the Corps during Operation Noah was 
nearly $20.8 million. Work done by local interests reimbursed by the federal 
government came to over $6.6 million.
“ This storm did as much damage in areas of southern New England as 
three years of warfare had done to the R uhr,’’ commented Division Engineer 
Robert Fleming, who had been with the army corps given the mission of 
mopping up the Rhineland and the Ruhr after the American Army had 
crossed the Rhine River. Had the dams and reservoirs authorized by Con­
gress years ago been constructed, Fleming contended, there would still have 
been a flood and some losses, but those losses would have been cut by 
seventy to eighty percent.17
As it was, the two reservoirs in the storm area— Knightville in the Con­
necticut watershed and Mansfield Hollow in the Thames—together with the 
local protection works on the rivers, prevented damages estimated at nearly 
$40 million. The reservoirs reduced flood stages in communities immediately 
downstream by as much as four to six feet; and with the exception of the 
work at W insted, where channel improvement had been limited by building 
foundations and other congestion along the river, the protection projects 
prevented any local damage from river flooding.
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WORK PERFORMED IN OPERATION NOAH
Type of Work
Corps of 
Engineers Reimb. Total
Bridges repaired, replaced, salvaged, or 
removed 213 67 280
Dams repaired or reinforced 35 4 39
Channels cleared and restored 278 26 304
Debris cleared 
Roads 68 57 125
Buildings 278 4 282
Other 5 - 5
Utilities cleaned or repaired 
W ater lines or plants 36 19 55
Sewer systems or plants 91 28 119
Other - 6 6
Roads repaired 182 1668 1850
Culverts repaired 110 72 182
Public Buildings repaired 32 41 73
Cost of work performed by the Corps of Engineers $20,796,081
Cost of reimbursable work performed by local interests 6,670,624
$27,466,705
Along with property and life, Diane swept away com placent attitudes to­
ward flood control. A few weeks after the flood, the entire M assachusetts 
congressional delegation met at Boston to name a committee on flood pre­
vention and relief. The congressional delegations of Connecticut and Rhode 
Island similarly ignored party ranks to conduct a vigorous campaign for au­
thorization and construction of an adequate flood protection system  in New 
England. O ther state leaders, including G overnor Abraham Ribicoff of Con­
necticut, and members of business communities joined in demanding action 
on projects recommended by the Corps of Engineers. Some seventy-five
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business concerns in communities in southern M assachusetts and northern 
Connecticut banded into an association to whip up support for the construc­
tion of the five dam s and reservoirs proposed by the Engineers for the upper 
tributaries of the Thames River. Similar cries for protection came from other 
areas of the ravaged s ta tes .18
Interest in flood control was reawakened in northern New England too, 
even though Diane left m ost of the area untouched. In 1953 the states of 
New Hampshire, Vermont, M assachusetts, and Connecticut had ratified, 
and Congress had approved, a com pact covering the Connecticut River Val­
ley under which the downstream  states benefiting from flood protection 
agreed to recom pense the upstream  states for tax and economic losses re­
sulting from setting aside lands for the construction of reservoirs. But 
neither New Hampshire nor M assachusetts had shown m uch disposition to 
ratify a similar com pact for the M errimack Valley that would have permitted 
the construction in the basin of a major twin-dam project authorized nearly 
two decades before. In 1953 and again in 1955 only fifteen of the 360-member 
New Hampshire House of Representatives voted in favor of the compact.
In 1956 M assachusetts ratified the agreement. New Hampshire still spent 
more time considering the matter, but support for the com pact rapidly de­
veloped. The threat of another flood disaster was no doubt a major m otivat­
ing force. In the spring of 1956 the entire M errimack Basin had between two 
to three times the normal w ater content in its snow cover. The spring season 
came late, and if the w eather had turned warm and the area had received a 
moderately heavy rain, the M errimack, to quote Division Engineer Fleming, 
“ would have gone down the drain .”  For three weeks Fleming had his fingers 
crossed so hard they hurt. He kept state officials continually advised of the 
situation; and residents of New Hampshire probably noticed more army 
jeeps than usual on their roads, for troops from Fort Devens were reconnoi- 
tering to figure out w here they would move men and equipm ent in an 
emergency. Fleming also had some of the contractors at the Pease Air Force 
Base standing by, prepared to rush in equipm ent where needed. Support for 
the M errimack River Flood Control Compact culminated early in 1957 when 
Fleming addressed a jo in t session of the New Hampshire legislature by re­
quest. Shortly afterwards the agreem ent was ratified by a vote of 286 to l l . 19
The actions of New Englanders had their effect in W ashington. In re­
sponse to public demands Congress instructed the Corps to review flood 
control plans for all rivers in the N ortheast and appropriated funds to begin 
the construction of a num ber of badly needed works already authorized. In 
1956 the New England Division began three new reservoirs and a local pro­
tection work; and every year for the next decade it continued to start new 
flood control projects.
Among them  was the tw in-dam  project in the M errim ack Basin, the 
H opkinton-Everett dams and reservoirs, on which construction began in 
1959. Planning for the project had begun in the early 1940s under the per­
sonal direction of Boston District Engineer Leonard B. Gallagher. Hydro­
logic studies determ ined th a t the C ontoocook R iver, w hich en ters the 
M errimack five miles above Concord, New Hampshire, was a heavy con­
tributor to flooding on the main river. Dozens of sites were investigated on 
the Contoocook to find a suitable location for a reservoir, but they were all
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Hopkinton-Everett Flood Control Project. Hopkinton Dam on the Contoocook River. 
The reservoir area is connected to the river by a short canal. Another 13,900-foot 
canal connects this reservoir to the Everett Reservoir.
Hopkinton-Everett Flood Control Project. Everett Dam on the Piscataquog River.
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too small for the storage required for the river’s 426-square-mile drainage 
area. The solution was to divert part of the storage of the Contoocook to the 
adjoining subbasin of the Piscataquog River, with a drainage area of 64 
square miles, by means of a canal through a low point in the divide. Thus 
two reservo irs  were construc ted : H opkinton L ake in the C ontoocook 
watershed having a capacity of 70,800 acre-feet, and E verett Lake in the 
Piscataquog watershed with 86,500 acre-feet. The canal betw een the lakes, 
13,900 feet in length, permits the two storage areas to function as a single 
unit during major floods. Together they provide the largest storage capacity 
of any reservoir project in New England, exceeding that of Franklin Falls in 
the upper reaches of the Merrimack Basin by some 3,000 acre-feet.20
By the spring of 1960 the New England Division had fifteen new flood 
control projects in operation, eleven more under construction, and five more 
almost ready to start. Then came a test of what had been done. In March 
1960 an unusually heavy storm dumped eighteen or more inches of snow on 
New England. This was followed the first week in April by warm rains, and 
as the annual spring runoff accelerated, floodwaters swept down the Con­
necticut and M errim ack rivers. On the C onnecticut, the flood was the 
seventh largest on record. But it caused little harm. Seven completed and 
four nearly completed reservoirs and the local protection works in the basin 
prevented damages of $27.3 million. In the Merrimack Valley, damages of 
$5.4 million were averted. “ The Governors and members of C ongress,” re­
ported Division Engineer Alden K. Sibley to the Chief o f Engineers, “ said 
this was the first time they had received negligible complaints during a major 
flood and were surprised that it attracted so little public atten tion .” 21 Not 
expecting and seldom getting public kudos, the division continued its work, 
and by 1970 it had constructed sixteen reservoirs in the Connecticut Basin, 
five in the M errimack, seven in the Housatonic, six in the Tham es, and one 
in the Blackstone—a total of thirty five. By 1973 it had brought the total 
number of local protection works completed to thirty-seven.
Hurricane Diane had wrought its destruction by the greatest and most in­
tense rains ever recorded in New England. But to communities on New Eng­
land’s southern coast, hurricanes had more often brought trouble by tidal 
flooding. The enormous damage caused by the Septem ber 1938 hurricane 
resulted in large part from high tides and intense winds that caused record 
tidal surges. Flooding in the Buzzards Bay area was more than fourteen feet 
above mean sea level. A hurricane of Septem ber 1944 caused flood levels 
along the south shore of Cape Cod ranging as high as eleven feet above mean 
sea level. In August and Septem ber 1954, disastrous losses were experienced 
along the Connecticut, Rhode Island, and southern M assachusetts coasts 
from near-record tidal flooding caused by Hurricanes Carol and Edna. Carol 
put downtown Providence under eight feet of water, causing damages of 
over $40 million. The New England Division’s response to this recurring 
danger was to design a new type of local protection work, the hurricane 
barrier, four of which were constructed between 1961 and 1969.
Work on the barriers began at Providence, where storm  waves driven up 
V-shaped N arrangansett Bay can pile to extraordinary heights. Located 
about a mile south of the heart of the city on the east side of the estuary, the 
Fox Point Barrier extends across the Providence River ju st above its conflu-
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North Hartland Dam on the Ottauquechee River, Vermont. View of the intake tower, 
looking upstream to the reservoir area.
Ball Mountain Dam on the West River, Vermont.
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Constructing the spillway discharge channel walls of the North Hartland Dam on the 
Ottauquechee River, Vermont.
Intake to the Worcester Diversion Channel. A 4.205-foot tunnel and an 11,300-foot 
open channel bypass flood flows from Kettle Brook, Middle River, and Blackstone 
River past Worcester, Massachusetts.
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Flood control dam of the Woonsocket Local Protection Project. Designed to protect 
the industrial area of Woonsocket, Rhode Island, the project also includes a flood- 
wall, four dikes, a pumping station, channel improvement, and the relocation and 
modification of bridges on the Blackstone River.
Local protection works at Hartford, Connecticut. The extensive works protecting the 
city include about 35,000 feet of dikes, 4,400 feet of concrete floodwalls, 10,900 feet 
of pressure conduits, six stoplog structures, and six pumping stations.
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ence with the Seekonk River. It protects the commercial and industrial 
center of the city, extensive transportation facilities, public utilities, and 
many homes. Consisting of a concrete dam about 700 feet long flanked by 
rock-faced earth dikes 2,200 feet long, the barrier includes three 40-foot-wide 
tainter gates and a pumping station. When raised the gates allow normal 
river and tidal flow and the passage of small boats and barges; when closed 
they prevent tidal floodwaters from surging up the river. The pumping sta­
tion houses five pumps with a combined discharge of 7,000 cubic feet per 
minute to expel flood runoff when the gates are closed. It also contains in­
take gates to admit condenser cooling w ater to  a thermal-electric power 
plant located ju st behind the barrier. Construction costs were $15,844,500, to 
which local interests contributed 30 percent, a requirem ent applied in all 
barrier projects. In a recurrence of the record Septem ber 1938 hurricane 
flood stages, the barrier would prevent damages estim ated at $74.9 million. 
Its maintenance and operation are local responsibilities.22
Started in the spring of 1961, the Fox Point Barrier was completed in 1966, 
considerably behind schedule. Delays caused by contractors running into 
difficulties, or by strikes tying up artisans or supplies, was an old story with 
the Corps, but to Division Engineer Seymour A. Potter, Jr., and to his suc­
cessor, Peter H yzer, the Fox Point Barrier was their “ num ber one civil 
problem .” H yzer was further exasperated when a strike at the Tower Iron 
Works delayed fabrication of the barrier’s third tain ter gate for several 
months. “ So we are not making up any tim e,” he commented rather resign­
edly to the Chief of Engineers.23
Hyzer had quite the opposite experience in the construction of a much 
lengthier hurricane barrier at New Bedford-Fairhaven, started in 1962 and 
completed in 1966. The contractor tended to proceed at a faster pace than 
the project schedule, leaving H yzer with the “ continual problem ” of funding 
his work. N ot all H yzer’s concerns over the project, however, were that 
preferable. The day before the main channel into New Bedford-Fairhaven 
Harbor was to be temporarily closed and a bypass channel put into use, the 
pilots of the harbor suddenly decided that the bypass was too narrow. H ast­
ily meeting with all interested parties in the m ayor’s office, H yzer agreed to 
provide a wider channel. “ This is still a touchy problem ,” he reported to the 
Chief of Engineers, “ but I think that local interests are now convinced that 
the Corps of Engineers is not trying to destroy New Bedford as a po rt.” 24
The New Bedford-Fairhaven Barrier consists of three massive, rockfaced 
earthfill dikes. The main barrier extends 4,500 feet across New Bedford- 
Fairhaven Harbor, runs southward 3,600 feet along the New Bedford side of 
the outer harbor, then turns westward for 1,000 feet to high ground. A 150- 
foot-wide opening in the barrier, equipped with sector gates, accom m odates 
harbor traffic. At Clarks Cove in New Bedford a supplem entary dike ex­
tends 5,800 feet along the head and east shore of the cove, tying to high 
ground at both ends. In Fairhaven a similar dike about 3,100 feet long pro­
tects another low shore area. The project includes two gated conduits in the 
main barrier to permit emergency release of water, a gated conduit in the 
Fairhaven dike, a street gate in the west extension of the main barrier, and 
two street gates and a pumping station in the Clarks Cove dike. The barriers 
protect thickly settled industrial and commercial areas of about 1,400 acres,
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Pumping Station, Fox Point Hurricane Barrier.
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Aerial view of the New Bedford-Fairhaven Hurricane Barrier.
• * *  •
Sector gates of the New Bedford-Fairhaven Hurricane Barrier.
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representing about 80 percent of the area flooded in the 1938 and 1954 hur­
ricanes. Costing $18,614,000, the project has since its completion prevented 
damages of $1,245,000, and in recurrence of 1938 flood stages would prevent 
damages of $61.6 million. The division operates and maintains the main har­
bor barrier with funds provided by local interests.
A somewhat smaller barrier was completed by the division at Stamford, 
Connecticut, in 1969. Constructed mostly of earth dike with short sections of 
concrete wall and sheet pile bulkhead, the Stamford Barrier extends across 
the East Branch of Stamford Harbor and the low ground on either side for a 
distance of about 11,700 feet. It is equipped with a 90-foot-wide navigation 
opening with a single gate that swings up from the bottom  of the channel, 
four pumping stations for handling storm runoff, gated openings for utility 
lines and drainage systems, and access ramps where the barrier crosses 
streets. Two months before the barrier was completely finished, it received 
its baptismal test. On N ovem ber 12, 1968 the fourth highest tide in a century 
was generated by one of the “ northeaster” storms that strike New England 
in the fall and winter. The 220-ton flap gate was raised and kept in position 
for seven hours, shutting out w ater that rose four feet higher outside the 
barrier than inside. Preventing damages of $750,000, this first operation of 
the barrier was the front page story of the Stam ford A dvoca te .25 Costing 
about $10.7 million, the barrier had by 1975 prevented damages of $2.5 mil­
lion, and in a recurrence of 1938 flood levels would prevent damages of $9.3 
million. The navigation gate is operated by the division.
The fourth barrier built by the division is a small work located on the west 
bank of the Pawcatuck River in Stonington, Connecticut. Costing $920,000, 
it consists of 1,915 feet of earth dike, 940 feet of concrete wall, two street 
gates, and a pumping station. In a single flood of 1938 stages it would pre­
ven t dam ages m ore th an  doub le  its  co st. I ts  m ain ten an ce  is a local 
responsibility.
The key to optimum efficiency in regulating the division’s twenty-eight 
gated reservoirs and two Corps-manned hurricane barriers is the rapid col­
lection and analysis of essential hydrological and meteorological data. This is 
the primary function of a Reservoir Control Center established at the New 
England Division headquarters at W altham in 1969. Form erly the compila­
tion and analysis of data collected by field observation and transm itted by 
telephone or voice radio took several hours. Through a com puterized radio 
reporting system  the center now collects and processes information more 
reliably in a m atter of minutes. The brainchild of Saul Cooper, chief of the 
division’s W ater Control Branch, the Automatic Hydrologic Reporting N et­
work was developed by the M otorola Corporation and placed in operation in 
1970.
The system consists essentially of forty-one centrally controlled remote 
reporting stations strategically located in the five river basins served by reser­
voirs and at two key coastal points. To safeguard against communication 
failures during major storms or floods, the stations transm it by radio signal, 
using batteries as their primary source of power. Repeater stations and relay 
centers pass the signals along to the Reservoir Control Center. The river 
basin stations send vital data on rainfall and on river and reservoir stages, 
while the coastal stations transm it tide, wind, and barom etric conditions.
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Aerial view of the Stamford Hurricane Barrier.
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The computerized equipment at the center interrogates the entire network at 
six hour intervals and provides complete printouts in about four minutes. 
W henever stations transm it flood warnings or barometric pressure drops, the 
network automatically reports every three hours. Manual interrogation also 
may be made at any time. Early warnings of high stream flows or tidal 
surges are assured, and the center’s personnel, rapidly analyzing the data 
stored in the com puter and information from other sources such as the Na­
tional W eather Service and the U.S. Geological Survey, can issue timely 
operating instructions by telephone or voice radio to the managers of the
dams and hurricane barriers.
Remote reporting station on the French 
River in Webster, Massachusetts.
Lighthouse at Old Saybrook, Connect­
icut, houses the hydrologic measuring 
equipment of a coastal remote reporting 
station.
With a view to developing a less expensive and possibly more reliable and 
effective method of data collection than by ground-station radio signal relay, 
the New England Division soon began experimenting with satellite data re­
lay, using the Data Collection System of the Earth Resources Technology 
Satellite (ERTS, later renam ed LANDSAT-1), launched by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration in July 1972, and that of its succes­
sor, LANDSAT-2, put in orbit in August 1974. Through a netw ork of 
twenty-seven data collection platforms located throughout New England, in­
formation about river stages, rainfall, wind, and water quality is relayed by 
LANDSAT to the Goddard Space Flight Center at Greenbelt, M aryland, and 
from there by teletype to the Reservoir Control Center. Continuing its study 
in order to develop and test a direct readout system that would eliminate 
time delays and safeguard against communication breakdowns, the division 
constructed a computer-controlled satellite ground receiving station at its 
headquarters in Waltham, which was placed in operation in Septem ber 1975.
The successful testing of the LANDSAT Data Collection System by the 
New England Division has helped to determine the feasibility of the estab-
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lishment by the Corps of a satellite data relay network serving all parts of the 
country. The division is also making a study of the imagery regularly col­
lected by LANDSAT to determine its usefulness in planning, designing, and 
managing water resource systems. Initiated under contract by the University 
of Connecticut, this investigation is being continued by the Cold Regions 
R esearch  and E ngineering L ab o ra to ry  at H an o v er, N ew  H am pshire . 
Through photo interpretation and com puter analysis, imagery studies and 
measurements are being made of fluctuations in river, lake, and reservoir 
stages, tidal changes, icing of water surfaces, the location and depth of snow 
cover, the moisture content of soil, and water quality param eters.
During the spring snowmelt, several weeks of reservoir regulation within 
watersheds is a nearly annual occurrence. But since there is no flood-free 
time of year in New England, the operation of the flood control system is far 
from seasonal. Fiscal Year 1974 was an exceptionally busy one. Heavy rain­
fall late in June 1973 threatened severe floods in Vermont and New Hamp­
shire, and several of the reservoirs in the C onnecticut and M errimack 
watersheds rose to near-record levels. In December, two heavy storms four 
days apart and a rapid melting of most of the northern snow cover by unsea­
sonably warm tem peratures caused rising riverflows in the Naugatuck, Con­
necticut, M errimack, and Thames river basins that quickly approached flood 
stage. For the first time all thirty-five reservoirs stored floodwater simul­
taneously, with storages ranging up to 43 percent of capacity. The damages 
prevented by the reservoirs and by local protection projects during these 
floods of July and Decem ber totaled $54.5 million.26
While the primary function of the reservoirs is to control floods, these 
land and water areas, set aside in a near-natural state from the ordinary 
encroachments of society, are uniquely fitted for filling other environmental 
and social needs. Two reservoirs constructed in the 1960s were specifically 
authorized by Congress as multiple-purpose projects. Littleville Lake on the 
Middle Branch of the Westfield River, M assachusetts, was designed as a 
future water supply for the city of Springfield, and Colebrook River Lake on 
W est Branch Farmington River, Connecticut, stores water for the Hartford 
M etropolitan W ater District and for downstream  fishery improvement by 
low flow augmentation. A nother project, the East Brimfield Reservoir on the 
Quinebaug River in Sturbridge, M assachusetts, provides storage for indus­
trial w ater supply. Reservoirs are also used to meet emergency situations. 
During a severe drought lasting through most of 1966, emergency water was 
stored in four reservoirs in the Connecticut and Thames basins at the request 
of the Commonwealth of M assachusetts in case the drought should continue 
for another year.27
Much more obvious to New Englanders seeking relaxation at woods and 
lakes are the recreational opportunities offered at the reservoirs. The New 
England Division has maintained recreational facilities at a number of its 
projects since the Corps was first authorized to construct them  by a provi­
sion of the Flood Control Act of 1944. But what was hardly more than an 
incidental amenity became a major program after the passage of the Federal 
W ate r P ro jec t R ec rea tio n  A ct o f 1965. T his m easu re  w en t beyond  
recognizing recreation as an appropriate function of reservoirs to requiring 
th a t co n sid era tio n  be given w h en ev er possib le  to  p rov id ing  o u td o o r
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Data Collection Platform.
Telecommunications control equipment, 
NED, Waltham, Massachusetts.
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recreational opportunities at federal pro jects. It also encouraged local 
participation in their development by provisions for sharing management and 
co s ts . Im plem enting  th is  a c t, the N ew  E ngland  D iv ision  m ain ta in s  
recreational pools or lakes at twenty-one reservoirs and offers recreational 
o p p o rtu n itie s  at all th irty -o n e  o p e ra ted  by the C orps. M any o f the 
recreational areas are managed by state agencies, and state authorities stock 
a number of them with fish and game. Outdoor enthusiasts flock to the 
reservoirs to picnic, camp, swim, boat, or fish, and to hike, hunt, study 
nature, and snowmobile. Visitor-day attendance at the reservoirs in 1974 
totaled over three million.
The 1965 Federal W ater Project Recreation Act also encouraged conserva- 
tional programs at federal water resource projects. In New England, the 
Corps of Engineers administers approximately 54,000 acres of federal land at 
the flood-control reservoirs and the Cape Cod Canal, and over 34,500 of 
these acres have been leased to the states of Vermont, New Hampshire, 
M assachusetts, and Connecticut for state developm ent of recreational, for­
estry, and fish and wildlife management programs.
As the Corps and the states enlarged their recreational and conservational 
activities at the reservoirs, demands for even more facilities and services by 
a public eager to enjoy them multiplied rather than slackened. Recognizing 
the need for a full-time professional staff to keep on top of the situation, the 
division created in 1973 a Recreation-Resources Management Section with 
responsibility for developing and administering a comprehensive program. 
The next year it began implementing the program in the field by staffing its 
principal river basin offices with uniformed Park Rangers with professional 
degrees in forestry and wildlife management. Within a decade a minor func­
tion of the division had grown into one of its most visible interests.
Bathing beach at Clough State Park, Everett Dam, New Hampshire
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Duck hunting in the Stumpfield Marsh Waterfowl Management Area administered by 
the New Hampshire Fish and Game Department at the Hopkinton-Everett Flood 
Control Project.
212
Snowmobiling at North Springfield Dam reservoir area, Vermont.
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The dams, dikes, and barriers constructed by the Corps have done their 
jobs well. But they also adversely affect to some degree various economic, 
environm ental, aesthetic, or other interests, and plans for them have not 
always met with unrestrained public enthusiasm. In M arch 1974 the New 
England Division was authorized to carry out a different type of project—the 
first of its kind in the country—to control flooding. This is by the protection 
of flood plains, or more correctly, the remaining wetland “ natural valley 
storage” areas of the plains. Carved out by the rivers them selves over aeons 
of meandering, flood plains are natural safety valves that absorb and di­
minish high flows. But three centuries of settlement and developm ent in 
New England have seen the building on flood plains of communities depend­
ent upon water for transportation, power, and industrial processes, and the 
stringing along river banks of railroads and highways to service expanding 
towns and cities. In recent years the unchecked momentum of urban growth 
has encroached on even those wetland areas of flood plains once considered 
unsuitable for building but now too often regarded merely as mistakes of 
nature in need of correction. Some river basins may still be naturally pro­
tected from serious flooding by the existence of substantial wetlands, but if 
floods of increasing severity even by minor storms are to be prevented in 
these watersheds in the future, their natural valley storage capabilities must 
not be further depleted.
In 1965 Congress directed the Corps to make a com prehensive study of 
the 307-square-mile Charles River W atershed in eastern M assachusetts with 
a view to multiple-purpose improvement. Beginning the study in 1967, the 
New England Division worked closely with a Coordinating Committee rep­
resenting the major federal, state, and regional agencies with responsibilities 
in the watershed and with a C itizens’ Advisory Committee speaking for the 
people of the valley. The study concentrated first on the lower Charles 
River, a densely urbanized area most exposed to the threat of serious flood 
damages. The division engineers noted that the congested cities of Boston 
and Cambridge and their immediate upstream  neighbors experienced inten­
sive flooding in severe storms. From  subbasins extending back into the 
communities of W atertown, Waltham, Brookline, and Newton, storm flows 
raced unchecked across paved surfaces and through culverted tributaries 
and drains into the Charles River Basin, that stretch of the river impounded 
between the Charles River Dam near its mouth and the W atertown Dam 
about eight and a half miles upstream . Submitting an Interim Report in 1968, 
the division recommended as the only feasible solution the construction of a 
pumping station capable of rapidly discharging the floodwater into Boston 
Harbor, which for nearly ten hours daily has tide levels equal to or greater 
than the water level in the basin. The station would be incorporated into a 
new Charles River Dam that would also contain navigation locks adequate to 
handle the ever-increasing boat traffic into the Basin.28
Turning to the middle and upper reaches of the Charles, the engineers 
found that the communities above Newton had a history of only minimal 
flooding. Extensive marshes, swamps, and wet meadows scattered around 
the upper watershed were apparently taking care of things very well by hold­
ing floodwaters and then only slowly letting them go. As if to prove its effi­
ciency, nature provided an intense storm in March 1968 to give the engineers
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Medfield-Millis wet meadow in the Charles River Watershed. Normal spring high 
water.
the opportunity to observe the workings of its system  under flood-of-record 
conditions. The wetlands, the investigators noted, restrained flood crests 
until four days after the storm, while in the basin below, high flows occurred 
within a few hours. These natural reservoirs released water so gradually that 
lower basin flows could pass out to sea before upstream  flows arrived.
From the approxim ately 20,000 acres of wetlands scattered through the 
upper watershed, the engineers identified some 8,500 acres in seventeen par­
cels as most critically in need of preservation. These areas, all of 100 acres 
or more, were large enough to be the most effective hydrologically, were in 
the right places to perform in a synchronized fashion, were of practical size 
for efficient management, and were still undeveloped. But they obviously 
would not long remain undeveloped unless protected. They were already 
threatened by urban expansion, and the completion in 1970 of Interstate 
Route 495 promised another industrial alley arcing around Boston with the 
same instant construction of businesses and homes as sparked by inner belt 
Route 128 a decade or so before. If in the scramble for building sites the 
wetlands were filled in, the Charles River communities were headed for 
trouble.
Sending its final report to Washington in 1972, the division recommended 
the protection of the crucial 8,500 acres of wetland through federal purchase 
or through easem ents restricting building and filling, at an estimated cost of 
some $7 million. While preserved primarily for flood control under the 
supervision of the division, the lands would be managed by governmental 
and private agencies as wildlife refuges and compatible recreational areas.
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The report also recommended that state and local authorities adopt measures 
for protecting the remaining 11,500 acres of smaller wetlands to reinforce the 
federal flood control program. Further proposals dealing more broadly with 
the environment of the watershed appended by the Coordinating Committee 
called for state and local action relating to sewage and waste disposal, insur­
ance of future water supply, and schemes for recreational and conservational 
facilities, including the carving out of a green parkland corridor along both 
banks of the Charles from end to end.29
An Environmental Protection Award was presented by Bruce L. Lund. President of 
the Charles River Watershed Association, to New England Division Deputy Engineer 
Col. Charles J. Osterndorf, in October 1973. John W. McCormack, former Speaker 
of the U.S. House of Representatives, was present at the ceremony. The Associa­
tion’s award, the first of its kind, cited the New England Division for “ a national 
pioneering use of natural valley flood water storage in the Charles River Watershed.”
Thus the Charles River Study resulted in recommendations for structural 
measures where flooding was already a problem and no other solution was 
possible and for a nonstructural approach where flood damages do not yet 
occur and can be forestalled. N ot every watershed lends itself to the concept 
o f natural valley storage. The natural reservoirs m ust be there, and in the 
right places and of the right dimensions to function in an effective, syn­
chronized way. Even on the Charles this concept is applicable only to the 
upper portion of the river. Yet the popular reaction to this imaginative ap­
proach of the Corps, overlooking the fact that the largest structural project 
in the history of the division’s civil works mission is necessary to protect the
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communities of the Low er Charles, tended to be simply that the Corps, 
rather than building dams, should recognize that “ nature’s way is b est.” 30 
A new Charles River Dam was authorized by Congress in 1968 and con­
struction began in February 1973. The original dam was completed by the 
Commonwealth of M assachusetts in 1910 to prevent tidal flooding along the 
lower reach of the river and to create a recreational pool covering unsightly 
and m aloderous tidal flats. The pool, or Charles River Basin, modeled on the 
Alster River Basin of Hamburg, Germany, soon became a major recreational
It
Artist’s rendering of the new Charles River Dam.
and aesthetic feature of Boston. But with the growth of the city and its envi­
rons over the course of a half century, the dam became unsuited to the needs 
o f the community. Its sluice gates are no longer adequate to handle flood- 
water coursing into the basin, and its single navigation lock cannot accommo­
date recreational river traffic growing in volume every year. The new dam, 
located a short way downstream , will expel floodwater with six huge pumps 
having a discharge capacity of 8,400 cubic feet per second, and will contain 
two navigation locks designed for small craft and one for larger recreational 
boats and commercial vessels. It will also include a fishway to allow shad 
and other anadrom ous fish to migrate up the river. The cost of the project is 
estimated at $55.9 million, to  which local interests will contribute $16.8 mil­
lion. The dam ’s average annual benefits, largely the prevention of flood 
damage, will run to $4,163,500. The natural valley storage project for the
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The pumping station and fishway structures of the Charles River Dam 
under construction.
Upper Charles was authorized by the W ater Resources Development Act of 
March 1974. It has been funded by Congress, hydraulic design studies have 
been completed, and real estate studies necessary for federal acquisition of 
land are under way.
Despite several decades of effort and a huge investment of money in flood 
control works, property damage and human suffering from flooding through­
out the country has steadily increased. The reason is simply that the con­
struction of homes, apartm ents, industries, and commercial facilities on the 
flood plains of rivers and coasts has outraced the building of flood control 
works. Without the works, damages would be astronomical. Nevertheless, 
they continue to grow. The losing battle cannot be turned around without the 
exercise of greater wisdom in the use of flood plains, which requires both 
adequate knowledge of flood hazards and cooperative action by governmen­
tal and private interests. Recognizing this, Congress in 1960 authorized the 
Corps of Engineers to compile and disseminate information relating to floods 
and flood damage for guidance in flood plain management. Later legislation 
and Presidential executive order broadened the responsibilities of the Corps 
in this field of activity.
Through a Flood Plain Management Services program, the Corps assists 
federal agencies in evaluating flood hazards when planning new facilities, 
disposing of properties, or issuing grants, loans, or mortgage insurance for 
non-federal construction projects. It also provides technical assistance and
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One of the six giant pumps of the Charles River Dam that together will discharge 
3,700,000 gallons per minute of flood runoff from the Charles River Basin into Boston 
Harbor against a high tide.
guidance to state and local governments and to private citizens involved in 
flood plain management planning and regulation. The FPMS specialists of 
the New England Division respond to about three hundred requests for such 
aid every year.
Upon request by local agencies with relevant jurisdiction under state law, 
the Corps carries out flood plain information studies for the guidance of 
planning groups, zoning boards, real estate developers, and anyone else to 
whom they may be of use. The study reports identify and map areas subject 
to flooding, docum ent the flood history of the region, define the scope of 
possible future floods, and offer suggestions to prevent or minimize future 
flood damage. By 1975 the New England Division had made forty-four such 
studies involving some one hundred communities, and had twelve more 
studies in progress.
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Flooding of the Black River at Ludlow, Vermont, showing the need for flood plain 
management.
The Corps’ FPMS specialists also conduct flood insurance studies in eligi­
ble communities for delineating risk zones for the determ ination of insurance 
rates under the National Flood Insurance Program. These studies are made 
pursuant to the National Flood Insurance Act of 1969 (as amended by the 
Flood Disaster Act of 1973), which authorized federal subsidization of flood 
insurance on homes and small business properties in communities that agree 
to meet certain requirem ents relating to zoning and to building in potential 
flood areas. By 1975 the New England Division had completed seventy-three 
flood insurance studies, and had three additional studies underw ay.31
DESIGNS FOR HYDROELECTRIC POWER
At the request of the Federal Power Commission to provide for possible 
future generation of hydroelectric power, several of the first flood control 
dams constructed  in New England— Knightville, B lackw ater, and Tully 
Lake—were designed so that they might later be raised and penstocks in­
stalled. But linking power generation with flood control in New England was 
a scheme nature and economic development had already largely ruled out 
long before it became the casualty of conflicting federal and state political 
interests. Army Engineers did initiate two major hydroelectric power proj­
ects in New England, but neither developed out of river basin plans for flood 
control. The first, the Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project, was conceived 
as a federal work relief measure during the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
and the second, the Upper Saint John River Hydroelectric Power Develop­
ment, grew out of continued interest in the aborted Passamaquoddy project.
Passamaquoddy and Cobscook bays, arms of the Bay of Fundy, are lo­
cated at the mouth of the St. Croix River, the boundary stream between 
Maine and New B runsw ick. The in ternational boundary  runs through 
Passamaquoddy Bay, while Cobscook Bay lies wholly within the United 
States. Nearly landlocked by headlands and islands, the bays form large 
natural and adjacent basins. The mean range of tides in the area is approxi­
mately eighteen feet, with a maximum of twenty-six feet and a minimum of 
eleven feet. About four billion tons of water flow in and out of the bays 
twice a day—a volume equal to the average flow of nearly two weeks of the 
Mississippi River below all its tributaries. The plan for harnessing this wide 
range of tides for the generation of electric power was conceived by an 
American engineer, D exter P. Cooper, while residing on Campobello Island 
in 1919. Cooper would close Passamaquoddy and Cobscook bays by a series 
of dams, equipped with regulating gates and navigation locks, to form two 
huge pools. Passamaquoddy Bay would be filled at high tide and used as a 
high-level pool, and Cobscook Bay would be emptied at low tide and main­
tained as a low-level pool. Power would be generated by drawing water 
through turbines in a powerplant located between the two pools. Compared 
to m ost river hydroelectric projects the average hydraulic head of the tidal 
project would be quite small and the energy output per turbine limited; but 
the very large quantities of w ater available for power production were per­
petual, dependable, and fully predictable, unaffected by rainfall, drought, or 
silting.1
In 1925 and 1926 Cooper formed companies in Maine and New Brunswick 
to develop his scheme. In 1929, however, Canada, fearing that closing 
Passamaquoddy Bay would injure herring fisheries, denied Cooper a de­
velopment permit. This forced a major revision of the project, confining it to 
Cobscook Bay and reducing its pow er potential. Cooper suffered another 
serious setback when private investm ent capital mostly shied away from the 
enterprise. Turning to the government for financial backing, he applied in 
1933 for a loan from the Public W orks Administration, which was denied
221
2 2 2
High and low tides at Eastport, Maine, site of the Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Proj­
ect. The Corps’ inspection boat Sea King is at the dock.
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when the Federal Power Commission determined that the project would not 
be self-liquidating. Cooper then proposed that his enterprise be taken over 
by the government as a federal work-relief project. President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, long a summer resident on Campobello Island and himself in­
trigued since 1921 with harnessing tidal power at Passam aquoddy Bay, 
favored the idea, as did the state of Maine. Secretary of the Interior Harold 
Ickes, who headed the Public W orks A dm inistration, appointed a four- 
member, wholly civilian, Passam aquoddy Bay Tidal Power Commission, 
chaired by Cooper, to consider the project further. Reporting in January 
1935, the commission recom m ended the allotment of $30 million for the con­
struction of “ Q uoddy,” as the project came to be known, under the direc­
tion of the Chief of Engineers.
Lt. Col. Philip B. Fleming, Eastport District Engineer.
Events then moved quickly. Further studies were initiated, and applica­
tion was made for funds under the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 
April 1935. On May 17 the Chief of Engineers established the Eastport Dis­
trict and three days later designated Lieutenant Colonel (then Major) Philip 
B. Fleming, formerly assigned to the Engineering Division of the Public 
Works Administration, as district engineer. On May 28 the President ap­
proved an initial allotment to Quoddy of $10 million of relief funds, which
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was later reduced to $7 million. M eantime negotiations were under way with 
Cooper to take over the assets of his companies. A preliminary agreement 
was signed on June 26 (a final agreement was reached on October 18), ac­
cording to which all rights and assets were conveyed to the United States for 
$60,000 and Cooper was appointed Advisor to the National Power Policy 
Committee to find a m arket for Quoddy power. The next day, June 27, the 
active prosecution of Quoddy began.
Fleming started the organization of the Eastport District with five military 
and ten senior civilian assistants; six months later the adm inistrative, techni­
cal, and supervisory force of the district had grown to 754 people. The de­
velopment they were to construct would be unique in the world. Although 
studies relating to tidal hydroelectric power had been made in several coun­
tries, the idea was yet to be applied. The design of Quoddy, as revised by 
Cooper and modified by the Eastport Office, was a single-pool scheme em ­
ploying Cobscook Bay as a high-level pool. The pool would be filled through 
sluice gates at high tide. When the tide ebbed and the difference in head 
between the pool and the Bay of Fundy reached five and a half feet, the 
turbines of a main power station would be started and power generated until 
with the incoming tide the difference in head again became five and a half 
feet. Since under a one-pool plan the main pow er plant would be shut down 
for about five hours twice each day, surplus peak power would be used to 
pump w ater to an elevated basin. While the main station was not operating, 
this water would be drawn through the turbines of an auxiliary plant to pro­
vide a continuous supply of energy. The m ajor structures of Quoddy were to 
include five rock-filled dams between the headlands and islands across the 
entrance to Cobscook Bay; a filling-gate structure with multiple gates; a 
two-way navigation lock; a main pow er station with ten turbines and struc­
tural p rovisions fo r the  la te r installa tion  of ten m ore tu rb ines; and a 
pumped-storage plant consisting of nine pumps, two turbines and an 8,000- 
acre storage reservoir located near Haycock H arbor, some twenty miles 
south of Eastport. The annual energy output of the developm ent would be 
262 million kilowatt-hours, a somewhat greater output than the large Moore 
Station of the New England Pow er Company on the upper Connecticut 
River. Leaving a door open to the future, the whole project was so designed 
that it could be incorporated into a larger international two-pool plan at any 
time.
The Passamaquoddy Bay Tidal Power Commission had relied on Cooper’s 
estimates to figure the cost of Quoddy at about $30 million. The Office of the 
Chief of Engineers, making its own study of C ooper’s estim ates, had raised 
the sum to over $36 million and cautioned that C ooper’s estim ates had been 
made in the absence of complete surveys and foundation explorations. The 
Eastport Office, undertaking comprehensive investigations and detailed en­
gineering studies, now found that even after modifying Cooper’s plan in sev­
eral respects to reduce costs, his estim ates had been quite inadequate, and in 
December 1935 it subm itted a new estimate of $61.5 million. Upon President 
Roosevelt’s request, the United States Reclamation Service appointed a 
Board of Review to study the findings and estim ates of the Eastport Office. 
Reporting the next April, the board increased the cost of Quoddy to $68.5 
million.
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The Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project as proposed in January 1936.
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Meantime the Eastport Office had proposed and the Chief of Engineers 
had approved, in January and February 1936, a revised plan of development. 
Topographical surveys of the Haycock Harbor site for the pumped-storage 
reservoir had indicated excessive construction costs, and investigations of 
other possible sites had produced the same findings. The revised plan there­
fore eliminated the pum ped-storage feature o f the project in favor of a 
thermal-electric auxiliary plant or interconnection with existing utilities. It 
also reduced the number of generating units in the tidal power plant to five 
while providing for the same annual energy output. The estim ated cost of the 
new plant was $37,985,250.
Many features of Quoddy were of a pioneering nature, necessitating ex­
tensive investigations to determine designs, suitable materials, and methods 
of construction. Studies were made to ascertain the proper type of concrete 
to withstand the severe climatic conditions of the area. Extensive soil tests, 
including the use of model structures, were made to determine such things as 
the settlem ent of dams built on marine clay and seepage and percolation 
through dams. Much had to be learned about the corrosive effects of salt 
w ater on various kinds of m etals, an area in which, surprisingly, few 
comprehensive investigations had been made. Experim ents were made to 
determine the effects of salt water upon metals individually, the effects of 
electrolytic action between different types of metals in close contact in sea 
water, and the resistance of metals to erosion under cavitation conditions in 
sea water. The latter studies, which were wholly novel, were conducted at
Deep water core drilling in Quoddy foundation explorations.
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the M assachusetts Institute of Technology with newly developed apparatus. 
Still other studies dealt with the chemistry of sea w ater and the likely degree 
of fouling of turbines and other structures by marine growth of the area.
Seepage studies for Quoddy using a model structure.
Hydraulic model tests to establish designs and construction methods for the 
dams, filling gates, and navigation lock were carried out under contract with 
the Alden H ydraulic Laboratory of the W orcester Polytechnic Institute. 
Comprehensive studies were made relating to generating and other electrical 
equipment. Since almost no data was available with which to predict the 
performance of the required low-head turbines under all conditions of opera­
tion, experiments were necessary to determine the proper spacing of units, 
the design of w ater passages, and the depth of excavation required for the 
power station. These investigations, conducted with models, were carried 
out under contract by four turbine manufacturers under the supervision of 
engineers from the Eastport District.
Quoddy presented a full share of administrative as well as engineering 
challenges. C o o p er’s com panies had not pu rchased  any land , and in 
acquiring sites for the project’s structures the Eastport District encountered 
unusual difficulties. Some owners dem anded exorbitant prices for their 
properties, and uncertainty over whether condemnation proceedings could 
be invoked hampered and delayed negotiations. Land titles were uncertain. 
Ownership for generations had almost without exception been transferred by 
inheritance, usually without record. It was often difficult to ascertain the real 
owners, and then to find them. The division and subdivision of property 
rights amoung heirs of owners dying intestate had become so involved that 
individual equities had become in one case as small as 1/504 of the value of
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Personnel of the Eastport District Soils Laboratory. Left to right: (top row) W. J. 
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Haines; B. F. Witham; Chief, Soils Laboratory, B. K. Hough, Jr.; D. M. Mills; 
Hydro. Eng’r G. H. Rich; E. C. Camick; B. J. Shaw; W. A. Balkam, Jr.
the property . R eliable defin itions of p roperties  in deeds were alm ost 
nonexistent. Descriptions in most cases had been copied from original grants 
based on an inaccurate survey and map made about 1794. The purchase by 
the district of 288.45 acres for $52,250.58 and the completion of surveys and 
negotiations for several thousand more acres amounted to a minor miracle.
Eastport was a small community of about 3,200 people, remotely located 
in a sparsely settled section of Maine. Dependent mostly on the packing of 
seafood, the city’s business and commerce had been declining, along with an 
ailing fishing industry, for thirty years. To cope with an influx of people that 
would nearly triple its population was beyond the city’s resources. Its fi­
nances were bankrupt, fire and police protection and municipal utilities were 
inadequate, hospital facilities and health supervision of any kind were 
nonexistent, and available housing was limited and primitive. As the first 
district employees began to arrive in July 1935, rents for rooms and houses 
in Eastport doubled and board increased nearly as much. By August shelter 
of any kind was difficult to find, and employees were compelled to take 
accommodations in distant villages, farm houses, and summer cottages, all 
generally lacking modern heating or plumbing facilities. Office accom m oda­
tions were equally limited, and at one time the district’s administrative and 
engineering personnel were scattered around the city in over twenty differ­
ent churches, halls, and warehouses.
Housing for the district’s employees was an obvious and immediate neces­
sity. Facilities for the engineering, adm inistrative, and supervisory personnel 
were grouped in “ Quoddy Village,” built from scratch on Moose Island 
about two and a half miles north of Eastport. Construction of the village, 
however, did not start until late August because of difficulties in securing 
land and failure to receive satisfactory bids on much of the work. Contrac-
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Two of the more than twenty halls, churches, and warehouses that housed the 
Eastport District’s first offices.
tors were apprehensive about the use of relief labor, the inadequacy of rail 
and highway transportation, and prevalent rumors that the project might be 
abandoned at any time. Hopes for completing construction before winter set 
in were further frustrated by difficulties in procuring m aterials and labor, 
adverse weather, and problems attending a new and largely untrained or­
ganization. By late Decem ber a few families could move into the village, and 
by mid-April 1936 it was completed. Single-family houses, duplex houses, 
four-family apartm ents, two large apartm ent buildings, and a dormitory pro­
vided 450 housing units. The village also included an adm inistration building, 
a laboratory, various utility buildings, and a thirty-bed hospital. Later an 
exhibition hall containing a working model of the project and other displays 
was added. About one-third of the construction was accomplished by con­
tract and two-thirds by hired labor and government plant.
To lodge hundreds of workers coming from all parts of the state of Maine, 
two camps, located near the principal construction and warehousing sites, 
were completed by hired labor by mid-November 1935. Consisting of twelve 
bunkhouses and three mess halls of standard CCC type, recreation halls, and 
other facilities, the camps accommodated at peak quartering a total of 1350 
men. O ther necessary  early construction  included m aintenance shops, 
warehouses, railroad yards and wharves, roads and walks, and sewer, elec­
tric, and water systems. W ater was obtained from the local servicing corpo­
ration, whose equipment was so antiquated that the district had to repair, 
improve, and maintain portions of the utility. Since the local electric com ­
pany could furnish only a limited supply of additional power, an auxiliary 
generating unit was installed in Quoddy Village and more were planned for 
other locations.
The work-relief nature of Quoddy created problem s. The district was
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Administration Building of the Eastport District in Quoddy Village.
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Working model of the Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project in the exhibition hall of 
Quoddy Village.
required to recruit all personnel through the newly organized National 
R eem ploym ent Serv ice , which was at first unprepared  to  handle the 
district’s demands for labor effectively. M oreover, NRS referrals had to be 
m ade from  re lie f  ro lls  p re p a re d  by the  F ed e ra l E m erg en cy  R elief 
Administration for the state of Maine, and the rolls were often faulty. They 
failed to include many people in the vicinity of Eastport who urgently needed 
work while including numerous others who had apparent means of support. 
This created considerable local resentm ent, which was unfairly directed 
against the Eastport District. Many workers referred under skilled categories 
proved not to have the necessary qualifications. Since W orks Progress 
Administration regulations required that at least 90 percent of all employees 
be p rocu red  from  re lie f  ro lls , ex em p tio n s had to  be o b ta in ed  from  
Washington to hire skilled non-relief personnel such as carpenters and diesel 
shovel operato rs. W hen com m on laborers w ere required  beginning in 
September 1935, less than 30 percent of the number requisitioned reported 
for work. Not enough relief workers resided in northeastern Maine, and 
many workers elsewhere in the state were unwilling to leave their families for 
the security wages prescribed by WPA regulations. Therefore during the period 
of urgent housing construction in the fall of 1935, approximately 45 percent of 
the district’s field employees were from non-relief sources. The extensive red 
tape involved in obtaining exemptions from WPA rules caused considerable 
loss of time and efficiency.
By late October workers were arriving at Quoddy at the rate of over one 
hundred a day. M ost were destitute of funds, some were without adequate 
outer clothing, some even without shoes. Many were too aged or otherwise 
physically unable to work. To cope with the situation the district established 
a Welfare Departm ent of five people. Through Herculean efforts the depart­
ment provided the needy with shelter, food, clothing, and medical treatm ent.
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It arranged with state and other welfare agencies for the return to their 
homes of people unable to work. It also provided non-sectarian religious 
services, attended to the distribution of mail, collected reading material, and 
organized recreational and athletic activities.
The district also had to establish its own Medical Departm ent. N ot only 
were local doctors too few and a hospital nonexistent, but relief labor on 
unfamiliar construction work spelled accidents, and there was not a surgeon 
in the area. Unable to attract established doctors from their practices, or 
secure physicians from the Army Medical Corps or the Civil Service, the 
district assembled a team of highly com petent though relatively inexperi­
enced young men through recommendations from leading surgeons of prom ­
inent Boston and New York hospitals. First aid stations were established, a 
house in Eastport was converted into an infirmary, and, finally, on May 1, 
1936, the Quoddy H ospital, a m odern, com plete, and com pact unit of 
thirty-bed capacity, was opened.
The distance to Eastport and the volunteer nature of the c ity ’s Fire De­
partment ruled out reliance upon it by the district, which consequently or­
ganized its own seven-man departm ent, complete with combination pumper 
engine and company of volunteer assistants. N or could E astport’s two-man 
Police Department be expected to maintain order. The huge influx of people 
inevitably brought in some undesirables. Petty thievery became extensive, 
and disorders common. Gangs of smugglers, accustom ed to operating on this 
stretch  of the in ternational border, also concen tra ted  at Q uoddy, and 
watchmen were intimidated and even shot at. The district therefore assem ­
bled a police force of nineteen trained men who did watchman duty, arrested 
thieves and bootleggers, maintained order in the labor camps, and controlled 
the traffic that sometimes choked the area. The Police Departm ent also had 
to handle an estimated 180,000 visitors to Quoddy during the summer of 
1936, an inpouring that culminated with thousands of people congesting 
Quoddy Village on the occasion of President Roosevelt’s visit to the project 
late in July.
Quoddy boasted  all the o ther institutions and a ttribu tes of a typical 
American small town. It had its own news journal, The Quoddy Courier, its 
Boy Scout and Girl Scout troops, its gun club, its Quoddy Engineer ball 
team, Quoddy Village Garden Club, and Quoddy Junior Theater Guild. Its 
citizens met, fell in love, and married. They organized soft ball team s, 
danced on week-end evenings, and w ent on fishing trips, outings, and 
scavenger hunts. They produced plays and minstrel show s.2 Quoddyites 
lived in their brand-new town just as they always had lived elsewhere.
Despite the huge investm ent of effort by the Corps of Engineers in 
Quoddy, the future of the project was uncertain from the beginning. Because 
of unsettled questions of cost and design, and the failure of the state of 
Maine to enact legislation providing for the leasing and operation of the de­
velopment, work on Quoddy was limited for several months by directive of 
the Chief of Engineers to tem porary housing and to studies and design. Em ­
ployment on the project peaked at the end of Novem ber 1935, when the 
district was racing to construct housing before winter. Over 5,400 people 
were employed, about four-fifths working directly for the district and the 
remainder for contractors. On December 18 the Chief of Engineers, acting at
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President Roosevelt inspects the working model of the Passamaquoddy Tidal Power 
Project upon his visit to the project in July 1936. Capt. Donald J. Leehey, Adminis­
trative Officer of the Eastport District, demonstrates with a pointer while District 
Engineer Lt. Col. Philip Fleming, on Roosevelt’s left, looks on.
the request of the administration, directed that a force of about 4,000 should 
be continuously employed on the project if possible. Minor perm anent fea­
tures of the developm ent were to be undertaken with hired labor as units of 
the housing project were completed, thus holding a labor pool available for 
contractors pending the letting of contracts for major features of the work. 
With the approval of the revised and less costly plan for Quoddy in February 
1936, active construction was begun on the three smaller dam s of the project 
with hired labor, and preparations were made to call for contractors’ bids on 
other structures of the development.
Before any contracts were made, Quoddy was suspended by Congress. 
When the annual War Departm ent Appropriation Bill came before Congress 
in March 1936, it included a recom m endation from the Bureau of the Budget 
for $9 million for Quoddy and $20 million more for four other work-relief 
projects currently underw ay, including the construction of a ship canal 
across Florida. But the House of Representatives, stating that the projects 
had never been approved by Congress, refused to make the appropriations.
The possibility of continuing Quoddy with relief funds was also blocked by 
Congress. The Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of June 1936 gave the 
President discretion within certain limits, as had the relief act of the year
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before, to allocate funds for work-relief projects. But funds for Quoddy and 
the Florida canal, both of which had come under severe political attack, 
were deftly debarred. No project could be undertaken or prosecuted under 
the appropriation, the act stipulated, “ unless and until an am ount sufficient 
for its completion has been allocated and irrevocably set aside for its com ­
pletion,” and both projects were too large for this requirem ent to be met. 
When the bill was before the Senate, Democratic majority leader Joseph 
Robinson of Arkansas had offered an am endment authorizing the President 
to appoint independent boards of engineers to study all questions relating to 
the controversial projects. If the reports were favorable, the President could 
allot $9 million to carry on Quoddy and $15 million to continue work on the 
Florida canal. The Senate rejected the amendment as it applied to Quoddy, 
while approving it in relation to the Florida canal. Ultimately, the canal pro­
vision was also stricken from the bill.3
Republicans had discovered in Quoddy a vulnerable point of attack on the 
adm inistration’s public works program, and Democrats were conceding that 
it had become a political liability. Since few people had any notion of how 
power could be generated by tides, the whole concept was easy to ridicule, 
and the escalating cost of Quoddy fitted nicely into the image of a pipedream 
of irresponsible advocates. Charges of boon-doggling became common, and 
stories spread of how the Army Engineers had bought a $17,000 yacht and 
built expensive houses. In some quarters Quoddy was condemned as an ex­
periment in socialism. More justifiable complaints were that it would be 
cheaper to build a steam generating plant, that Quoddy power would cost 
more than steam-generated power, that there was no present or prospective 
m arket for Quoddy power, and that hydroelectric power, when needed, 
could be more cheaply produced on M aine’s undeveloped rivers. Republican 
Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, Quoddy’s foremost critic in the 
upper house, used these arguments with telling effect.
Quoddy might still have survived had the adm inistration chosen to support 
it. Both Roosevelt and Public Works Adm inistrator Ickes had been quick to 
display their interest in the project in 1934, when it was expected to have 
beneficial results in Maine in the Septem ber elections. A year and a half 
later, however, when it appeared that the project would cost about $65 mil­
lion rather than $35 million, and Quoddy had become a prime target of op­
position criticism, Roosevelt’s interest began to cool. Both he and Ickes 
were inclined to blame the Army Engineers for accepting D exter Cooper’s 
figures on cost without checking them until after the government was com­
mitted and work actually started. It was not in fact the Engineers who had 
hastily committed the government, nor had they accepted C ooper’s figures. 
Yet Ickes, after appointing Cooper to head the Passamaquoddy Bay Tidal 
Power Commission, the civilian panel which had  relied on C ooper’s figures, 
criticized the Engineers for “ accepting a prom oter’s estim ate of co sts .”
By M arch 1936 Roosevelt was expressing a wish to get out of the project 
as quickly and as gracefully as possible, but apparently was not wholly de­
cided. He brought up the question of the com parative costs of producing 
power with Chief of Engineers Major General Edward M. M arkham. When 
M arkham  said tha t Quoddy pow er would be m ore costly  than  steam ­
generated pow er unless the whole original project was developed, which
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would require an international agreem ent with Canada, the President began 
figuring. He suggested that if a generous amount of work-relief money was 
applied to the project, the cost on the basis of non-relief money would be 
lower than for current produced by steam. This, of course, was no new idea. 
That Quoddy could be economically justified only if developed as a relief 
project had been evident from the beginning. Yet Ickes, never enthusiastic 
about the project or about Army Engineers, now advised that the country 
“ would consider the total cost, regardless of how it was divided or what it 
was called, a n d . . .  the best possible position to take was that the project 
would not be justified unless it went forward as a whole in cooperation with 
Canada.” Roosevelt agreed. Although a few months later, upon his visit to 
Quoddy in July, the President revived the project as a possibility, an act 
Ickes thought “ very unwise indeed,” nothing came of this momentarily re­
newed interest.4
On July 6, 1936 the order was issued to demobilize Quoddy. In addition to 
the temporary housing, the three smaller dams of the project were by this 
time essentially completed, nine permanent residences for the operating per­
sonnel of the project had been built, the site of the navigation lock had been
First and last train-loads of fill in the construction of Pleasant Point Dam. The dam 
was built from and encased a railway trestle of the Maine Central Railroad line to 
Eastport.
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cleared, and excavation for the filling gates and minor work in connection 
with the pow er house had been started. Thereafter construction was limited 
to the fulfillment of minor contractual obligations until all active operations 
ceased on August 16. On that date Lieutenant Colonel Fleming was trans­
ferred to duty with the Resettlem ent Administration in W ashington and Cap­
tain Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr., was appointed Acting District Engineer. All 
facilities at Quoddy were turned over to the National Youth Administration, 
and plant, stock, and per annum employees were transferred to other gov­
ernmental activities. On October 31 the Eastport District was discontinued 
and operations relating to the final demobilization of the project were placed 
under the direction of the Boston District. About $5.9 million had been ex­
pended on the project.
Quoddy, however, continued to have its advocates. And, ironically, it was 
Senator Vandenberg who introduced a resolution in February 1939 request­
ing the Federal Power Commission to review its reports on Quoddy and 
bring them up to date. In April 1941 the commission filed an adverse report 
on the economic feasibility of an all-American proiect. Yet it predicted that 
as fuel prices increased and markets for pow er expanded in the Northeast, 
the power potentially available in Passam aquoddy tides would one day be 
developed. “ The event seems certain ,” it com m ented, “ the only uncertainty 
is in point of tim e.”
There the m atter rested until 1947, when Maine was struck by disastrous 
forest fires and drought. Its rivers ran low and power was in such short 
supply that naval vessels had to be sent to pump pow er from their plants into 
the Maine towns. The state’s congressional delegation, led by Senator Mar­
garet Chase Smith, now opened a campaign for the revival of Quoddy on an 
international basis. Consequently in N ovem ber 1948 the governments of the 
United States and Canada requested the International Joint Commission, a 
body established in 1909 for the regulation of boundary waters, to  determine 
the practicability and cost of a complete survey for an international de­
velopment. The Corps of Engineers, which carried out the investigation, re­
ported in M arch 1950 that the project was physically feasible and the survey 
would cost $3.9 million. Two years later the Engineers scaled down their 
estim ate to $3 million. During the summer of 1951 the New England Division 
and the United S tates Geological Survey had tested  at E astport depth- 
finding sonic equipment recently developed by the Magnolia Oil Corporation 
of Dallas, Texas. By comparing sonic data with boring data obtained by the 
Eastport District in 1935-36, they had established the reliability of the new 
fathometer, called a Sonoprobe, for determining the depth of overburden, or 
sediment layers, above bedrock. The new equipm ent would cut sharply the 
cost of bottom and foundation explorations.5
In January 1951 and again in January 1953, the Maine congressional dele­
gation introduced joint resolutions in the House and Senate for authorization 
of the survey. In 1955 these efforts were given a boost by the report of the 
New England-New York Interagency Committee. The report included all 
information on the Passam aquoddy Bay region available at the time and rec­
ommended that the survey be undertaken. Canada, at first skeptical of the 
project, later agreed to bear ten percent of the cost of a survey. In January 
1956 Congress authorized the study, and in August the United States and
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Canada requested the International Joint Commission to make the necessary 
arrangements.
To supervise the study the com m ission established the International 
Passamaquoddy Engineering Board, composed of two representatives each 
from the United States and Canada. The American section of the board was 
headed by recently retired Chief of Engineers Lieutenant General Samuel D. 
Stuigis, Jr., who had seen service at Quoddy twenty years before. The New 
England Division carried out the engineering phases of the investigation; the 
Federal Power Commission and the New Brunswick Electric Power Com­
m ission co n d u c te d  p o w e r-m ark e t su rv e y s; and  an  In te rn a tio n a l 
Passamaquoddy Fisheries Board studied the effects the project might have 
upon the fisheries of the area.
To supplement the mass of information collected by the Eastport Office in 
1935-36, New England Division engineers established a field office and a 
soils laboratory at Eastport to gather and analyze new data obtained by aer­
ial topographical surveys, tidal observations, hydrographic surveys, and 
subsurface explorations. The most difficult and most costly phase of the field 
investigations was core drilling to determine the location and design of dams 
and regulation gates. The drilling, carried out in waters up to 300 feet deep 
swept by reversing tidal currents reaching velocities of 10 feet per second, 
was done under contract by a Texas firm using special oil-drilling equipment 
brought from the Gulf of Mexico. The test borings of overburden and bed­
rock were carefully selected so they could be supplemented with less expen­
sively obtained sonic data.
Some sixty different engineering arrangements of dams and turbines were 
considered. The annual energy output of each was determ ined by an elec­
tronic com puter, and the arrangement with the best relationship of installed 
capacity and energy output to construction cost was selected for design. 
Under this layout, Passamaquoddy Bay would form the high pool of the 
project and Cobscook Bay the low pool. The bays would be closed by nearly 
seven miles of rock-filled dam s, and between the pools, at the same place on 
Moose Island selected for the earlier Quoddy project, would be an outdoor 
type powerhouse with thirty large-diameter turbines. There would be 90 
vertical-lift filling and 60 emptying gates, each thirty feet square, and four 
navigation locks, two for fishing vessels and two for larger ships. On the
Artist’s rendering of the outdoor type powerhouse proposed in 1959 by the Interna­
tional Passamaquoddy Engineering Board.
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recommendation of the International Passam aquoddy Fisheries Board, the 
project would also include fishways into the bays and the relocation, if 
necessary, of two lobster pounds in the upper pool.
The average annual energy generation of the tidal power plant would be 
1,843 million kilowatt-hours, seven times the planned output of the earlier 
Quoddy project. Unlike the earlier one-pool scheme, the two-pool project 
would generate power continuously, but because of a constantly changing 
available head, production would still be uneven. Although the installed 
capacity of the project would be 300,000 kilowatts, power output, varying 
with the ebb and flood of tides and with differences from spring to neap 
tides, would range from a dependable capacity of 95,000 kilowatts to a 
maximum of 345,000 kilowatts.
This variable output, together with the fifty-minute difference between 
lunar and solar days, meant that energy supplied could be out of step with 
the normal pattern of power demands. Peak demand for power might at 
times coincide with mimimum output. Therefore to supplement the varying 
output of the tidal power project, the Engineering Board considered several 
different types of auxiliary power sources, including river hydroelectric, 
pumped-storage, and steam-electric plants, to determ ine the type best suited 
for making the combined power output of the tidal project and its auxiliary 
match the characteristic load pattern. The auxiliary selected was a hydro­
electric plant at Rankin Rapids on the upper Saint John River in Maine, 
about three and a half miles upstream  from the town of St. Francis and 175 
air miles from Quoddy.
Power development at the Rankin Rapids site had already been suggested 
by other agencies. Studies of its power potential had recently been made by 
the International Saint John River Engineering Board and by the New 
England-New York Interagency Committee. The Rankin Rapids auxiliary 
project, whose em bankm ent would be 7,400 feet long and 333 feet high, 
would impound 8.23 million acre-feet of water, of which 2.8 million acre-feet 
would be usuable storage. A powerhouse of eight units would have a de­
pendable capacity of 460,000 kilowatts and would generate 1,220 million 
kilowatt-hours annually. The tidal project and the Rankin Rapids auxiliary 
together would have a dependable capacity of 555,000 kilowatts and would 
generate 3,063 million kilowatt-hours annually.
The estim ated cost of the tidal project was $484 million, and with the Ran­
kin Rapids auxiliary, $630 million. Power market studies showed that the 
output of the project could be readily absorbed by the growing utility mar­
kets of Maine and New Brunswick. Because of differences in interests rates 
and in values of alternative pow er prevailing in the U nited S tates and 
Canada, it was necessary to compute separate benefit-cost ratios for the two 
areas. The International Passamaquoddy Engineering Board concluded that, 
assuming an equal division of power and first costs between the United 
States and Canada, the project was not economically justifiable for Canada. 
If built entirely by the United States, however, Quoddy and its Rankin 
Rapids auxiliary was economically feasible.
The International Joint Commission, reviewing the conclusions of the En­
gineering Board presented in October 1959, agreed with the engineering find­
ings of the report, but not with its economic analysis. The tidal project,
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when considered alone, was clearly not economically justifiable. The Rankin 
Rapids project, on the other hand, was economically feasible. The board, 
adding the costs and benefits of the two projects together, had determined a 
favorable benefit-cost ratio for the combined project. In the opinion of the 
commission, a benefit-cost ratio determined on this basis was not a valid 
representation of the economic worth of the tidal project—the favorable 
ratio for the joint project could not be construed as indicating economic 
feasibility for the tidal power project.
Concluding that the tidal power project was not economically feasible 
under present conditions, the commission recommended that its develop­
ment be viewed as a long-range possibility having better prospects of realiza­
tion when other less costly energy resources available in the area were 
exhausted. It noted that the economic feasibility of the project might be af­
fected by future changes in the costs and benefits considered in the evalua­
tion of the project. It also observed that the two governments might wish to 
consider crediting the tidal project with certain public benefits that were not 
included in the economic feasibility determ inations presented in the report.
The International Joint Commission issued its report in April 1961. The 
following month President John F. Kennedy requested the Departm ent of 
the Interior to review the report with a view to changes in fuel, engineering, 
and financial costs that might make the project economically feasible. In July 
1963 S ec re ta ry  of the  In te r io r  S tew art L . U dall rep o rted  th a t, w ith 
modifications that would present no major problems, the development of 
Passamaquoddy and the upper Saint John River was both desirable and eco­
nomically justified. He recommended authorization for their development by 
the Corps of Engineers and the marketing of the power by the Departm ent of 
the Interior. The President thereupon directed the Departm ents of the Inte­
rior and Army to proceed with additional studies. At the suggestion of the 
Chief of Engineers, an Arm y-Interior Advisory Board was created to assist 
the field agencies making the studies. Originally consisting of members from 
the Corps of Engineers and the Departm ent of the Interior, the board was 
later expanded to include representatives of other governmental agencies.6
Studies relating to the economic aspects of the project were the responsi­
bility of the Departm ent of the Interior, those dealing with its physical com­
ponents the concern of the Corps of Engineers. The requisite field work, 
detailed engineering studies, and cost estimates of the structures were per­
formed by the New England Division. The findings of these more detailed 
economic and engineering studies were submitted to the Secretary of the 
Interior in August 1964.
Quoddy emerged from the 1961-64 studies with a new purpose. Under 
previous concepts Quoddy was to produce continuous base load power for a 
local area. Now it was to be operated to supply a substantial proportion of 
the peaking pow er requirem ents of an extensive marketing area embracing 
all New England and New Brunswick. The two pools of the project would be 
regulated to provide the maximum amount of head on the powerplant tur­
bines at the start of each peaking period of two hours duration. During the 
preceding high and low tides the high pool would be filled and the low pool 
emptied to the greatest extents possible, and these pool elevations would be 
maintained until the start of the peaking period. By using reversible pump-
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turbines the generating units of the powerplant could pump water from the 
low pool to the high pool during periods of neap tides, thereby increasing the 
available head beyond what nature at these times provided. Thus the power- 
plant could be operated at full installed capacity during all peaking periods. 
Following the peaking period, off-peak energy could be produced until it was 
time for the pools to be filled and emptied in preparation for the next peaking 
period.
The layout and design of Quoddy were to be the same as proposed in the 
previous plan with the exception of the powerplant. Instead of a 300,000- 
kilowatt plant equipped with thirty conventional vertical shaft turbines, the 
station would contain fifty inclined axis turbines with an installed capacity of 
500,000 kilowatts. Additionally, layouts were completed for the construction 
o f a second 500,000-kilow att plant when w arran ted  by growing pow er 
demands.
On the upper Saint John River the power developm ent was relocated. Al­
though the Rankin Rapids site was the best in the region from the standpoint 
o f power production, a development there would flood a series of rapids in 
the lower reaches of the Allagash River, esteem ed by environmentalists and 
sportsm en for its wild river characteristics, trout fishing, and white water 
canoeing. Therefore a damsite was selected at Dickey, ju st above the con­
fluence of the Allagash with the Saint John. The main dam across the river, 
9,200 feet long and 340 feet high, and perim eter dikes at five scattered loca­
tions would be of the earthfill type. They would impound 8.08 million acre- 
feet of water, of which 2.9 million acre-feet would be actively utilized for 
pow er purposes. The powerplant, with eight turbines operating under an av­
erage head of 293 feet, would have an installed capacity of 760,000 kilowatts 
and would generate 750 million kilowatt-hours of energy annually.
W ater releases from the Dickey Dam would be irregular. Therefore a re­
regulating reservoir would be located about eleven miles downstream  at Lin­
coln School. The earthfill dam here, having a crest length of 1,290 feet and a 
maximum height of 87 feet, would impound the Dickey discharges and regu­
late them for more effective use by existing and proposed hydroelectric 
plants dow nstream  in New Brunswick. Im pounding 52,500 acre-feet of 
water, of which 16,000 acre-feet would be active storage, the dam would also 
include a two-turbine, 34,000-kilowatt powerplant capable of generating 260 
million kilowatt-hours of energy each year.
Both powerplants on the Saint John would be operated primarily to gener­
ate peaking pow er in conjunction with the plant at Passam aquoddy, but sub­
stantial quantities of load factor pow er could also be produced.
The total cost of the Passam aquoddy-Upper Saint John pow er develop­
ment was estim ated at $845.1 million, which included $541.9 million for 
Passam aquoddy, $218.7 million for Dickey-Lincoln School, and $84.5 million 
for a transmission system interconnecting the powerplants and linking them 
w ith load ce n te rs  in M aine and in the v ic in ity  o f B oston . B oth the 
Passamaquoddy and the Saint John projects were determined to be eco­
nomically feasible independently of each other, although Passamaquoddy 
was only marginally so. While the development would provide significant 
additional benefits in the form of recreational opportunities, area redevelop­
ment in economically distressed counties, and flood control, its predominant
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benefit would be the generation of approximately 3 billion kilowatt-hours of 
electrical energy annually in a region where power rates were 28 percent 
above the national average.
Secretary Udall transm itted the report of the study to President Lyndon 
B. Johnson in July 1965. But by then fast-changing circum stances had al-
T ID A L  POWER PRO JECT PLAN 6 / 1 5 / 7 6
Plan of the International Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project resulting 
from new studies authorized in March 1975. Except for the installation 
of 40 rather than 50 power units in each powerhouse, which will provide 
the same energy output, the plan is the same as that proposed in 1964.
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tered the economics of power production. The pow er benefits analyzed in 
the report were derived from pow er value estim ates furnished by the Federal 
Power Commission in Decem ber 1963 and from the interest rate in use at 
that time for federal water resource projects. The pow er value estimates 
were based on the generating costs of the steam-electric plants in use in 
Maine and in the vicinity of Boston. But meantime the utility companies had 
developed  larger-capac ity  p lan ts , w hich w ere being installed  or w ere 
scheduled for installation, that would reduce pow er values. And a week be­
fore Udall made his report, the interest rate prescribed for federal water 
resource pro jects was raised. The result was tha t while the com bined 
Passamaquoddy-Dickey-Lincoln School developm ent still had a favorable 
benefit-cost ratio, Passam aquoddy by itself again was not economically 
justified.
The Dickey-Lincoln School project, however, could still produce low-cost 
load factor power for Maine and low-cost peaking power for the remainder 
of New England, which Udall thought should tend to reduce rates in the 
area. He therefore recommended the immediate authorization and construc­
tion of these works on the Saint John and a transm ission system  to serve 
them. He also recommended continued study on the Passamaquoddy project.
Three days after receiving Udall’s report, President Johnson approved the 
Dickey-Lincoln School project. In O ctober 1965 Congress voted authoriza­
tion. After thirty years punctuated by studies, delays, and modified recom ­
m endations, Army Engineers were again directed to construct a federal 
pow er project in New England. With funds appropriated for preconstruction 
planning, the New England Division began advanced engineering and design 
work, including photogram m etric mapping of the project areas, subsurface 
explorations, topographic surveys, real estate planning, and preliminary de­
sign activity. In the course of this planning minor alterations were made on 
the dimensions of the dams and reservoirs, and the installed capacity of the 
Lincoln School powerplant, still to be equipped with two generating units, 
was increased from 34,000 to 70,000 kilowatts. By N ovem ber 1967 pre­
construction planning was about 50 percent completed. Then it came to a 
halt.7
Private power compahies were opposing the project, and were disputing 
government claims about its power benefits and costs. The House Commit­
tee on Public Works, hoping to unravel the snarl with which it was faced, 
conducted its own staff investigation of the project. In the course of this 
study, investigators visited the Dickey site, consulted the files of the New 
England Division, and conferred with New England power companies. Con­
vinced that the project was economically feasible and would provide effi­
cient hydroelectric pow er at reasonable rates, the committee supported a 
budget request for $1,676,000 for FY 1968 to continue preconstruction plan­
ning. The full House, however, deleted the item from the committee report. 
Since the Senate approved the budget request, the conference committee 
split the difference and proposed $875,000. But not inclined to appropriate 
anything for the project, the House sliced the sum from the conference re­
port.8 For the next six years the Senate included funds for the Dickey- 
Lincoln School project in appropriation bills, even though for the last three
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Artist’s rendering of interim general plan of the Dickey dam and reservoir.
years no budget requests were made for them. Each time, however, the 
House blocked the appropriation.
But the future is perhaps with Dickey-Lincoln School, and perhaps even 
with Quoddy. The Arab oil embargo in 1973 and doubling costs of fuel and 
electric pow er heightened public awareness of the necessity for exploring 
and utilizing alternatives to fossil fuels for energy. When public works ap­
propriations were voted for FY 1975, though no budget request for Dickey- 
Lincoln School was made, Congress voted $800,000 to resume preconstruc­
tion planning. Attention was inevitably directed also to the wasted energy in 
the unharnessed tides at Quoddy. And on M arch 21, 1975 the Senate Com­
mittee on Public W orks requested the Board of Engineers for Rivers and 
Harbors to review the report submitted to President Johnson in July 1965, 
and other pertinent reports, with a view to determining the current feasibility 
of the Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project in the interests of providing tidal 
power, recreation, economic developm ent, and related land and water re­
source projects.9
The New England D ivision thus tu rned  its a tten tio n  once again to  
Passamaquoddy and the upper Saint John River.
NEW CHALLENGES AND TASKS
Roads and canals, navigable rivers and safe harbors—the vital transporta­
tion needs of an economically bustling new nation—these were in the eye of 
Congress in 1824 when it first entrusted the Corps of Engineers with a civil 
mission. And for more than a decade Army Engineers assigned to New Eng­
land were as occupied with planning canals and laying out railroads as with 
developing harbors and deepening rivers. Canal and railroad construction in 
the United States, however, was soon left wholly to private enterprise, and 
public demands on the technical expertise of the Corps focused largely on 
the improvement of navigable waterways. For over half a century this con­
stituted the main function of the engineer districts and then divisions created 
after the Civil W ar to carry out unprecedented am ounts of work legislated in 
Washington. With aid to commerce the end in view, the civil mission of the 
Corps thus came to be oriented to the water resources of the nation.
Narrowly defined by the aspirations of the nineteenth century, the dimen­
sions of the Corps’ mission were to expand trem endously in the twentieth. 
Pressures of urban growth, economic developm ent, technological change, 
and rising standards of living upon w ater resources gave rise to new public 
concerns about water management and in turn to new tasks for the Corps of 
Engineers. In New England the “ 308” surveys starting in the late 1920s, 
flood control work beginning in the 1930s, and the Passamaquoddy Tidal 
Power Project of the latter decade launched the region’s engineer districts 
into new areas of study and construction.
The 1930s also saw the beginnings of a system atic approach toward the 
control of beach and shore erosion along the nation’s coasts. Federal interest 
in shore erosion had formerly been limited to improvements for navigation 
and for protection of federal property. In 1930, however, Congress estab­
lished under the Chief of Engineers a Beach Erosion Board (replaced in 1963 
by a Coastal Engineering Research Center), staffed by officers of the Corps 
and engineers from state agencies, whose function was to make studies of 
beach erosion in cooperation with state authorities. In 1936 Congress defined 
more precisely the functions of the board and, more importantly in term s of 
federal objectives, declared it to be the policy of the United States to assist 
state and local agencies in the im provem ent and protection of beaches, 
where federal interests were involved, not only to prevent damage to prop­
erty but to prom ote and encourage “ the healthful recreation of the people.” 1 
Recreation for the first time became a stated purpose of federal w ater re­
sources projects.
For a decade federal assistance was limited to conducting studies and pro­
viding technical advice. In 1946 federal contributions to construction costs of 
projects protecting publicly owned shores were authorized; and in 1950 the 
first shore protection projects in New England were initiated. Since then the 
New England Division has participated in the restoration and protection of 
over thirty beaches and shores. In consultation with state or local sponsoring 
agencies, the division determines w hether federal investments are justified
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and develops plans and specifications for projects. The federal financial con­
tribution to projects usually may not exceed 50 percent of costs, though in 
certain publicly owned park and conservation areas it may be up to 70 p er­
cent. In most cases the states have supervised the work on projects, but in 
recent years the division itself has awarded the contracts. M easures taken 
have included the replenishm ent of beaches and sand dunes, the construc­
tion of groins extending into the water to intercept sand movements along 
the shore and widen beaches, and, where necessary, the building of sea­
walls, sand fences, and je ttie s .2
J
(
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Wallis Sands State Beach, Rye, New Hampshire. This project, authorized in 1962 
and completed the next year, included widening about 800 feet o f the beach to a 
general width of 150 feet by direct placement of sandfill, and constructing an im­
permeable groin at the southern limit of the sandfill. The public facilities were con­
structed by the state.
Most shore protection projects planned by the New England Division have 
been on publicly owned beaches, but under present law federal aid may also 
be extended to privately owned shores if they are open to public use or 
essential to the protection of nearby public property. A project within this 
criteria was the restoration in 1971-72 of a large portion of the popular and 
historic Cliff Walk that skirts the ocean bluffs in front of some of the coun­
try ’s most palatial turn-of-the-century sum m er homes at N ewport, Rhode 
Island. The walk, which was partially destroyed by the 1938 hurricane and 
further damaged by later storms, traverses privately owned land but is open 
to the public. Restoration of the famous Newport feature included placing 
riprap, backfill, and stone slope revetm ent where necessary to protect the 
shore, repair of seawalls, and grading and surfacing the walk. Spectators 
came in such num bers to sidewalk superintend the project that the division 
engineer arranged for the construction of an observation platform for their 
convenience and safety. The Cliff Walk Shore Restoration was selected in
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Aerial view of the Cliff Walk Shore Restoration, Newport, Rhode Island.
New England Division Engineer Colonel John H. Mason displays the Chief of 
Engineers' Award of Merit for Landscape Architectural Design, presented to the 
division for the Cliff Walk Shore Restoration. John Wm. Leslie, Chief, Engineering 
Division, holds an aerial photograph of the project while George Sarandis, Project 
Engineer, looks on.
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1973 for the Chief of Engineers’ Award of Merit for Landscape Architectural 
Design.3
The promotion of outdoor recreation, declared by Congress in 1936 an 
essential purpose of shore protection work, became in subsequent years an 
increasingly important function of other Corps projects as well. Many of 
New England’s small harbors were improved wholly or in part in the inter­
ests of recreational boating, and at flood control reservoirs opportunities 
were sometimes provided for picnicking, boating, and other activities. But it 
was in the 1960s that the recreational aspects of the Corps’ civil mission 
came into their own. Recreational demands on w ater resources virtually 
skyrocketed, and Congress m andated that w henever possible provision 
should be made for recreational opportunities at federal projects. Under this 
authorization the New England Division intensified its efforts and expanded 
the construction and management of recreational facilities at flood control 
reservoirs and the Cape Cod Canal into m ajor programs. Public enjoyment 
of reservoir areas is furthered too by ways that are small in themselves but 
indicative of the increasing emphasis placed on the recreational features of 
Corps projects. At Ball Mountain Lake in Vermont and at Knightville Dam 
in M assachusetts, for example, w ater releases are regularly made for white 
w ater canoe and kayak  races tha t draw  hundreds o f co n testan ts  and 
thousands of spectators. At W est Thompson Lake in Connecticut the con­
servation pool is raised every year after Labor Day weekend to provide 
satisfactory w ater levels for annual three-day retriever trials held by the 
Shoreline Retriever Club of C onnecticut.4
Recreation is the most prom inent ancillary purpose of Corps projects in 
New England. But the Corps may also incorporate o ther purposes beneficial 
to the public into projects designed primarily for navigation improvement, 
flood control, or o ther conventional objectives. Several New England flood 
control reservoirs were authorized as multiple-purpose projects so as to pro­
vide municipal or industrial w ater supply and to augment low river flows to 
improve downstream  fisheries; and at all projects the conservation of fish 
and wildlife resources in cooperation with o ther agencies has become a 
routine part of Corps planning, construction, and management.
The evolution of multiple-purpose projects has been accompanied by the 
even more far-reaching developm ent of com prehensive, long-range planning 
for water use and water control. The “ 308” surveys, the pioneer efforts in 
this direction, were valuable compendiums of information on major river 
basins. But their scope was limited, and in time they became outdated. Far 
more exhaustive was a com prehensive survey of the New England-New 
York region authorized by the Flood Control Act of 1950. Broadened by 
executive order from a Corps survey into a cooperative undertaking, the 
study was directed by a New England-New York Interagency Committee, 
chaired by the Corps of Engineers, which represented seven federal agencies 
and agencies of the seven states involved. Completed in 1957, after four 
years of research and field investigation by a team  of about one thousand 
engineers and o ther professionals, the study inventoried the w ater and 
related land resources of twenty-eight river basins and drainage areas and 
formulated general plans for their use and conservation. The study report, 
filling fo rty -s ix  vo lum es, w ent b eyond  the co n v en tio n a l sub jects  o f
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navigation, flood control, and pow er developm ent to deal with water supply 
and po llu tion  co n tro l, beach  e ro sio n , fish and w ildlife p re se rv a tio n , 
recreation, land management, mineral resources, and insect control. It did 
not propose specific projects and program s fo r au thorization , but was 
intended to serve as a guide for future planning by federal, state, and local 
agencies.5
“ The New England-New York report is an excellent example of what is 
needed to achieve comprehensive river basin planning,”  commented Bureau 
of the Budget Director Percival Brundage. “ The report provides the type of 
information which should be available for the m ajor river basins of the 
N ation.”  Action to this end had been urged as early as 1951 by a W ater 
Resources Planning Commission appointed by President Trum an and more 
recently by a Presidential Advisory Committee on W ater Resources Policy 
appointed by President Eisenhower. A bill for appropriate legislation was 
introduced in the House in 1959, and in 1961 a Senate Select Committee on 
National W ater R esources again recom m ended, and President Kennedy 
requested Congress to authorize, com prehensive, coordinated federal-state 
planning for the nation’s w ater resources.6 The sense of urgency for such 
planning was heightening, and in the next several years guidelines for 
planning were laid down, machinery for implementing the guidelines was 
established, and studies were got under way.
Policies to govern w ater resources planning were set forth in 1962 in Sen­
ate Document No. 97. Prepared under the direction of the W ater Resources 
Council, a group of appropriate cabinet secretaries acting at President Ken­
nedy’s request, the docum ent provided uniform standards and procedures 
for the formulation and evaluation of both comprehensive river basin and 
individual project plans. To achieve optimum use and developm ent of w ater 
and related land resources, emphasis was placed upon coordinating the ef­
forts and objectives of all planning agencies—federal, state, regional, and 
local.7
Delineation of policy was followed by the W ater Resources Planning Act 
of 1965, authorizing new key planning instrumentalities. Officially establish­
ing the W ater Resources Council and charging it with general oversight and 
coordination of all federal w ater resources programs and policies, the act 
also authorized the President to create river basin planning commissions to 
coordinate joint-agency planning within major w atersheds. It further pro­
vided for financial assistance to states in order to increase state participation 
in planning. At the request of the governors of the New England states and 
New York, the President established a New England River Basins Commis­
sion under the provisions of the act in Septem ber 1967. A partnership of the 
w ater resources agencies of the seven m em ber states, six interstate commis­
sions, and nine federal departm ents or agencies, the commission exercises 
jurisdiction over the whole of New England and over portions of New York 
State draining into Long Island Sound.8
Public concern over the quality of the total environm ent, rising to full 
force late in the 1960s, further shaped the objectives and methods of water 
resources planning. The National Environm ental Policy Act of 1969 dedi­
cated the federal government to preserving and improving the natural envi­
ronm ent and established in the executive office a Council on Environmental
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Quality whose duties include analyzing important environm ent conditions 
and trends, appraising federal programs having an impact on the environ­
ment, and recommending policies for carrying out the intentions of the act. 
The next year the President set up the Environmental Protection Agency, 
placing for the first time executive responsibility for enforcing environmental 
protection laws and for recommending additional legislation in a regulatory 
body devoted solely to that purpose.9 As an aspect of their broadly con­
ceived objectives, both agencies became major participants in w ater re­
sources planning.
Even before the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act, the 
Corps of Engineers had begun reorganizing its own planning structure to 
place greater emphasis on environmental considerations. In 1966 the Chief of 
Engineers, Lt. Gen. Frederick W. Cassidy, established a recreation and en­
vironmental branch within his office’s planning division and defined en­
vironmental quality as a “ primary goal” of the Corps. Cassidy’s successor, 
Lt. Gen. Frederick J. Clarke, making new environmental initiatives a major 
theme of his tenure as Chief of Engineers, created an Environmental Advi­
sory Board of outside experts to help define the C orps’ responsibility to the 
environment and restructured the Corps to em phasize planning, conserva­
tion, and resources m anagem ent.10
The first of the new comprehensive studies in New England—one of a 
series of similar planning efforts initiated throughout the nation— was au­
thorized in 1962 when the Senate Committee on Public W orks requested the 
Corps of Engineers to review reports on the Connecticut River with a view 
to formulating a multiple-objective plan of im provem ent for the 11,250- 
square-mile basin. In accordance with the developing emphasis upon joint- 
agency planning, the study was directed by a Connecticut River Basin Co­
ordinating Committee. Chaired by the New England Division Engineer, the 
committee represented six federal agencies, the states of Vermont, New 
Hampshire, M assachusetts and Connecticut, and, after Septem ber 1967, the 
New England River Basins Commission.
In wide-ranging investigations, team s from the various agencies examined 
the basin’s needs relating to flood control, navigation, power developm ent, 
and water supply. They investigated its requirem ents for w ater quality, fish 
and wildlife conservation, anadrom ous fisheries restoration, and outdoor 
recreation. They took under consideration upstream  water and related land 
resource potential, and identified some 850 archeological, historical, and 
natural resources sites that should be preserved from disturbance by future 
development within the basin. Since the study was more broadly conceived 
in terms of multiple-purpose programs and projects than any earlier survey, 
fresh investigative tools had to be devised. New evaluation techniques, new 
methods of cost and benefit allocations, and better ways to project future 
conditions and needs were all required. Planning work also included con­
tracting the research firm of Arthur D. Little Company of Cambridge to pre­
pare a projective economic study of New England through the year 2020.
The Connecticut River Basin Study Report, completed in 1970, analyzes 
in nine volumes the basin’s multiple w ater resources needs, recommends 
numerous structural projects and water management programs for initiation 
during the next ten to fifteen years, and identifies further studies and m eas­
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ures necessary to meet the basin’s requirem ents through the year 2020. Like 
the earlier New England-New York Interagency Committee report, its pur­
pose is not to provide a basis of authorization  for its various recom ­
mendations, but to constitute a guide for federal, state, local, and private 
development of the w atershed.11
The impulses motivating com prehensive river basin studies inevitably in­
spired even broader regional planning efforts. In 1965 the P resident’s W ater 
Resources Council designated the N orth Atlantic Region one of twenty in 
the United States for com prehensive study, and later in the year Congress in 
the Flood Control Act of 1965 directed the Corps of Engineers to prepare “ a 
framework plan for developing the w ater resources of the region.” The 
N orth Atlantic Regional W ater Resources Study, begun in 1966 and com ­
pleted in 1972, em braced all river basins draining into the Atlantic Ocean 
from the St. John River in northern Maine to the James River in southern 
Virginia—a 1,000-mile seaboard stretch that includes the Eastern chain of 
m etropolitan areas from Boston to Richmond and contains approximately 
one-quarter of the nation’s population. A Coordinating Committee represent­
ing some twenty-five federal, regional, and state agencies, chaired by the 
division engineer of the North Atlantic Division, guided all phases of investi­
gation and planning. The N orth Atlantic Division acted as the executive 
agent of the committee, and the New England Division assisted in planning 
relating to the New England states.
F o r planning pu rposes the N orth  A tlantic Region was divided into 
twenty-one hydrologically defined areas ranging from large river basins to 
small coastal drainages. And through a multiple-objective planning approach 
that considered alternative objectives, needs, devices, benefits, and costs, a 
fifty-year management program for the region’s water and related land re­
sources was developed. Municipal and industrial water supply, w ater quality 
maintenance, irrigation, rural w ater supply, navigation, hydroelectric power, 
power plant cooling water, recreation, fish and wildlife conservation, health, 
visual and cultural environm ent resources, flood control, drainage control, 
and erosion control all came under the study’s purview. The study report, 
consisting of a main report, two annexes, and twenty-two appendices, pro­
vides an extensive set of recom m endations for guiding appropriate agencies 
in establishing w ater developm ent programs involving both structural meas­
ures and managerial action. It establishes priorities for additional detailed 
river basin and project studies that need to be made, and it identifies sub­
jects and fields in which further research and study are necessary for better 
water resources m anagem ent.12
The congressional legislation authorizing the NAR Study also directed the 
Corps of Engineers to cooperate with other governmental agencies in prepar­
ing plans to meet long-range w ater needs in the northeastern United States. 
A severe drought then in its fifth year, which caused unprecedented water 
supply emergencies and restrictions in many localities along the northeastern 
seaboard, had brought to national attention the growing problem of assuring 
adequate supplies of w ater to the nation’s constantly expanding metropolitan 
centers. The resulting N ortheastern United States W ater Supply Study, cover­
ing approximately the same area as the NAR Study, includes all river basins 
draining into the Atlantic Ocean from Maine to Virginia, into Lake Ontario, and
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into the St. Lawrence River. Overall responsibility for planning was assigned to 
the North Atlantic Division.
The New England Division is participating in the effort, conducting spe­
cific studies within its area of jurisdiction. The first, completed in 1969, was 
an engineering feasibility study exploring various alternatives for meeting 
water demands through the year 2020 in heavily populated eastern M assa­
chusetts and Rhode Island. This was followed by studies on two projects to 
meet future w ater supply needs in eastern M assachusetts—the Northfield 
Mountain and the Millers River projects—which were recommended for au­
thorization and construction by the Board of Engineers for Rivers and H ar­
bors in March 1975. Both projects propose to employ skimming techniques 
to divert water during high flows from the Connecticut River Basin through 
acqueducts to the huge Quabbin Reservoir in the center of the state operated 
by the Metropolitan District Commission of the Commonwealth of M assa­
chusetts. Adding about 148 million gallons per day to the region’s water 
supply, they will help sixty-five communities to meet their water demands in 
the near future and will assist possibly sixty-six more cities and towns that 
may wish to join the MDC system after 1990.13
Although the Northfield M ountain and the Millers R iver projects will con­
tribute significantly  to  fu tu re  w a te r needs in e a s te rn  M assach u se tts , 
additional projects will be necessary. The Corps is therefore examining the 
potential of the Merrimack River as a supply source. Since the Merrimack is 
presently a grossly polluted stream, the first step was an examination of the 
feasibility of establishing w astew ater system s covering the en tire  5010 
square miles of the river basin. Authorized by Congress in April 1971 and 
completed by the following September, the study was directed by the North 
Atlantic Division in cooperation with other governmental agencies. The re­
sults showed that river restoration was possible and would produce benefi­
cial impacts.
The next year the Senate and House committees on public works au­
thorized a Merrimack W astewater M anagement Study of the M assachusetts 
portion of the basin. Carried out by the New England Division in coopera­
tion with the Environm ental Protection Agency and the Commonwealth of 
M assachusetts, the study was undertaken by the Corps as part of a pilot 
program addressed to the w ater pollution problem s of six m etropolitan areas 
across the nation. A fter considering a num ber of alternative w astew ater 
treatment schemes, the study team recommended in N ovem ber 1974 a plan 
employing both water- and land-oriented treatm ent facilities capable of pro­
cessing about 120 million gallons per day, the projected average daily flow of 
wastewater in 1990. Consisting of three secondary and six advanced treat­
ment facilities,* the system will meet the goal laid down by Congress in the 
Federal W ater Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 for the zero dis­
charge of pollutants by 1985. A com plem entary w astew ater management 
plan for the New Hampshire portion of the Merrimack Basin was completed 
in Novem ber 1973 by the New Hampshire W ater Supply and Pollution Con­
trol Com mission.14
*Primary treatment of wastewater removes solids; secondary treatment removes 
about ninety percent of organic matter; advanced treatment removes nutrients.
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The Committee resolutions authorizing the Merrimack W astewater Man­
agement Study also directed the Corps to undertake a joint study with the 
Commonwealth of M assachusetts to recommend improvements and alterna­
tives for w astew ater m anagem ent in the B oston m etropolitan  area. In 
N ovem ber 1972 the Corps and the Commonwealth reached an agreement 
under which a Boston H arbor-E astern  M assachusetts M etropolitan Area 
W astew ater M anagement Study would be conducted by a multi-agency Tech­
nical Subcommittee on Boston Harbor. Chaired by the M etropolitan District 
Commission, the subcommittee included the New England Division and sev­
eral other federal and state agencies involved in w ater pollution control. Its 
task was to provide guidelines for w astew ater management by the commis­
sion for the next eighty years. In pursuit of this objective the Corps contrib­
uted approxim ately 50 percent of the study effort, which initially included 
109 cities and towns within a thirty-mile radius of Boston. By the close of 
1975 the study was completed. The key recom m endations emerging from the 
final study report, dated M arch 1976, were to expand the service of the Met­
ropolitan Sewerage D istrict from its present forty-three com m unities to 
fifty-one; upgrade the present primary treatm ent plants at D eer and N ut is­
lands to provide secondary treatm ent and handle greater flows; construct 
two advanced treatm ent facilities; and construct or replace various pumping 
stations and interceptors that collect w astew ater from the sewers of the 
MSD m ember com m unities.15
In 1971 the New England Division joined multi-agency team s in two re­
gional studies conducted under the general direction of the New England 
River Basins Commission. Both studies, in the jargon by now in use, were 
“ level B” studies: broad and com prehensive surveys of an array of water 
and related land resources needs, problem s and solutions, designed to serve 
as planning tools and guides for the future development of their respective 
regions.
One study focused on Long Island Sound and the crowded lands enclosing 
it. From this effort evolved a Plan fo r  Long Island Sound, completed in July 
1975, which proposed numerous interim and long-range policies and pro­
grams for institution by federal, state, and local governments. U nder the 
plan appropriate agencies will guide future growth and developm ent around 
the sound, clean up its waters, open its shores to greatly increased recre­
ational use, improve fishing, protect natural areas, and reduce flood damage. 
They will increase ferry services, redevelop rundown urban waterfronts, re­
locate tank farms and non-water-dependent industries inland, and consoli­
date the existing eighteen petroleum  receiving and distribution facilities into 
five centers so as to reduce the likelihood of oil spills and free waterfronts 
for other uses. Totally the program s aim to improve the environmental qual­
ity and enhance the usefulness of the sound yet at the same time encourage 
the continuation of a healthy economy for the millions of people who live 
around it. In the implementation of the plan the Corps of Engineers will be 
especially involved in program s relating to m arine transportation, flood 
management, and shoreline preservation and im provem ent.16
The second study took a hard look at the southeastern corner of New 
England, where w ater and related land resources are under equally intense 
pressure. The study area, which includes most of eastern M assachusetts, all
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of Rhode Island, and a small bit of southeastern Connecticut, has a growing 
population that already numbers about five million people. Here nearly 50 
percent of New England’s population live on barely 7 percent of its lands. In 
the course of the Southeastern New England Study, completed in Decem ber 
1975, the New England Division investigated the region’s needs for flood 
protection, preservation of natural valley storage, shore erosion control, and 
navigation. It cooperated with other agencies in studies relating to water 
supply, w ater quality control, land use management, and coastal resources. 
It also compiled hydrologic and geologic basic data for the entire study. The 
study’s findings, presented in a regional report, ten planning area reports, 
and over a dozen special reports, bulge with recom m endations for both 
structural and non-structural measures to insure the balanced development 
and protection of the region’s resources. Like the plan for Long Island 
Sound, the reports include policies and programs for dealing with w ater sup­
ply, land use, water quality, outdoor recreation, marine resources, flood and 
erosion protection, and siting of key economic facilities. “ Southeastern New 
England is, to put it simply, a good place to live and w ork ,” stated the 
chairman of the New England River Basins Commission in submitting the 
study’s recom m endations. “ The resources management strategy offered in 
this report is designed to help keep it that w ay.” 17
The Southeastern New England Study fashioned a broad framework for 
assisting subsequent specific planning of greater depth and detail. The New 
England Division is now undertaking this type of planning for the drainage 
b asin s  o f th e  P aw catu ck  R iv er and  N a rra g a n se tt B ay , a c lu s te r  o f 
watersheds covering nearly half of the SEN E Study area, under guidelines 
laid down by the Corps for a recently established Urban Studies Program. 
Designed to cope in a coordinated way with one of the most compelling 
questions facing the nation, the Urban Studies Program seeks to develop 
plans that not only provide solutions for specific urban w ater resources prob­
lems, but also offer the potential to assist in the solution of other related 
urban problem s.18
The Pawcatuck River and Narragansett Bay Drainage Basins Study began 
with more limited goals. Following heavy flood damage in southern New 
England during a storm of March 1968, the Senate and House committees on 
public works adopted a series of resolutions requesting the Corps to review 
the advisability of improvements in the basins in the interests of flood con­
trol, navigation, w ater supply, w ater quality control, recreation, low flow 
augmentation, and other allied w ater uses. In keeping with the intent of 
these directives, the division initiated the study with primary emphasis upon 
solving the immediate flood problems of the area. The authorizing reso­
lutions, however, allowed for wider multiple-objective planning and thus 
could embrace the broad concepts and approaches to urban w ater resources 
planning that were later developed by Congress in the Federal W ater Pollu­
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972. A more com prehensive approach was 
also in accordance with the C orps' current philosophy on w ater resources 
planning. Therefore in February 1973 the Office of the Chief of Engineers 
directed the New England Division to reorient the PNB Study to an Urban S tudy.
Implementing this directive, the division has drafted a plan of study out­
lining the procedures, activities, and costs, the interagency coordination, and
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the public involvement that will govern the effort. U nder the overall direc­
tion of the New England Division, the Commonwealth of M assachusetts, the 
State of Rhode Island, and the various regional planning agencies within the 
study area will all contribute to the development of a resources management 
plan. This will be directed to problem s of inland flood control and flood plain 
management, w ater supply management, coastal area restoration and protec­
tion, and navigation. Conjunctive with the study, w astew ater management 
programs will be developed under the overall responsibility of the govern­
ments of M assachusetts and Rhode Island.19
The extensive search of recent years for solutions to water-related prob­
lems has involved the New England Division in still o ther regional studies. 
Because of increasing public concern over the costly financial and environ­
mental damages of shoreline erosion, Congress in 1968 directed the Corps to 
appraise shore erosion and shore protection needs of the nation’s coasts with 
a view to assisting all levels of government in developing shoreline erosion 
programs. Completed in 1971, the study developed general guidelines for 
shore protection by engineering techniques and for shore management by 
regulative procedures. It also compiled regional inventories for each of nine 
major drainage areas into which the nation was divided that assessed the 
nature and extent of erosion within the area, presented conceptual plans for 
remedial action, and made general estim ates of the costs of these protective 
measures. The inventory for the N orth Atlantic region, covering the ten 
coastal states from Maine to Virginia, was prepared by the N orth Atlantic 
Division. The New England Division cooperated in the effort by developing 
the data for the New England shoreline.20
Another problem of growing magnitude in recent years is how to accom ­
modate ships of rapidly increasing size in American ports and waters. Few 
U.S. ports have naturally deep water. Major harbors have been deepened to 
36 to 45+ feet by dredging, but supercarriers now more and more in use in 
world trade, especially in shipping crude oil, require 70 feet or more of 
water. In 1971 the Senate Committee on Public W orks requested the Corps 
to review reports on commercial navigation between Eastport, Maine, and 
Hampton Roads, Virginia, to determ ine the best way of providing facilities 
for very large bulk carriers. Major responsibility for the study was assigned 
to the Philadelphia District Engineer, acting under the direction of the N orth 
Atlantic Division Engineer. The New England Division carried out those 
aspects of the study relating to the New England coastline, examining ten 
potential deepw ater sites. The findings of the study, reported by the Board 
of Engineers for Rivers and H arbors in 1973, were that offshore deepw ater 
facilities are needed and are economically justifiable. They are also en­
vironmentally preferable to present methods of bringing in crude petroleum, 
where oil is either shipped in num erous small tankers or is transferred from 
large tankers into lighters without the use of fixed mooring structures. The 
study concluded, however, that there is presently no foreseeable need, nor 
precedent, for the federal government to undertake the major capital invest­
ments that would be required to bring deepw ater crude oil transshipm ent 
facilities into operation. Private o r non-federal public ow nership of the
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facilities would be compatible with the public interest if accomplished under 
effective federal and state or local regulation.21
The construction of navigation, flood control, and other civil works by the 
New England Division is a well-known activity. Its recent military construc­
tion program touched New England in about every corner. Its regulative and 
planning functions also bring it into contact with many interested groups. 
A nother a c tiv ity  o f the  d iv is io n , h o w ev er, seldom  com es to  public  
attention—except in time of crisis. W henever natural disaster strikes or 
threatens, the Corps responds to requests from state and local officials, and 
cooperates with the Federal D isaster Assistance Administration, to ward off 
destruction, keep essential facilities in operation, and repair damage.
Operation Noah—the largest disaster relief program in Corps history—is 
the most notable but by no means the only instance of the New England 
Division swinging into action. Since the passage of the Federal D isaster Act 
of 1950, the Corps has provided the principal engineering support to agencies 
administering federal assistance under that and subsequent legislation. In 
1955 Congress assigned various responsibilities for meeting flood emergen­
cies directly to the Corps. To keep in readiness, the Corps prepares Flood 
Emergency Manuals and from time to time conducts emergency practice 
exercises in cooperation with other governmental and private organizations. 
The New England Division has not been required to hold such exercises: it 
has sharpened its capabilities through actual experience. Between 1970 and 
1976, for example, the division responded to 407 requests for aid on ten 
occasions of flood destruction caused by ice jam s, coastal storms, rampaging 
rivers, or hurricane. Division personnel temporarily loaned to the division’s 
Emergency Operations Center completed 2,032 damage survey reports, pro­
vided state and local authorities with technical advice and assistance, and 
handled contracts for repairing or rebuilding hundreds of damaged structures 
and waterways. The total cost to the Federal D isaster Assistance Adminis­
tration was about $29 million.
Since prevention is better than cure, averting flood destruction by break­
ing up ice jam s and other measures has become a routine part of the di­
vision’s work. Occasionally, these activities have been quite extensive. In 
the winter of 1968-69 record snowfalls across the northern half of the nation 
posed the threat of major flooding when the spring thaw began. To cope with 
the danger, President Nixon called for a coordinated preventive effort by 
federal agencies, code-named “ Operation Foresight.” In emergency opera­
tions beginning the first of M arch and lasting into May, the New England 
Division supplied local and state  au thorities with technical assistance, 
sandbags, and pumps. It cleared stream s and culverts of obstructive debris, 
replaced undersized drains, and strengthened dams, dikes, and floodwalls. It 
constructed channel diversions, built tem porary dikes, protected bridges, 
and broke up ice jam s. All told it awarded sixty-one contracts and expended 
nearly $863,000. The damages prevented were estim ated at about $5 million. 
Two years later, in a second “ Operation Foresight”  lasting from February to 
June 1971, the division carried out sim ilar though less extensive flood 
emergency m easures.22
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“ Operation Foresight,” March-May 1969. Bulldozers working in the Saco River at 
Bartlett, New Hampshire, to clear the channel.
Restoration of seawall at Roughan's Point, Revere, Massachusetts, for the Federal 
Disaster Assistance Administration.
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Getting explosives ready to break up an ice jam on the Connecticut River at White 
River Junction, Vermont.
Expertise acquired in flood disaster work will do in o ther catastrophes as 
well, and in 1973 the New England Division played a major part in the first 
federally assisted operation to help a city recover from fire damages. In 
Chelsea, M assachusetts, a crowded suburb of Boston, a fire raging through 
the night of O ctober 14 wiped out eighteen city blocks containing five 
hundred houses and businesses. President N ixon im m ediately declared 
Chelsea a disaster area, and federal aid was extended through the Federal 
Disaster Assistance Administration. The administration turned to the New 
England Division, assigning it the task of clearing streets of debris and de­
molishing safety hazards. During the next two months, from October 15 to 
December 19, an emergency operations team of twenty-eight administrative 
and engineering specialists under the direction of Assistant Division En­
gineer Major John G. Benca awarded and supervised contracts amounting to 
$550,000 for razing unsafe structures, clearing away debris, repairing water 
and sewer lines, and protecting health through decontam ination measures. It 
was an “ outstanding jo b ,” congratulated the regional director of the Federal 
Disaster Assistance Administration. “ Hardly a day goes by that I do not 
hear laudatory comments on the speed with which the Corps of Engineers 
brought together the contractors’ organizations into an effective working 
unit; I also continue to hear comments on the efficiency with which the 
Corps directed the clean-up work so essential to the health, safety and well­
being of the citizens of C helsea.” 23
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Fire rubble in eighteen-city-block area in Chelsea. Massachusetts, is shown in this 
aerial photograph taken by a New England Division cameraman on October 15, 1973, 
the morning after the disaster.
The same area two months later, after the New England Division razed fire-gutted 
buildings, removed debris, eliminated health hazards, and made the area ready for 
redevelopment.
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An “ outstanding jo b ” would serve as a fitting citation for the entire his­
tory of military and civil work in New England by the Corps of Engineers. 
Many challenges have been met and numerous tasks well done since Colonel 
Gridley first marked out field fortifications for New England militiamen con­
fronting the British at Boston in 1775.
Weapons of war and the conduct of war underwent great transform ations 
in two hundred  y e a rs , and so did the c h a ra c te r  o f C o rp s  m ilitary  
construction in New England. From the American Revolution to World War 
II, seacoast fortifications were erected under a half-dozen successive harbor 
defense program s. F rom  sim ple ea rth en  red o u b ts  shielding prim itive 
m uzzle-loaders, defense stru c tu res evolved through the granite-w alled 
fortresses that still stand at New England harbors, to the thickly parapeted 
batteries of the Endicott period, to the even more massive casem ates of the 
Second World War. Even greater demands were placed on the competence 
of Army Engineers in New England when the Corps took over the gigantic 
military building program o f World War II and continued on to meet the 
much larger construction requirem ents of the Cold War. People who had 
been planning and supervising the dredging o f harbors, the building of 
breakwaters, or the erection o f flood control dams now unrolled blueprints 
for airfields, cantonm ents, missile facilities, research laboratories, and other 
military projects new to their experience.
While military construction took precedence during World W ar II and the 
early years of the Cold War, the civil work of the Corps has for more than a 
century been its larger mission. As the focus of civil work broadened from 
river and harbor im provem ent to include flood control, shore preservation, 
power developm ent, w ater supply, and every aspect of w ater resources 
management, the New England districts and later the New England Division 
responded with increasing technical know-how and engineering versatility. 
The New England Division today, a highly professional organization of mili­
tary and civilian specialists in many fields of engineering and management, is 
a far cry from the small district offices established a century ago.
Much has been accomplished, and much more remains to be done. On­
going planning for navigation im provem ent, flood control, and shoreline 
stabilization, for example, will continue to be necessary. Problems to which 
public and congressional concern have more recently directed the talents of 
the Corps, including flood plain management, water supply provision, and 
water quality control, still largely remain to be solved. But as the challenges 
of the past have been taken in their stride by Army Engineers in New Eng­
land, they will no doubt be met with the same ability in the future.

APPENDIX
1. Boston District Engineers
2. Providence District Engineers
3. Portland District Engineers
4. N ewport District Engineers
5. New London District Engineers
6. Portsm outh District Engineers
7. Eastport District Engineers
8. New England Division Engineers
9. Flood Control Projects
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Name of Officer From To
1. BO STO N DISTRICT ENG INEERS
Lt. Col. John G. Foster
Maj. Charles W. Raymond 
Lt. Col. George L. Gillespie 
Lt. Col. Samuel M. Mansfield 
Col. Charles R. Suter 
Col. William S. Stanton 
Lt. Col. Edward Burr 
Col. Frederic V. Abbot 
Col. John Millis 
Lt. Col. William E. Craighill 
Maj. Frederick B. Downing 
Col. Charles L. Potter 
Col. Francis R. Shunk 
Maj. Gilbert Van B. Wilkes 
Lt. Col. Wildurr Willing 
Maj. Stuart C. Godfrey 
Maj. Roger G. Powell 
Maj. Francis K. N ewcom er 
Col. Sherwood A. Cheney 
Lt. Col. Richard Park 
Lt. Col. John J. Kingman 
Lt. Col. Albert K. B. Lyman 
Maj. Leonard B. Gallagher 
Maj. William G. Van Allen 
Col. George W. Gillette 
Lt. Col. Bruce D. Rindlaub 
Lt. Col. Henry P. Dunbar 
Col. Hom er B. Pettit 
Col. Clifton T. Hunt
10 May 1867 25 May 1871
11 June 1874 24 Aug. 1874
18 Jan. 1883 4 Feb. 1886
5 Feb. 1886 20 Dec. 1888
21 Dec. 1888 31 Oct. 1898
1 Nov. 1898 31 May 1901
1 June 1901 16 June 1906
17 June 1906 24 May 1910
25 May 1910 13 June 1913
14 June 1913 14 Feb. 1914
15 Feb. 1914 27 Oct. 1916
28 Oct. 1916 22 Nov. 1916
23 Nov. 1916 31 Oct. 1917
1 Nov. 1917 19 Dec. 1919
20 Dec. 1919 9 June 1920
10 June 1920 20 Aug. 1923
21 Aug. 1923 26 Aug. 1925
27 Aug. 1925 12 Jan. 1926
13 Jan. 1926 5 May 1927
6 May 1927 26 Aug. 1932
27 Aug. 1932 15 Jan. 1934
16 Jan. 1934 31 July 1936
1 Aug. 1936 1 May 1940
2 May 1940 5 June 1942
6 June 1942 15 Oct. 1942
16 Oct. 1942 29 Apr. 1943
30 Apr. 1943 26 Nov. 1943
27 Nov. 1943 20 Sept. 1944
21 Sept. 1944 13 Aug. 1945
14 Aug. 1945 30 Sept. 1946
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2. PROVIDENCE DISTRICT ENGINEERS
Name of Officer From To
Maj. Thomas M. Robins 1 Jan. 1920 3 Jan. 1921
Maj. Virgil L. Peterson 4 Jan. 1921 22 July 1924
Maj. Roger G. Powell 23 July 1924 16 June 1926
Maj. Francis K. Newcomer 17 June 1926 26 Aug. 1926
Maj. Raymond F. Fowler 27 Aug. 1926 7 Nov. 1927
Col. Sherwood A. Cheney 8 Nov. 1927 12 July 1928
Maj. Frederick S. Skinner 13 July 1928 21 July 1930
Maj. Charles J. Taylor 22 July 1930 11 Sept. 1933
Lt. Col. John J. Kingman 12 Sept. 1933 30 June 1934
Maj. Mason J. Young 1 July 1934 5 July 1937
Lt. Col. John S. Bragdon 6 July 1937 10 May 1941
Lt. Col. Harley Latson 11 May 1941 29 Sept. 1941
Lt. Col. Leonard B. Gallagher (acting) 30 Sept. 1941 31 Oct. 1941
Col. Hoel S. Bishop, Jr. 1 Nov. 1941 28 May 1943
Lt. Col. Edgar W. Garbisch 29 May 1943 13 Jan. 1944
Lt. Col. Samuel G. N eff 14 Jan. 1944 22 May 1944
Lt. Col. George L. Cook (acting) 23 May 1944 5 June 1944
Col. W alter J. Truss 6 June 1944 6 May 1945
Col. Thomas F. Kern 7 May 1945 30 Sept. 1946
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3. PORTLAND DISTRICT ENGINEERS
Name of Officer From  To
Lt. Col. George Thom 
Col. Charles E. Blunt 
Lt. Col. Jared A. Smith 
Lt. Col. Peter C. Hains 
Lt. Col. David P. Heap 
Lt. Col. Andrew N. Damrell 
Maj. Richard L. Hoxie 
Maj. Solomon W. Roessler 
Lt. Col. William M. Black 
Capt. Curtis W. Otwell 
Lt. Henry C. Jew ett (acting) 
Maj. Edward Burr (acting) 
Lt. Col. George A. Zinn 
Lt. Col. William E. Craighill 
Maj. Francis A. Pope 
Col. Charles L. Potter 
Mr. H. W. Hobbs 
Mr. C. F. Porter 
Maj. Charles L. Hall 
Mr. H. W. Hobbs
8 Nov. 1866 16 Jan. 1883
17 Jan. 1883 28 Feb. 1886
1 Mar. 1886 3 Dec. 1891
4 Dec. 1891 5 Nov. 1894
6 Nov. 1894 19 Oct. 1895
20 Oct. 1895 27 Apr. 1897
28 Apr. 1897 15 Oct. 1898
16 Oct. 1898 2 Aug. 1904
3 Aug. 1904 12 Oct. 1906
13 Oct. 1906 24 Nov. 1906
25 Nov. 1906 15 Jan. 1907
16 Jan. 1907 18 May 1907
19 May 1907 15 Oct. 1910
16 Oct. 1910 6 Nov. 1914
7 Nov. 1941 22 Aug. 1917
23 Aug. 1917 14 Sept. 1917
15 Sept. 1917
30 Aug. 1919
31 Aug. 1919 1 Nov. 1919
2 Nov. 1919 8 June 1920
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Name of Officer From  To
4. NEW PO R T DISTRICT ENGINEERS
Maj. David C. Houston 
Lt. Col. Gouverneur K. W arren 
Maj. John W. Barlow 
Lt. Col. George H. Elliot 
Maj. William R. Livermore 
Capt. William H. Bixby 
Lt. William W. H arts (acting) 
Maj. Daniel W. Lockwood 
Lt. Robert P. Johnston (acting) 
Maj. George W. Goethals 
Capt. Cassius E. Gillette 
Lt. Col. Joseph H. Willard 
Maj. Harry Taylor (acting)
Lt. Col. James C. Sanford 
Col. Frederic V. Abbot 
Col. John Millis 
Col. William E. Craighill 
Capt. Frederick B. Downing 
Col. Charles L. Potter 
Col. Joseph H. Willard (retired) 
Col. Raymond A. W heeler 
Col. William P. Wooten 
Maj. Thomas M. Robins
21 July 1866 1 May 1870
2 May 1870 8 Aug. 1882
9 Aug. 1882 1 Nov. 1882
2 Nov. 1882 1 Apr. 1887
2 Apr. 1887 7 Dec. 1891
8 Dec. 1891 8 June 1895
9 June 1895 12 Sept. 1895
13 Sept. 1895 25 July 1900
26 July 1900 31 Aug. 1900
1 Sept. 1900 22 May 1903
23 May 1903 10 Dec. 1903
11 Dec. 1903 28 Feb. 1908
1 Mar. 1908 6 Oct. 1908
7 Oct. 1908 22 Apr. 1911
23 Apr. 1911 8 Aug. 1912
9 Aug. 1912 22 July 1916
23 July 1916 27 Oct. 1916
28 Oct. 1916 24 Nov. 1916
25 Nov. 1916 25 Apr. 1917
26 Apr. 1917 18 Aug. 1919
19 Aug. 1919 12 Sept. 1919
13 Sept. 1919 6 Oct. 1919
7 Oct. 1919 31 Dec. 1919
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Name of Officer From  To
5. NEW  LO ND O N DISTRICT ENGINEERS
Maj. John W. Barlow
Maj. Smith S. Leach
Lt. Col. Charles F. Powell
Capt. Gustave R. Lukesh (acting)
Lt. Col. Harry Taylor
Capt. Albert E. Waldron
Maj. George B. Pillsbury
Lt. Col. Charles H. M cKinstry
Maj. Harley B. Ferguson
Col. Solomon W. Roessler (retired)
Col. Charles P. Gross
Maj. Thomas M. Robins
1 July 1874 23 May 1883
5 Aug. 1896 7 Jan. 1902
8 Jan. 1902 8 Mar. 1906
9 Mar. 1906 19 Apr. 1906
20 Apr. 1906 13 May 1911
14 May 1911 1 Oct. 1912
2 Oct. 1912 22 Jan. 1916
23 Jan. 1916 21 Mar. 1917
29 Mar. 1917 15 June 1917
16 June 1917 20 Aug. 1919
21 Aug. 1919 15 Sept. 1919
16 Sept. 1919 31 Dec. 1919
6. PORTSMOUTH DISTRICT ENGINEERS
Name of Officer From  To
Maj. W alter L. Fisk 30 Sept. 1899 15 Dec. 1900
Capt. Harry Taylor 16 Dec. 1900 31 Aug. 1903
7. EASTPORT DISTRICT ENGINEERS
Name of Officer From  To
Lt. Col. Philip B. Fleming 20 May 1935 15 Aug. 1936
Capt. Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr. (acting) 17 Aug. 1936 31 Oct. 1936
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8. NEW ENGLAND DIVISION ENGINEERS
Name of Officer
Col. Leonard B. Gallagher
Col. Douglas L. Weart
Col. George W. Gillette
Brig. Gen. Jam es A. O ’Connor
Maj. Gen. William M. Hoge
Brig. Gen. Douglas L. Weart
Brig. Gen. Raymond G. Moses
Col. Jam es H. Stratton
Col. Bartley M. Harloe
Col. Henry J. W oodbury
Col. Leland H. Hewitt
Col. Richard W. Pearson
Brig. Gen. Robert K. Fleming, Jr.
Brig. Gen. Alden K. Sibley
Brig. Gen. Seymour A. Potter, Jr.
Brig. Gen. Peter H yzer
Brig. Gen. Robert R. Ploger
Col. Remi O. Renier
Col. Frank P. Bane
Col. John H. Mason
Col. John P. Chandler
From To
1 May 1942 6 Aug. 1942
7 Aug. 1942 9 Dec. 1942
10 Dec. 1942 4 Feb. 1945
8 Feb. 1945 6 Dec. 1945
13 Dec. 1945 10 Jan. 1946
2 : Feb. 1946 31 Oct. 1946
12 Nov. 1946 17 Nov. 1948
18 Nov. 1948 31 July 1949
24 Oct. 1949 31 Dec. 1949
24 July 1950 11 May 1952
24 July 1952 31 Mar. 1954
22 May 1954 14 Jan. 1955
15 Jan. 1955 7 Apr. 1957
8 Apr. 1957 9 Sept. 1960
17 Oct. 1960 30 Sept. 1962
1 Oct. 1962 25 Jan. 1965
30 Apr. 1965 31 Aug. 1965
12 Jan. 1966 29 Aug. 1968
25 Sept. 1968 31 July 1972
1 Aug. 1972 30 Aug. 1976
31 Aug. 1976
9. FLOOD CONTROL PROJECTS
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CONNECTICUT RIVER BASIN 
DAMS AND LAKES
FLOOD 
DRAINAGE CONTROL 
NAME RIVER AND STATE AREA STORAGE CONSTRUCTED
(sq. mi.) (ac. ft.)
Union Village Ompompanoosuc, Vt. 126 38,000 1947-50
No. Hartland O ttauquechee, Vt. 220 71,400 1958-61
No. Springfield Black, Vt. 158 50,600 1957-60
Ball Mountain W est, Vt. 172 54,600 1957-61
Townshend W est, Vt. 278 33,200 1958-61
Surry Mountain Ashuelot, N .H . 100 32,500 1939-42
Otter Brook Ashuelot (O tter Brook), 47 
N .H .
17,600 1956-58
Birch Hill Millers, Mass. 175 49,900 1940-42
Tully Millers (Tully), Mass. 50 22,000 1947-49
Barre Falls Chicopee (W are), Mass. 55 24,000 1956-58
Knightville Westfield, Mass. 164 49,000 1939-41
Littleville Westfield (Middle Br.), 52.3 
Mass.
23,000 1962-65
Conant Brook Chicopee (Conant Brook), 8 
Mass
3,740 1964-66
Colebrook River Farmington (W est Br.), 119 
Conn.
50,800 1965-69
Mad River Farmington (Mad), Conn. 18.2 9,510 1961-63
Sucker Brook Farmington (Still), Conn. 3.4 1,480 1966-70
A 
N
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CANADA
BALL MOUNTAIN LAKE 
TOWNS HE ND LAKE
KNIGHTYILLI DAM
UTTLEVILLE LAKE
■•■TIBtTOR.
HOLY O ft
c r ic o p e i 
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WIST SPRIRMWIR
COLE H O O K  " t i v E I
MAD RIVER DAM
w irstii 
SUCKER IROOK DAM
PAH RIVER (■•* (•■flaWl)
N«w
vltremfkii am 
••m m  n i in  iu in
NORTH HARTLAND LAKE
NORTH SPRINGFIELD LAKE 
CRARUSTOVH (■ •( € • ■ * ! • » • * )
RIRCN HILL DAM 
SARRRIR
BARRE FALLS DAM
• WIST WAIIEH 
'  THREE RIVERS
-T T rC O H A H T  RROOR d a m
» ip r i h c i i ( i i
L E G E N D  
•  RESERVOIRS 
M LOCAL PROTECTION P 
▲ IIIIM T III MULCT
L O N G  IS L A N D  S O U N D
CO N N E C TIC U T RIVER BASIN 
H a w  H a a p ih l r a ,  V a r a o a l ,  
M a i i a c h a ia t t i  A  C o a a a c tlc a t
SCftLE IN R ILES 
0 R II
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CONNECTICUT RIVER BASIN 
LOCAL PROTECTION WORKS
LOCATION RIVER CONSTRUCTED
Hartford, Vt. White 1970
Weston, Vt. West 1957
Keene, N .H . Ashuelot 1954
Gardner, Mass. Millers (Mahoney and 
Greenwood Brooks)
1964-65
Northampton, Mass. Connecticut and Mill 1939-41
Ware, Mass. Chicopee (Ware) 1958-59
West W arren, Mass. Chicopee (Quaboag) 1962-63
Holyoke and
Springdale, Mass. Connecticut 1938-40 1947-50
Three Rivers, Mass. Chicopee, Ware and Quaboag 1964-66
Chicopee Falls, Mass. Chicopee 1963-65
Chicopee, Mass. Connecticut and Chicopee 1936-41
Huntington, Mass. Westfield 1959
West Springfield and
Riverdale, Mass. Connecticut and Westfield 1936-53
Springfield, Mass. Connecticut and Mill 1937-48
Winsted, Conn. Farmington (Mad) 1951
Hartford, Conn. Connecticut and Park Rivers, 
Gully and Folly Brooks
1938-57
East Hartford, Conn. Connecticut and Hockanum 1938-43
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LINCOLN , /  y ^ . . ,  
LOCAL PROTECTION j  --------
FRANKLIN FALLS 
D AM
BLACKWATER
DAM
H O PKIN TO N - 
EVERETT LAKES
EDWARD 
MocDOWELL 
DAM
w  Peterbore 
J*ffre 3
W ILTO N 
LOCAL 
PROTECTION
S E E  N O R T H  N A S H U A  
R I VER B A S I N  M A P
MERRIMACK  
RIVER BASIN
N aw  H a a p ih lr a  t  
M o ss o c h a sa lls
SCALE IN  N ILE I 
4 1 4  1 1 ?
N O T E .
D e line a tio n  o f stream s on map Is  lim ite d  lo  only  
those having exist ing  project o r  c u rre n t study
MERRIMACK
RIVER
NEWBURYPORT
HARBOR
SA X O N V ILL l 
LOCAL PROTECTION 
(U a d a r D as iga )
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MERRIMACK RIVER BASIN 
DAMS AND LAKES
NAME RIVER AND STATE
DRAINAGE
AREA
(sq.mi.)
FLOOD
CONTROL
STORAGE
(ac.ft.)
CONSTRUCTED
Franklin Falls 
Edward MacDowell
Pemigewasset, N .H . 
Contoocook 
(Nubanusit Brook),
1,000 154,000 1939-43
Blackwater
N .H .
Contoocook
44 12,800 1948-50
Hopkinton-Everett
(Blackwater), N .H . 
Contoocook and
128 46,000 1940-41
Piscataquog, N .H. 490 157,300 1959-62
MERRIMACK RIVER BASIN 
LOCAL PROTECTION WORKS
LOCATION RIVER CONSTRUCTED
Lincoln, N .H . 
Nashua, N .H. 
Wilton, N .H . 
Lowell, Mass. 
Haverhill, Mass. 
Fitchburg, Mass.
E. Br. Pemigewasset 1960
M errimack and Nashua 1948
Stony Brook 1971
M errimack 1936-44
Merrimack and Little 1936-38
North Nashua 1936-38
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HALL MEADOW 
H O O K  DAM
EAST BRANCH DAM
T0RRIN6T0N 
LOCAL PROTECTION 
WEST BRANCH, 
NAUGATUCK RIVER
NORTHFIELD BROOK LAKE
BLACK kOCK LAKE
WATERBURY-WATERTOWN 
LOCAL PROTECTION
HOP BROOK LAKE
NAUGATUCK RIVER 
SUB-BASIN 
of the 
HOUSATONIC 
RIVER BASIN
: n i 2 a 4 «
SCALE IN NILES
_  TORRINGTON LOCAL PROTECTION
3:5 EAST BRANCH I  NAUGATUCK RIVER»!>
THOMASTON DAM
HANCOCK BROOK LAKE
RESERVOIRS 
LOCAL PROTECTION 
WORKS
N O T E :
A ll p r» |M ti c m p b t id  
• • I h i  i t k i r a l M  u t i l .
N O T E :
D t l in to t io n  o f  ll r g o m s  o n  m o o  it I/m H od  to m m /or t tr o o m  
or to t h o u  h o e in g  t  t i t l i n g  p ro jo c l o r  c u r r fA l  H ud*
ANSONIA DERBY 
nia LOCAL PROTECTION
DERBY LOCAL PROTECTION
( UNDIIW AT |
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HOUSATONIC RIVER BASIN 
DAMS AND LAKES
RIVER FLOOD
(All in Naugatuck DRAINAGE CONTROL 
NAME River sub-basin, AREA STORAGE CONSTRUCTED
Connecticut) (sq. mi.) (ac. ft.)
Hall Meadow Brook Hall Meadow Brook 17.2 8,620 1961-62
East Branch East Branch, Naugatuck 9.3 4,350 1963-64
Thomaston Naugatuck 97.0 42,000 1957-60
Northfield Brook Northfield Brook 5.7 2,430 1963-66
Black Rock Branch Brook 20.4 8,700 1966-70
Hancock Brook Hancock Brook 12.0 4,030 1963-66
Hop Brook Hop Brook 16.4 6,970 1965-68
HOUSATONIC RIVER BASIN 
LOCAL PROTECTION WORKS
LOCATION RIVER CONSTRUCTED
Torrington
Torrington
W aterbury-W atertown
Ansonia-Derby
Derby
East Branch, Naugatuck 1957-58
West Branch, Naugatuck 1959-60
Naugatuck 1960-61
Naugatuck 1968-73
Housatonic & Naugatuck 1970-73
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N O T E :  D e l in e a t io n  o f  s t r e a m s  on m ap  i t  l im i t e d  lo  m a jo r  t t r e a m t
( “  Y  UIMHELD
. I L.— y \  « a re
2 r  f j j ?; THAMt ItIVEft BA
HODGES VILLAGE DAM 
BUFFUMVILLE LAKE
WEST THOMPSON
MANSFIELD HOLLOW 
LAKE
L E G E N D  
■4 RESERVOIR 
^  CHANNEL IMPROVEMENT 
▲ NAVIG ATION  PROJECT 
—  HURRICANE RARRIER 
N O T E :
A ll p ro jtc tf (OHpl«t«d 
hrIb i i  o th t r w l i t  io t« d .
THAMES 
RIVER BASIN
Massacbasatts,
Rkoda Islaad I  Coaaacticat
NEW LONDON HARBOR
LONG ISLAND SOUND
SCALE IN  MILES
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THAMES RIVER BASIN 
DAMS AND LAKES
FLOOD 
DRAINAGE CONTROL 
NAME RIVER AND STATE AREA STORAGE CONSTRUCTED
(sq. mi.) (ac. ft.)
East Brimfield Quinebaug, Mass. 67.5 28,800 1958-60
Westville Quinebaug, Mass. 99.5 11,100 1960-62
Hodges Village French, Mass. 31.1 12,800 1958-59
Buffumville Little, Mass. 26.5 11,300 1956-58
Mansfield Hollow Natchaug, Conn. 159.0 52,000 1949-52
West Thompson Quinebaug, Conn. 173.5 25,600 1963-65
THAMES RIVER BASIN 
LOCAL PROTECTION WORKS
LOCATION RIVER CONSTRUCTED
Norwich, Conn. Shetucket 1947-49 1957-58
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BLACKSTONE RIVER BASIN 
DAMS AND LAKES
FLOOD 
DRAINAGE CONTROL 
NAME RIVER AND STATE AREA STORAGE CONSTRUCTED 
 (sq. mi.) (ac. ft.)___________
W est Hill W est, Mass. 28 12,400 1959-61
BLACKSTONE RIVER BASIN 
LOCAL PROTECTION WORKS
LOCATION RIVER CONSTRUCTED
W orcester 
(Diversion) Mass. 
W oonsocket, R.I. 
W oonsocket, Lower
Leesville Pond,
Middle, & Blackstone 1957-60
Blackstone 1959
Blackstone, Mill,
& Peters 1960-66
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CONNECTICUT WESTERN COASTAL AREA 
LOCAL PROTECTION WORKS
LOCATION RIVER CONSTRUCTED
Pemberwick Byram 1959-60
Norwalk Norwalk 1951
MASSACHUSETTS COASTAL AREA 
LOCAL PROTECTION WORKS
LOCATION RIVER CONSTRUCTED
Canton N eponset, E ast Branch
PISCATAQUA RIVER BASIN 
LOCAL PROTECTION WORKS
1962-63
LOCATION RIVER CONSTRUCTED
Farmington, N .H . Cocheco
MAINE EASTERN COASTAL AREA 
LOCAL PROTECTION WORKS
1956, 1961
LOCATION RIVER CONSTRUCTED
Cherryfield Narraguagus 
(Ice Dam)
1960-61
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S ton ing ton , C o n n ., 36 
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H E N R Y  A. W H IT C O M B
C h ie f ,  O p e r a t i o n s  D iv is io n  
M r. W hitcom b  jo in ed  the  C orps  o f  E ng in eers  in A pril 1919, fo llow ing A rm y  se rv ic e  in W orld  W ar I, as  a 
su rvey  m an in the  P ro v id en ce  D is tric t. A native  o f  N ew  L o n d o n , C o n n ec tic u t, he had  a tte n d e d  R hode Island  
S ta te  C o llege. W ork ing  his w ay  up in the  C orps  from  rod  m an  to  s u rv ey o r  and ju n io r  en g in eer, he w as nam ed 
C hie f o f  the  O p e ra tio n s  D iv ision  in  1946 w hen  the  P ro v id en c e  D is tric t w as co n so lid a te d  in to  the  N ew  England  
D ivision . H e rece iv ed  an  O u ts tan d in g  P erfo rm an c e  A w ard  in 1958. H e held m em b ersh ip  in sev e ra l en g in ee r­
ing so c ie tie s. H e d ied  in P ro v id en ce  O c to b e r  30, 1958.
R O B E R T  F. L A F R E N Z  
E x ecu tiv e  O ffice r
M r. L a fre n z  en te red  th e  C o rp s  o f  E n g in eers  in Ju ly  1926 a t  the  R ock  Island  D is tric t. H e cam e to  the  E a stp o rt 
D is tric t in  1935 to  w ork  on  the  P assa m aq u o d d y  T idal Pow er P ro jec t. Inc rea sin g ly  re sp o n s ib le  ass ig n m en ts  in 
th e  N ew  E ngland  D iv ision  in c lu d ed  F isca l O ffice r, F isca l A c c o u n tan t, and  C hief, M anagem en t B ranch . H e 
w as nam ed  E x e cu tiv e  A ss is ta n t, in  Ju n e  1953, and  in the  12 y ea rs  he held th e  position  he rece iv ed  seven  
a w a rd s  fo r o u ts ta n d in g  o r su sta in ed  su p e rio r p e rfo rm a n ce . H e se rv ed  on  a c tiv e  d u ty  w ith  the  A rm y E ng ineers  
fo r 3V i y e a rs  in W orld  W ar II and  a tta in ed  th e  ran k  o f  M ajor. H e re tired  in D ecem b er 1965 and p assed  aw ay  
in N e w to n , M a ssa c h u se tts , in Ju ly  1969.
N O R R IS  M. H U M P H R E Y  
R eservo ir M anager
M r. H u m p h re y ’s C o rps  o f  E n g in eers  se rv ic e  c o v e rs  40 y ea rs  beginning  M arch  28 , 1929, in  th e  H un ting ton  
D is tric t, and  con tin u in g  in the  R ock  Is lan d , Z an esv ille , and  P ittsb u rg h  D is tric ts . In  1938 he tra n sfe rre d  to  the 
P ro v id en ce  D is tric t. H e la te r  se rv ed  as  o p e ra to r  at S urry  M oun ta in  D am  and  in 1967 b ec am e th e  firs t R eser­
vo ir M anager fo r th e  M errim ack  R iver B asin . H e re tired  O c to b e r  31, 1969.
J O H N  E. A L L E N  
C h ie f ,  E n g i n e e r in g  D iv is io n  
M r. A llen , C h ie f, E n g ineering  D iv ision  from  1943 to  1955, jo in ed  th e  C orps  in K an sas  C ity  in 1934. H e 
tra n sfe rre d  to  the  E a s tp o rt D is tr ic t in 1935 and w orked  on the  P assa m aq u o d d y  T idal P ow er P ro jec t. H e cam e 
to  the  B o s to n  D is tric t in 1936. H e se rv ed  as  C hief, F lood C on tro l E ng ineering  S ubd iv is ion  and th e n  as Chief, 
E ng ineering  D iv ision . M any early  flood  co n tro l and  local p ro te c tio n  p ro je c ts  w ere  built u n d e r  his gu idance . 
H e w as in charge  o f  m ilitary  design  and  co n s tru c tio n  in W orld  W ar II. M r. A llen rece iv ed  a  B S C E  d eg ree  in 
1915 fro m  W o rc e s te r  P o ly tech n ic  In s titu te . H e  w as a  m em ber o f  th e  A m erican  S o c ie ty  o f  C iv il E n g in eers , the 
B osto n  S o c ie ty  o f  C ivil E n g in eers , and  th e  A m erican  C o n c re te  In s titu te . A h ighw ay a c c id e n t cau sed  his 
re tire m e n t in 1955 and  he p as sed  aw ay  in 1968.
H A R R Y  G . S H E A  
C h ie f ,  F o u n d a t i o n s  a n d  M a te r i a l s  B r a n c h  
M r. S hea , an  a lu m n u s o f  th e  U n iv e rs ity  o f  M aine , s ta rted  his c a re e r  w ith  the  C o rp s  o f  E ng in eers  as a borings 
in sp e c to r  a t  the  P a ssa m aq u o d d y  T idal P o w er P ro jec t in 1935. H e se rv ed  in W orld  W ar II w ith  the  U .S . A rm y 
as C h ie f, S u rv ey  P a rty , fo r  gaso lin e  p ipe line  lo c a tio n s  in  the  C h in a -B u rm a-In d ia  T h e a tre . M r. S hea  w as the 
rec ip ien t o f  a  S u sta in ed  S u p e rio r  P erfo rm an ce  aw ard  in 1959. A t the  tim e  o f  his d ea th  M ay 15, 1968, a t the 
age o f  58, he had  ac h iev ed  a  rep u ta tio n  fo r an  o u ts ta n d in g  fo u n d a tio n s  and m a te ria ls  eng ineer.
J O H N  E .  E K L U N D  
C h ie f ,  C o n s t r u c t i o n  D iv is io n  
M r. E k lu n d , a 1932 g rad u a te  o f  T u fts  U n iv e ris ty  w ith  a  B S C E  deg ree , jo in ed  the  C orps  o f  E n g in eers  in A pril 
o f  1936. H e saw  fo u r y ea rs  o f  ac tiv e  du ty  w ith  the  C orps  o f  E n g in eers  in  W orld  W ar II . M r. E k lund  w as 
nam ed  C h ie f, C o n s tru c tio n  D iv ision , in D ecem b er 1955. H e w as the  rec ip ien t o f  an  o u ts ta n d in g  p erfo rm an ce  
aw ard  in 1965. H e su p erv ised  c o n s tru c tio n  valued  a t  s e v e ra l h u n d red  m illion d o llars . H e w as ac tiv e  in  the 
S ocie ty  o f  A m erican  M ilitary  E n g in ee rs , B oston  C h ap te r. H e p assed  aw ay  sudden ly  Ju n e  14, 1968.
Z A V E N  M A L K A S I A N  
C hief, O pera tio n s D ivision 
M r. M alkasian  en te red  th e  C orps  o f  E n g in eers  as a  s u rv ey o r  in Ju n e  1936 fo llow ing re c e ip t o f  a  B S C E  degree 
from  N o r th e a s te rn  U n iv e rs ity . H e en te red  th e  A rm ed  S erv ic es  in 1942 and re tired  as  a M ajo r in 1946. R e tu rn ­
ing to  the  N ew  E ngland  D iv is ion , he held p ro g re ss iv e ly  re sp o n s ib le  ass ig n m en ts  lead ing  to  his ap p o in tm e n t as 
C hief, O p e ra tio n s  D iv ision  in D ecem b er 1958. H e  w as th e  rec ip ien t o f  th re e  aw ard s  fo r o u ts ta n d in g  p e rfo rm ­
ance  and  a  C ertif ic a te  o f  A ch ie v em en t. H e re tired  D ecem b er 28, 1966.
E D W A R D  D . C H A S E  
A s s i s t a n t  C h ie f ,  E n g i n e e r in g  D iv is io n  
M r C hase  w as serv ing  h is  34th y ea r o f  civ ilian  se rv ice  w ith  the  C o rp s  o f  E n g in eers  a t  th e  tim e o f  his sudden  
d ea th  Ja n u a ry  9 , 1970. H e b egan  as  a  ju n io r  civil en g in eer a t th e  P ro v id en c e  D is tric t in  1936 fo llow ing  g rad u a­
tion  from  W o rc e s te r  P o ly tech n ic  In s titu te  w ith  a  B S C E  deg ree . M r. C hase  w as C hief, M ilitary  B ran ch  w hen 
he w as nam ed  A ss is ta n t C h ief, E n g ineering  D ivision  in  S ep te m b er 1963. H e held key  p o s itio n s  in P lanning 
and  D esign and  w orked  on m ajor m ilitary  and civ il w o rk s  p ro je c ts .
JO H N  W M . L E S L IE
C h ie f ,  E n g i n e e r in g  D iv is io n  
M r. L eslie  jo in ed  th e  C o rp s  o f  E n g in e e r’s B o ston  D is tric t a s  a d redg ing  in sp e c to r  in  A ug u st 1936. H e served  
as  a  s tru c tu ra l and  p ro je c t eng in eer; as C h ief, D esign  and  M ilitary  b ran ch e s; and  a s  D ep u ty  C hief, E n g in eer­
ing D iv ision , p rio r to  being  nam ed  C h ie f in 1956. H is 41 y ea rs  o f  fed era l se rv ic e  in c luded  U . S . N av y  line 
o fficer du ty  in W orld W ar II. D uring  his te n u re  as  C h ie f. E ng ineering , the  D iv ision  acco m p lish ed  $1.5 billion 
in  m ilitary  and  civil w o rk s. H is civ ilian  A rm y H o n o rs  inc lude  the  A rm y ’s D eco ra tio n  fo r E x c ep tio n a l S erv ice . 
H e  w as nam ed  O u ts tan d in g  E n g in eer in 1976 b y  E n g ineering  S o c ie tie s  o f  N ew  E ngland . M r. L eslie  rece ived  
his B S C E  d eg ree  from  M assa c h u se tts  In s titu te  o f  T e chno logy  in 1932. H e re tired  D ecem b er 17, 1976.
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